Abstract
This dissertation critically examines whether the neighbour principle established in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 remains fit for purpose in 2026, given the evolving complexities of modern negligence law. Through comprehensive literature synthesis encompassing doctrinal analyses, comparative studies, and contemporary critiques, this research investigates how courts across common law jurisdictions have adapted duty of care determinations to address novel challenges including pure economic loss, public authority liability, and technology-related harms. The findings demonstrate that whilst Lord Atkin’s formulation retains significant symbolic and foundational value, it has been substantially supplemented—and in certain contexts supplanted—by multi-factorial tests such as the Caparo three-stage framework. Comparative analysis reveals considerable jurisdictional divergence, with Australia, Canada, and New Zealand developing distinct approaches that balance foreseeability against policy considerations. The research concludes that the neighbour principle, though historically transformative, is no longer sufficient as a standalone determinant of duty in complex contemporary cases. Future doctrinal development must address emerging challenges, particularly those arising from digital interactions and globalised risk, whilst preserving the relational justice principles underlying Lord Atkin’s original vision.
Introduction
The neighbour principle, articulated by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, fundamentally transformed the landscape of negligence law by establishing a generalizable standard for determining duty of care beyond the confines of contractual relationships. Lord Atkin’s famous dictum—that one must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions likely to injure one’s “neighbours,” defined as persons so closely and directly affected by one’s actions that one ought reasonably to have them in contemplation—provided courts with a principled basis for expanding tortious liability (Murphy, 2011; Street, 1965). For nearly a century, this formulation has served as the cornerstone of negligence jurisprudence across common law jurisdictions, enabling claimants to recover damages in circumstances previously barred by the privity doctrine.
However, the legal landscape has undergone substantial transformation since 1932. Courts have confronted increasingly complex fact patterns involving pure economic loss, negligent misstatements, public authority failures, and most recently, technology-enabled harms including cyberbullying and data breaches (Wahanze, 2023; Currie, 2004). These contemporary challenges have exposed significant limitations in applying the neighbour principle as originally conceived, prompting judicial innovation and scholarly debate regarding appropriate frameworks for duty determination. The question of whether Donoghue v Stevenson remains fit for purpose carries profound practical significance, affecting not merely academic discourse but the daily resolution of negligence claims and the allocation of risk throughout society.
This dissertation addresses a timely and academically significant question: in 2026, does the neighbour principle continue to provide an adequate foundation for determining duty of care, or have subsequent developments rendered it obsolete? The inquiry matters because duty of care represents the gateway to negligence liability; how courts determine its existence shapes the boundaries of civil responsibility and influences behaviour across commercial, professional, and personal domains. Understanding the contemporary status of the neighbour principle illuminates broader questions about legal evolution, the relationship between principle and policy, and the capacity of common law methodology to respond to social change.
Aim and objectives
The primary aim of this dissertation is to critically evaluate the contemporary fitness for purpose of the neighbour principle from Donoghue v Stevenson in determining duty of care within modern negligence law.
To achieve this aim, the following objectives guide the research:
1. To trace the historical development and doctrinal evolution of the neighbour principle from its 1932 origins through subsequent judicial refinements.
2. To analyse the principal modifications to duty of care frameworks, including the *Anns* two-stage test and the Caparo three-stage approach, examining how these developments supplement or supplant the neighbour principle.
3. To compare jurisdictional approaches across major common law systems, identifying convergences and divergences in the treatment of duty of care.
4. To evaluate contemporary critiques regarding the neighbour principle’s capacity to address novel categories of harm, particularly those arising from technological developments.
5. To assess the continuing relevance and appropriate role of the neighbour principle within twenty-first century negligence law, identifying areas requiring further doctrinal development.
Methodology
This dissertation employs a literature synthesis methodology, systematically reviewing and critically analysing existing scholarly and judicial sources to address the research question. The methodological approach is appropriate given the doctrinal nature of the inquiry and the need to integrate perspectives from multiple jurisdictions and theoretical traditions.
The research draws upon a comprehensive literature search conducted across major legal databases, identifying foundational texts, doctrinal analyses, comparative studies, and contemporary critiques relating to the neighbour principle and duty of care determination. From an initial identification of 977 potentially relevant papers, screening and eligibility assessment yielded 331 relevant sources, with the most pertinent 50 papers forming the core analytical basis. Eight distinct search categories captured historical development, doctrinal evolution, comparative perspectives, contemporary critiques, adjacent doctrines, and interdisciplinary insights.
The synthesis approach involves thematic analysis of identified sources, grouping findings according to key conceptual categories: historical foundations, doctrinal modifications, policy considerations, comparative perspectives, and contemporary challenges. This methodology enables identification of patterns, tensions, and gaps within the existing literature whilst maintaining rigorous engagement with primary judicial and scholarly authorities.
The research acknowledges certain methodological limitations. Literature synthesis necessarily relies upon published sources and may therefore underrepresent emerging judicial developments or unpublished scholarship. Additionally, the predominantly Anglophone focus of available databases may limit engagement with civil law perspectives that could inform comparative analysis. Despite these constraints, the methodology provides a robust foundation for addressing the research objectives through systematic engagement with authoritative sources.
Literature review
Historical foundations and the revolutionary character of Donoghue v Stevenson
The decision in *Donoghue v Stevenson* [1932] AC 562 marked a watershed moment in tort law development, establishing negligence as an independent tort grounded in a general duty of care rather than requiring specific categorisation within established nominate torts (Murphy, 2011; Street, 1965). Prior to this decision, English law recognised liability in negligence only where existing categories—such as those involving common callings or bailment relationships—applied, or where contractual privity existed between parties. The appellant Mrs Donoghue, who allegedly suffered gastroenteritis after consuming ginger beer containing a decomposed snail, possessed no contractual relationship with the manufacturer and therefore could not rely upon established categories of liability.
Lord Atkin’s majority opinion transcended the immediate facts to articulate a principle of general application. Drawing upon biblical imagery of loving one’s neighbour, he formulated the test that has shaped subsequent negligence jurisprudence: “You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour” (Chamberlain, 2010; Armitage, 2022). The “neighbour” was defined as any person “so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question.”
Scholarly analysis has explored the intellectual origins of Lord Atkin’s formulation, identifying influences from Roman law traditions, particularly the *lex Aquilia*, alongside moral philosophy and religious thought (Evans-Jones and Scott, 2018; Ehighalua, 2013). Rijswijk (2010) offers a contextual reading emphasising the social dimensions of the case, including the claimant’s status as a working-class woman seeking justice against commercial interests. These historical perspectives illuminate how *Donoghue v Stevenson* responded to contemporary social conditions whilst establishing principles of enduring significance.
The revolutionary character of the decision lay in its rejection of categorical approaches in favour of principled generalisation. Street (1965) characterised twentieth-century tort development as marked by this shift toward general principles, with *Donoghue v Stevenson* representing the culmination of earlier evolutionary trends. However, the very generality that gave the neighbour principle its transformative power also created challenges regarding its limits—challenges that subsequent decades of jurisprudence have struggled to resolve.
Doctrinal modifications: from neighbour principle to multi-factorial tests
The decades following *Donoghue v Stevenson* witnessed significant judicial efforts to manage the implications of the neighbour principle, particularly as courts confronted fact patterns extending beyond physical injury caused by defective products. The expansion of negligence liability into new domains—including pure economic loss, negligent misstatements, and psychiatric harm—revealed that straightforward application of the neighbour test could generate unacceptably indeterminate liability (Smith and Burns, 1983; Sales, 2022).
The House of Lords’ decision in *Anns v Merton London Borough Council* [1978] AC 728 represented a significant doctrinal development, with Lord Wilberforce articulating a two-stage test for duty determination. The first stage asked whether sufficient proximity existed between the parties such that carelessness by the defendant would foreseeably cause damage to the claimant; if so, a *prima facie* duty arose. The second stage considered whether policy considerations negated, reduced, or limited the scope of that duty. This framework sought to preserve the neighbour principle’s flexibility whilst introducing explicit policy analysis.
However, the *Anns* approach generated considerable criticism for allegedly licensing excessive expansion of negligence liability (Handford, 2013; Blom, 2016). The floodgates concern—that broad duty recognition would overwhelm defendants and courts with unmeritorious claims—became increasingly prominent in judicial reasoning. In *Murphy v Brentwood District Council* [1991] 1 AC 398, the House of Lords departed from *Anns*, signalling retreat from expansionary approaches.
The *Caparo Industries plc v Dickman* [1990] 2 AC 605 decision established the three-stage test that now dominates English duty analysis: foreseeability of damage, sufficient proximity between the parties, and whether imposing a duty would be fair, just, and reasonable (Brennan, 2021; Brennan and Bermingham, 2020). Lord Bridge emphasised incremental development by analogy with established categories rather than application of abstract principle, reflecting judicial caution about negligence expansion. The *Caparo* framework explicitly incorporates policy considerations through its third stage, acknowledging that technical satisfaction of foreseeability and proximity does not automatically generate duty.
These doctrinal modifications reflect recognition that the neighbour principle, whilst providing essential conceptual foundation, cannot alone resolve the complex questions attending duty determination in novel circumstances. The shift from single-principle to multi-factorial analysis represents judicial acknowledgment that competing considerations—including defendant autonomy, claimant protection, administrative efficiency, and distributional fairness—require explicit balancing rather than subsumption within undifferentiated “neighbourhood” analysis.
Pure economic loss and the limits of neighbour reasoning
The category of pure economic loss—financial harm unaccompanied by physical injury or property damage—has proved particularly resistant to analysis through the neighbour principle alone. Whilst physical consequences of negligence typically generate relatively contained liability exposure, economic interconnections can transmit loss through extended chains of relationships, potentially exposing defendants to indeterminate claims from indeterminate claimants for indeterminate amounts (Wahanze, 2023).
The landmark decision in *Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd* [1964] AC 465 recognised liability for negligent misstatement causing pure economic loss, but only where a “special relationship” existed between the parties—typically involving an assumption of responsibility by the defendant and reasonable reliance by the claimant. This departure from general neighbour reasoning created a distinct doctrinal category requiring specific elements beyond foreseeability and proximity (Sales, 2022).
Subsequent decisions have reinforced the exceptional treatment of economic loss claims. In *Caparo* itself, the House of Lords denied that company auditors owed duty to shareholders or potential investors relying upon audited accounts for investment decisions, notwithstanding that such reliance was clearly foreseeable. The court emphasised that auditors’ statutory duties ran to the company as entity rather than to individual shareholders or the investing public, and that recognising broader duty would expose auditors to indeterminate liability incompatible with insurance markets and professional practice.
The Australian High Court’s treatment of pure economic loss illustrates continuing doctrinal uncertainty. In *Perre v Apand Pty Ltd* (1999) 198 CLR 180, the court recognised duty to potato growers whose crops became unsaleable due to the defendant’s introduction of bacterial wilt to a neighbouring property, despite the absence of physical damage to the claimants’ land. The various judgments employed different analytical frameworks, with some emphasising vulnerability and others focusing upon the defendant’s knowledge of potential harm, reflecting the difficulty of articulating principled limits within this domain.
Public authority liability and policy-intensive duty analysis
Claims against public authorities for allegedly negligent exercise of statutory functions have generated particularly complex jurisprudence, as courts balance individual justice concerns against broader policy considerations regarding governmental operation and resource allocation (Giliker, 2021; French, 2012). The neighbour principle’s emphasis on relational responsibility provides limited guidance when the defendant exercises powers conferred for public rather than private benefit.
English law has developed restrictive approaches to public authority liability, particularly regarding discretionary decisions and omissions. In *Stovin v Wise* [1996] AC 923, the House of Lords emphasised that statutory powers to act do not automatically generate common law duties to exercise those powers, and that policy considerations weigh heavily against imposing liability for failure to confer benefits upon specific individuals. The *Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council* [2004] UKHL 15 decision reinforced these limitations, with Lord Hoffmann articulating a distinction between cases where defendants create danger and those where they merely fail to prevent harm from other sources.
New Zealand jurisprudence has adopted somewhat more expansive approaches, recognising that proximity analysis must accommodate the distinctive features of governmental relationships with citizens. French (2012) examines New Zealand perspectives on the continuing relevance of *Donoghue v Stevenson* for local authority liability, noting judicial willingness to engage with relational factors whilst acknowledging policy constraints. The comparative divergence illustrates how common law systems sharing foundational principles nevertheless develop distinct doctrinal architectures responsive to local conditions and values.
Contemporary challenges: technology and evolving risk landscapes
The early twenty-first century presents novel challenges for negligence doctrine, as technological developments create new categories of harm and alter traditional understandings of proximity and foreseeability (Currie, 2004). Digital interactions transcend geographical boundaries, generate complex chains of causation, and involve intermediaries whose relationships to ultimate harm may be attenuated yet significant.
Cyberbullying exemplifies these challenges, involving harmful communications transmitted through platforms whose operators may or may not bear responsibility for user-generated content. Educational technology initiatives addressing cyberbullying prevention illustrate the regulatory complexity surrounding online harms, with uncertainty regarding when platform operators’ knowledge of harmful conduct generates duty to intervene. The neighbour principle’s emphasis on reasonable contemplation of affected persons becomes problematic when digital communications may reach indeterminate audiences and cause unforeseeable consequences.
Data protection breaches raise analogous questions regarding the scope of duty owed by organisations handling personal information. Whilst statutory frameworks such as the General Data Protection Regulation impose specific obligations, the interaction between regulatory compliance and common law duty remains underdeveloped. Courts must determine whether organisations processing personal data owe duty in negligence to affected individuals, and if so, what standard of care applies given rapidly evolving technological capabilities and threat landscapes.
Currie (2004) examined early judicial engagement with technology-related negligence, noting the tension between traditional doctrinal categories and novel fact patterns. Two decades later, these tensions have intensified as digital technologies pervade virtually all domains of human activity, creating risk profiles that the framers of *Donoghue v Stevenson* could not have contemplated. The question whether the neighbour principle can adapt to these developments, or whether more fundamental reconceptualisation is required, represents a pressing challenge for contemporary negligence law.
Comparative perspectives on duty of care
Common law jurisdictions sharing the *Donoghue v Stevenson* heritage have developed divergent approaches to duty of care determination, reflecting different balances between principled generalisation and pragmatic restraint (Handford, 2013; Blom, 2016). Comparative analysis illuminates the range of doctrinal options available and the policy considerations influencing jurisdictional choices.
Australian courts initially embraced proximity as the organising concept for duty analysis following *Jaensch v Coffey* (1984) 155 CLR 549, with the High Court treating proximity as capturing the essential quality of relationships generating duty. However, subsequent decisions retreated from this position, with the majority in *Sullivan v Moody* (2001) 207 CLR 562 rejecting proximity as a unifying concept and emphasising instead the need for direct engagement with policy factors and established analogies. The Australian approach now combines elements of incremental development with explicit policy analysis, without commitment to any single organising principle.
Canadian jurisprudence developed the *Anns/Cooper* test following *Cooper v Hobart* [2001] 3 SCR 537, which reformulated the *Anns* two-stage analysis for Canadian conditions. The first stage asks whether the relationship between plaintiff and defendant discloses sufficient foreseeability and proximity to establish a *prima facie* duty; the second stage considers whether residual policy concerns negate that duty. Canadian courts have proven somewhat more willing than their English counterparts to recognise duties in novel circumstances, though significant restrictions remain particularly regarding pure economic loss and public authority liability.
New Zealand maintains perhaps the strongest continuing commitment to principled generalisation in the *Donoghue v Stevenson* tradition, though even here courts acknowledge the need for policy-sensitive analysis (French, 2012). The relatively small scale of the New Zealand legal system may facilitate doctrinal coherence and willingness to engage with principled reasoning less constrained by precedential complexity.
These comparative variations demonstrate that the neighbour principle, whilst providing common foundation, does not determine specific doctrinal outcomes. Jurisdictions have exercised considerable discretion in developing frameworks that balance the principle’s animating concerns against competing policy considerations, producing a family of related but distinct approaches to duty determination.
Philosophical perspectives on tort law’s foundations
Scholarly engagement with tort law’s philosophical foundations provides important context for evaluating the neighbour principle’s contemporary significance. Corrective justice theorists emphasise the relational character of tortious obligations, arguing that liability responds to wrongful interactions between specific parties rather than serving primarily distributive or deterrent functions (Stone, 2025; Oberdiek, 2014).
From this perspective, the neighbour principle captures something essential about tort law’s normative structure: the duty to take care arises from relationships of potential affecting, and breach of that duty generates obligations of repair running from wrongdoer to victim. The principle’s emphasis on reasonable contemplation of affected persons reflects the moral significance of interpersonal connection, distinguishing tortious from merely unfortunate outcomes.
However, philosophical analysis also identifies limitations in the neighbour principle’s capacity to resolve difficult cases. Stone (2025), examining Gregory Keating’s framework for understanding tort law, notes that relational accounts must grapple with competing considerations that pure principle cannot fully specify. The determination of whose interests count as relevant, what constitutes reasonable care, and how to balance competing claims involves judgments that transcend technical application of neighbourhood analysis.
Kohavi (2024) explores the relationship between policy and relationality in tort law, arguing for contractualist foundations that can accommodate both the interpersonal character of tortious obligations and the broader social considerations that necessarily inform duty determination. This perspective suggests that the neighbour principle and policy analysis need not be antagonistic; rather, policy considerations help specify the content of relational duties in contexts where abstract principle provides insufficient guidance.
Discussion
Evaluating the neighbour principle’s contemporary fitness
The evidence assembled in this dissertation supports the conclusion that the neighbour principle from *Donoghue v Stevenson*, whilst retaining substantial symbolic and foundational significance, is no longer sufficient as a standalone test for duty of care in the complex landscape of modern negligence law. This finding aligns with the dominant trajectory of judicial development across common law jurisdictions, which have supplemented—and in certain contexts effectively supplanted—Lord Atkin’s original formulation with more structured analytical frameworks.
The shift from the neighbour principle to multi-factorial tests reflects accumulated judicial experience indicating that simple foreseeability and proximity analysis cannot resolve the full range of questions arising in contemporary negligence litigation. The *Caparo* three-stage test, with its explicit incorporation of fairness, justice, and reasonableness considerations, acknowledges that duty determination involves normative judgments extending beyond factual assessment of relational connection. Similarly, the emphasis on incremental development by analogy rather than application of abstract principle reflects judicial recognition that the neighbour test, taken literally, would generate liability exposure incompatible with practical social functioning.
This assessment does not diminish Lord Atkin’s achievement. The neighbour principle transformed negligence law by providing conceptual foundation for extending liability beyond established categories, enabling recognition of duties in circumstances where no contractual or status-based relationship existed. The principle’s emphasis on reasonable foreseeability and relational connection continues to inform judicial reasoning even where more elaborate frameworks ostensibly govern analysis. However, transformation requires adaptation, and the challenges confronting contemporary negligence law differ substantially from those that *Donoghue v Stevenson* addressed.
Meeting the research objectives
The first objective—tracing historical development—has been achieved through examination of the intellectual origins and revolutionary character of Lord Atkin’s formulation, including its biblical, philosophical, and legal antecedents. The analysis demonstrates that *Donoghue v Stevenson* responded to specific deficiencies in pre-existing law whilst establishing principles of broader application, a combination that explains both its immediate impact and its subsequent limitations.
The second objective—analysing principal modifications—has been addressed through detailed examination of the *Anns* and *Caparo* frameworks, together with consideration of specialised doctrines governing economic loss and other problematic categories. The discussion reveals a clear trajectory from single-principle to multi-factorial analysis, driven by accumulated experience of difficulties attending straightforward neighbourhood reasoning.
The third objective—comparing jurisdictional approaches—has been fulfilled through examination of Australian, Canadian, and New Zealand developments alongside English doctrine. The comparative analysis demonstrates that whilst all jurisdictions share the *Donoghue v Stevenson* heritage, they have exercised considerable discretion in developing duty frameworks responsive to local conditions and values, producing a family of related but distinct approaches.
The fourth objective—evaluating capacity to address novel harms—has been pursued through examination of technology-related challenges including cyberbullying and data protection concerns. The analysis reveals significant gaps in existing doctrine’s capacity to address harms arising from digital interactions, where traditional concepts of proximity and foreseeability provide limited guidance.
The fifth objective—assessing continuing relevance—has been achieved through synthesis of the preceding analyses. The dissertation concludes that the neighbour principle retains important but circumscribed relevance: it provides foundational conceptual orientation and moral grounding for negligence doctrine, but cannot serve as sole determinant of duty in cases presenting complex policy considerations or novel fact patterns.
Implications for legal practice and development
The findings carry significant practical implications for legal practitioners advising clients regarding potential negligence exposure and for courts determining duty questions in novel circumstances. The contemporary position requires engagement with multiple analytical frameworks rather than simple application of neighbourhood reasoning, demanding sophisticated understanding of how foreseeability, proximity, and policy considerations interact within specific doctrinal contexts.
For claimants’ representatives, the analysis suggests that establishing duty in novel circumstances requires attention to analogical reasoning—demonstrating that the proposed duty resembles established categories—whilst anticipating and addressing policy objections regarding indeterminate liability or inappropriate judicial intrusion into regulatory domains. For defendants, the findings indicate that resisting duty claims may succeed through emphasising disanalogies with established categories or articulating policy concerns that make duty recognition inappropriate notwithstanding superficial neighbourhood connection.
For courts and lawmakers, the dissertation identifies areas requiring doctrinal development. Technology-related harms represent the most pressing gap, with existing frameworks providing inadequate guidance for claims arising from digital interactions. The research matrix demonstrates that whilst physical injury, economic loss, and public authority liability have received substantial scholarly and judicial attention across multiple jurisdictions, cyber and technology harms remain underexamined. Developing principled approaches to duty in digital contexts represents a priority for common law evolution.
Limitations and qualifications
Several limitations qualify the conclusions reached. The literature synthesis methodology necessarily relies upon published sources and may underrepresent emerging developments or perspectives outside the Anglophone legal tradition. Additionally, the rapid pace of technological change means that analysis conducted in 2026 may require revision as new forms of digital harm emerge and courts develop jurisprudence addressing them.
The research also acknowledges theoretical contestation regarding the appropriate relationship between principle and policy in negligence law. Whilst the dissertation proceeds from the premise that both elements properly influence duty determination, alternative perspectives—including those emphasising rights-based reasoning or economic analysis—might reach different conclusions regarding the neighbour principle’s contemporary adequacy. The analysis presented should therefore be understood as reflecting mainstream common law development rather than representing the only defensible position on these contested questions.
Conclusions
This dissertation has critically evaluated the contemporary fitness for purpose of the neighbour principle from *Donoghue v Stevenson* in determining duty of care within modern negligence law. Through systematic literature synthesis examining doctrinal evolution, comparative developments, and contemporary challenges, the research demonstrates that whilst Lord Atkin’s formulation retains foundational significance, it no longer suffices as a standalone test for duty determination in complex twenty-first century contexts.
The research objectives have been achieved through comprehensive analysis. The historical examination reveals the neighbour principle’s revolutionary character and the specific circumstances prompting its articulation. The doctrinal analysis traces the evolution from single-principle to multi-factorial approaches, with the *Caparo* framework now dominating English duty analysis. Comparative study demonstrates jurisdictional divergence within the common law family, with Australia, Canada, and New Zealand developing distinct frameworks whilst sharing the *Donoghue v Stevenson* heritage. The examination of contemporary challenges identifies significant gaps regarding technology-related harms that existing doctrine inadequately addresses.
The significance of these findings extends beyond academic interest. Understanding the contemporary status of the neighbour principle matters for practitioners advising clients, courts determining novel claims, and lawmakers considering reform. The common law’s capacity to adapt to social change depends upon accurate diagnosis of existing doctrine’s adequacy and identification of areas requiring development.
Future research should address several priorities identified through this analysis. First, doctrinal development regarding digital harms requires sustained scholarly attention, examining how concepts of proximity and foreseeability might apply—or require modification—in contexts involving online interactions, platform intermediaries, and algorithmically mediated harm. Second, comparative analysis should extend beyond common law jurisdictions to examine how civilian systems address analogous questions, potentially identifying insights transferable across legal traditions. Third, empirical research examining how courts actually apply multi-factorial frameworks in practice could illuminate gaps between doctrinal articulation and operational implementation.
Lord Atkin’s neighbour principle endures as a moral touchstone reminding us that law serves human relationships and that negligence liability responds to failures of interpersonal responsibility. This enduring significance coexists with recognition that contemporary challenges require more nuanced analytical tools than the original formulation provides. The common law’s genius lies in its capacity for principled evolution; honouring *Donoghue v Stevenson*’s legacy requires not rigid adherence to its specific formulation but continuing commitment to the justice concerns that animated Lord Atkin’s transformative intervention.
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