Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia and Kazakhstan have been seen to maintain a special relationship. How did this reputation emerge and how has their relationship changed over time? This paper seeks to address such questions and proceed as follows: First, it is necessary to establish a broad foreign policy concept of each state. The bilateral relationship between the two nations must be viewed within the context of their overarching goals and worldviews. Second, a brief look at relationship development under Yeltsin and Putin’s first term will be used to illustrate the early presence of common interests and Russia’s initial turn towards Eurasia. In particular focus will be an emphasis on the political and security relationship, which will carry through the remainder of the paper. Next, the period from 2005-2012 will serve as the starting point for real cooperation following key diplomatic and political changes, which will be mirrored the improved bilateral and multilateral security agreements. This time will highlight a convergence of foreign policy goals and shared ambitions between the two states, supporting the notion of a special relationship. However, turning to the period of 2012-2015 will reveal a shifting dynamic in the relationship between Kazakhstan and Russia due to the impact of the Ukraine crisis. Lastly, brief consideration will be made for contemporary and future issues surrounding the uncertainty resulting from this time.
Foreign
Policy Concept- Russia and Kazakhstan
The making of foreign policy is anything but constant, as it must remain flexible to reflect a state’s inner identity and react to wider changes in the global or regional system. Although the focus of this paper is on the development and shifting bilateral dynamics between Russia and Kazakhstan specifically, it is necessary to first establish a brief understanding of the general shape and broad interests and goals of both states to illustrate the environment in which they develop. Looking first to Russia, their initial post-Soviet foreign policy began even before the fall of the USSR with Gorbachev’s ‘New Thinking,’ that would eventually peak under Yeltsin.[1] Russia’s challenge during this period was deciding between their Soviet past and an assumed Western future.[2] This would be the issue that preoccupied most debate, surrounding both domestic and foreign policies, and divided elites into three distinct viewpoints: Statists, Westernists, and Civilizationists.[3] As expected, Westernists highlighted commonality with Europe and saw greater liberalization as the best path forward. Statists were concerned with maintaining and promoting Russia’s distinct identity, stressing the state’s social order and preoccupation on traditional concepts of power and security. Lastly, Civilizationists noted the Eurasianist elements in Russian identity, urging greater relations and priority in the post-Soviet space. Other authors developed somewhat similar categorizations, but recognized a Pragmatist faction that wished to remain more open to the East or West so long as it was beneficial.[4] Although simplified here, each branch saw fluctuations in preference during the 1990s among elites. However, the new century and the rise of Putin saw the implementation of a more overarching and ambitious goal: Russia’s return to great power status.[5] The Cold War era had seen Russia as a full member of the international community, they were strong and respected. Resurgence in desire for an empowered Russia that could secure itself as a ‘competitive pole’ in the world has been reflected in official Foreign Policy Concepts.[6] Prioritization of relations first and foremost with other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) members was seen as the most efficient means of achieving the goal of great-power balancing, as their primary geo-economic as well as security interests were concentrated here. Where once Russia saw its backyard, it now saw its future through ambitious region building.
Worth
considering briefly is looking at the specific influence of Putin himself on
Russia’s foreign policy. Although the ‘Great Man’ theory of politics and
history has fallen out of favor, and it is dangerous to view the man outside of
the conditions they develop, Putin’s influence and personal ambitions are
unarguably correlated with Russia’s foreign policy practices.[7] The Russian state, by
nature, places a vast amount of power in decision making in the Presidential
position, with Putin using the role to cause a drastic resurgence in Russian
nationalism. He based his initial vision on 19th century Russian
Foreign Minister Alexander Gorchakov, who incorporated a policy of domestic
strength to lessen the gap between state ambition and state capability in order
to foster a vison of a powerful Russia.[8] Putin saw a need for
geo-economic resurgence to manifest alongside geo-political, in order to
balance Russia’s foreign policy capacity alongside its desires. During his
transition to Prime Minister and the ascension of Medvedev to the Presidency
from 2008-2012, he yielded power but maintained his monopoly on authority.
Medvedev differed greatly from Putin in his conception of foreign policy,
falling more in line with the ‘Westernist’ school of thought by injecting
liberalism and facilitating positive movements towards the West.[9] Although difficult to
place, Putin was a Pragmatist who favored the post-Soviet space yet tolerated
cooperation with the West where necessary.[10] Regardless, these
differences were in the means, but both individuals shared a common,
traditional desire to obtain great power status championed first and most successfully
by Putin. These critical understandings of Russian foreign policy- both the
desire to become a great power and the reliance on projected strength and
domestic stability- inform all foreign policy decisions.
As we
will focus on bilateral relations, it is also important to give recognition to
the foreign policy goals of Kazakhstan. Borrowing from the same schools of
thought that were applied to Russian politics, Kazakhstan remains consistently
‘Pragmatist’ from the outset. Just a year after Soviet collapse in 1992, an
official strategy was published emphasizing the need for a multi-vector foreign
policy.[11] They would develop
soft-balance relationships with the East and West, ones that would be mutually
advantageous to both the state and the region. Not only would it ensure global
acknowledgement of Kazakh sovereignty and regional influence, but also provide
strategic and economic security through multilateralism.[12] Adoption of such a
strategy was hoped to limit their reliance on any one state, primarily Russia.[13] Additionally, the
consideration for ‘Great Man’ concepts could carry over in the form of Nursultan
Nazarbayev, the man in charge of Kazakhstan since 1989. The Kazakh Constitution
grants authority over domestic and foreign policy directions to the President,
and Nazarbayev’s continued hold on the position since 1990 has allowed him to
follow paths of personal interest.[14] It was Nazarbayev who
initially urged the pragmatic path through multi-vector policy, and this desire
has continued and manifested in his passion for participation in regional
multilateral organizations.[15] Kazakh foreign policy has
maintained the goals of autonomy and regional authority through
multi-vectorism, in no small part supported by the authoritarian hand of
Nazarbayev.
Early
Years and Initial Relationship
Having
established the broad ambitions and goals that built the political context and
framework, we will now turn to how specifically the bilateral relations began
within this context. From the outset of the Soviet collapse, Russia and
Kazakhstan developed an early ‘uneasy alliance.’[16] Need for internal
restructuring and infighting amongst elites left Russia disinterested with
Central Asian states outside of security issues.[17] In fact, with both
nations focused on state-building and identity formation, their official
bilateral relationship was relatively stable under Yeltsin. In 1995 Yeltsin
issued a decree insisting on revitalization of the post-Soviet space around
Russian interests, primarily motivated by security concerns.[18] 1992 had already seen an
early manifestation of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in
response to desires to maintain the mutual security of member states. Further on
6 July 1998, the two states forged a Declaration on Eternal Friendship and
Alliance.[19]
These diplomatic moves illustrate the expanding interest in the near abroad,
and Kazakhstan in particular, although these moves were primarily rhetoric
devices and had little correlation with increasing influence. Kazakhstan was
far more eager to engage in cooperative activity, with Nazarbayev personally
keen on advancing integration efforts beyond security. In 1994 at Chatham House
in London, Nazarbayev initially floated an idea for a Eurasian Union, an
alternative to the CIS that would incorporate economic considerations.[20] The CIS was more of a
symbolic institution in which to exchange dialogue rather than one of policy
action. Russian Foreign Minister Primakov was eager to see the return Russia’s
great power status and regional reassertion. However, the economy and political
will under Yeltsin were far too weak to support such aggressive advances.[21] Thus, the initial
post-break up situation can be likened to a civil divorce. The two remain
officially friendly for the benefit of the region, with Kazakhstan more eager
to remain friends and Russia focusing on finding itself.
Bilateral
relations between Kazakhstan and Russia became increasingly proactive under
Putin’s first term as he began pursuing his Eurasian vision. Three key
documents were published at various points during the year 2000: a new National
Security Concept, Military Doctrine, and an updated Foreign Policy Concept.[22] Each document highlighted
the need for greater multilateral cooperation, as well as stressed bilateral relations
between CIS members amidst a declining security environment. Terrorist threats emitting
from nearby post 9/11 Afghanistan and political upheavals in the Caucuses and
Central Asian states greatly upset the region. Initially, Russia tolerated and
Kazakhstan welcomed US military presence in the region, with agreements
allowing for presence of troops, air bases, and long term cooperation.[23] However, it was
understood that US aid would not go beyond addressing terrorism, and Russia
adopted a position as the best guarantor of national and regional security.[24] This understanding was
reflected in pointed bilateral action between Kazakhstan and Russia, such as
the February 2000 bilateral agreements between the Russian State Defense
Company Rosvooruzheniye and Kazakhstan’s Kazspetsexport that included
exportation of crucial weapons and equipment. The same agreement created a
joint task committee on Military and Technology Cooperation, which included
provisions to train Kazakh officers in Russia.[25] During this initial
period of instability, Russia and Kazakhstan found reassurance through mutual
cooperation.
Further, broad security
movements that were initialized under Yeltsin became formalized under Putin. Development
of the organizations provided a framework that encouraged bilateral action
between Kazakhstan and Russia, as well as promoted more wide ranging
integration opportunities. Initiated in part in 1992, the CSTO officially
formed in 2002 with the renewed goal of promoting regional security and
maintaining territorial sovereignty of its member states.[26] Additionally, the
Shanghai Cooperative Organization (SCO) was announced in 2001 by participant
states of the 1996 Shanghai Five- plus Uzbekistan- which saw a widening of
interests from border disputes and antiterrorism to further cooperation in
trade and energy.[27] Russia saw both
organizations as potential macro-regional platforms to assert itself as lead
security provider in counter-NATO style organizations, and Kazakhstan welcomed
closer relations with China and Russia as a reflection of their multi-vector
policy. Improvement the military and security relationships spawned further
integration even in the economic sphere. A free trade agreement had existed
between the “Troika” members- Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia- since 1994, but
further encouragement led to the establishment of the Eurasian Economic
Community in 2000.[28] It was very much seen as
the economic compliment to the CSTO and actively promoted true creation of a
common market. Although its actual effects were minimal, it was a politically
key reflection of growing Eurasianist sentiment and desire for closer
cooperation.[29]
Ultimately, the changing security situation during Putin’s first term allowed
for closer cooperation between Kazakhstan and Russia, and multilateral
integration provided frameworks for future bilateral cooperation.
2005-2012:
Intensified Cooperation
This
period was selected as the initial point of focus because 2005 saw a few key
political moves that opened up the relationship and allowed it to blossom; if
the early years tracked Russia’s shift towards Kazakhstan, this period saw illustrates
the open armed enthusiasm. Primary amongst these moves was the signing of a
border agreement on 18 January 2005 that officially demarcated the territory. Although
Kazakhstan had ratified agreements with China on her Eastern borders in 1994,
no official agreements or border limitations had occurred since the 1991 Soviet
collapse.[30]
It was a lingering point of contention, as Cossack groups in Russia claimed
connection to Northern territories in Kazakhstan and there were worries that
Russia would claim ownership or challenge the border.[31] Furthering of bilateral
relations were unlikely with the issue lingering. Thus, with the border secured
Kazakhstan, could lessen the militarization of the area and good faith was
augmented between the two nations. Second to the border agreement, although
still important, was a 2005 renewal of the initial 1998 Declaration on Eternal
Friendship and Alliance.[32] This act cemented the
dedication and official commitment towards friendship and future cooperation in
the name of stability and regional security for the mutual prosperity of both
states. The combination of these two agreements led to renewed diplomatic
interaction, illustrated by the number of annual meetings between Nazarbayev
and the Russian President increasing from an average of five per year to at
least ten.[33]
Progress in bilateral diplomacy saw great strides forward early in the period,
which would spillover and encourage additional fields.
The
solidification of diplomatic relations carried over prominently to the
military/security relationship between the two as well as direct bilateral
cooperation. Russia clearly remained Kazakhstan’s primary military ally during
this period, with dedications to increased cooperation in the technology and
military sectors.[34] Mutual membership in the
CSTO solidified their official goals of regional security, and justified their
focus on bilateral cooperation. In fact, participation in the CSTO sees overlap
with and encourages bilateral agreements, with over 60 signed between the two
regarding defense cooperation 2005 alone.[35] Prominent among these were
continued deals of weapons and complex system exchange needed for post-Soviet
modernization of military equipment. Outside of Chelyabinsk in September 2008,
Russia and Kazakhstan participated in the largest joint military exercise
between the two since the collapse of the Soviet Union.[36] It involved over 2000
military personnel and over 100 pieces of equipment, such as tanks and planes.
This incident is representative of the commitment to their bilateral
relationship and shared security interests, especially in the face of growing
regional unease surrounding China’s growing influence and expanding interests.[37] Lastly, security
cooperation was evident in space-related advances. A project group formed in
March 2006 that brought together Kazakh and Russian scientists and engineers
with the goal of cooperation and sharing technologies. This task forced
predicated the June 2006 launch of Kazakhstan’s first communications satellite, which relied
heavily on Russian specialists and engineers.[38] With mutual interests
solidified by membership in security organizations like the CSTO, Russia and
Kazakhstan developed greater cooperation in military and technology fields.
Further, political
advances furthered regional integration efforts during this time. Exempt from
this was true meaningful furthering of the CIS, which remained weak and
unreliable as between 1991-2008 the organization had drafted only 37 key
agreements and ratified only 3 of them.[39] Thus, alternative areas
of cooperation were sought out for greater integration. The CSTO had expanded
its scope beyond pure military security aims by addressing regional issues of
narcotics trafficking in the past, and 2008-2011 saw firm rededication to the
issue.[40] The SCO remained of minor
integration importance, as it lacked a consistent identity as either a security
or political or economic focused body, though it did encourage bilateral
coordination between states. It also did have some side ranging improvements,
such as the 2007 conducting of collective military exercises and also increased
interaction in energy and oil trade.[41] Perhaps the most notable
and politically strategic progress was in economic integration, ironic as
though it may sound. In 2006, Nazarbayev and Putin agreed to the creation of a
Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) that would support the development of market
economies and encourage trade.[42] In 2007, the members of
the EEC agreed on the desire to form a true customs union. This would be
realized on 1 January 2010 with the Eurasian Customs Union and further
solidified in the intended creation of a Single Economic Space (SES) in 2012.[43] It saw the removal of
internal border controls and the stabilization of both external and internal
tariffs.[44]
Although the integration process was slow, its continued development was a
reflection of Russian and Kazakh, as well as Belarussian, desires for
cooperation. Russia saw itself establishing a more firm foothold on the region
through economics, and Kazakhstan sought its continued Eurasianist goal.
Participation in the customs union actually proved unfavorable to Kazakhstan,
who saw an increase in its Russian trade deficit and rise in food price and
incursion by Russian companies.[45] However, the political will
and emphasis on bilateral/multi-lateral cooperation proved more important in
the foreign policy vision.
Though
the highlight of this period is the advancing of cooperation and focus on
mutual interest and benefit of dependence, there were still lingering tensions
between the two states. Perhaps most notable was Russia’s continued weariness
of US and European incursions in the CIS region. Whereas originally Putin
advocated improved relations with the West and cooperation with NATO in the
Central Asian War on terror, this pragmatic approach lessened early in his
second term. Presence of NATO bases were unsettling to both Russia and China.[46] Through the SCO, in 2005
a mutual declaration was put forth that called for a US exit timetable on its
troop and base withdrawal from Central Asia. However, the US refused to give in
to the demands, which highlighted the growing contentions surrounding Western
presence in the region by Russia. Kazakhstan maintained high levels of
cooperation with NATO and the US even after the incident, such as signing a
NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan in 2006 through which Kazakhstan
received antiterrorism and immigration support.[47] Kazakh multi-vectorism
supported close interaction with the West in pursuit of national security,
despite growing Russian disapproval. Of additional concern was Russian use of
the Baikonur Cosmodrome, a large space launch facility. An agreement was
ratified in June 2005 extending Russia’s lease on the space to 2050 with a
fixed rent price of $15 million a year.[48] Initially a success, the
agreement strained as Russia grew tired of needing Kazakh permission to launch
rockets. Russia began development of their own Vocstochny Cosmodrome facility
to avoid rent payments and the delaying of launches, with a Russian military
officer even saying “today’s allies could be tomorrow’s enemies.”[49] Both the possibility of
Russia breaking the lease agreement and the questionable statement would result
in heightened tensions and dampen the initial success of the agreement. Amidst
times of otherwise unparalleled cooperation, disagreements over the level of
involvement by the West and lingering bilateral disputes highlight potential
tensions between Russia and Kazakhstan.
Thus, during this period
the respective foreign policy programs of Russia and Kazakhstan supported their
advancing relationship. Shared regional security interests and Eurasianist
visions for the future prompted unmatched integration and bilateral cooperation.
Further, although a point of contention over time, the multi-vector nature of
Kazakhstan’s policy was generally tolerated by Russia so long as they retained
prime interest. Although not in perfect alignment, the Kazakh and Russian
relationship advanced from one of an uneasy alliance to enthusiastic, if still
unequal, cooperative partnership.
2013-2015:
Impact of Ukraine and Beyond
Russia’s
foreign policy goals of returning to great power status and region building did
not magically change on 1 January 2013. However, it was the year that saw
upheavals in the post-Soviet political system. NATO incursions into Eastern
Europe and the growing appeal of EU membership to Ukraine were interpreted as
poignant threats to Russia’s sphere of influence in the near abroad.[50] Following the return of
Putin to the Presidency in 2012 and the Euro-Maidan protests in 2013, Russian foreign policy has become
increasingly unpredictable and outright aggressive. They have asserted a
renewed obligation towards regional intervention and use of increased resources
to dissuade opposition.[51] In fact, in 2013 Russia
utilized three main areas of pressure to control or directly intervene in
Ukraine: use of military and localized presence through the Black Sea Fleet,
use of rhetoric to incite ethnic and political minority strife, and attempted
economic controls.[52] These reactions affected
not just Ukraine, but extended throughout the post-Soviet space as exemplified
by the mirroring of these actions in the relationship with Kazakhstan. Where
once Kazakhstan benefitted from Russian attention and cooperation, now they
experienced Russian efforts to undermine Kazakh interests to ensure loyalty.
Continuing
on from the previous period of intensified relations was official diplomatic
efforts to maintain this trend, despite simultaneous unofficial rhetoric that
prompted renewed fears. In 2013, Nazarbayev and Putin met in Yekaterinburg to
sign a Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Alliance in the 21st
Century which consisted of multi-sector bilateral agreements and an emphasis on
cooperation.[53]
Throughout the Ukrainian civil protests and subsequent referendum in 2014, formal
relations between Kazakhstan and Russia remained positive and supportive. In
2014, just a week before the referendum, Nazarbayev refused to condemn Russian
actions despite his personal stance against them.[54] Despite shock at the
boldness of Russia in Ukraine, maintaining official relations was the best
strategy to appease loyalists at home and avoid similar attention from Russia.
Regardless of Nazarbayev’s efforts to uphold the status quo, the situation was
jolted by Putin’s comments at the 2014 Seliger National Youth Forum, in which
he spoke on Kazakhstan’s lack of statehood prior to the fall of the Soviet
Union.[55] Such rhetoric seemingly
undermined the nation, portraying it as more of a politically demarcated state
rather than one with historic and ethnic legitimacy. Combining such an
implication with existing ethnic tensions in the North furthered fears that
Kazakhstan could be the next Ukraine.[56] Whereas the official
relationship maintained a cooperative element, namely due to Kazakhstan’s
willingness, unofficial actions revealed deeper instability.
Rising tensions were
present even in the military and security sphere, where the bilateral
relationship between the two had historically found its strongest foundation.
Officially the relationship remained strong, and the two still participated in
cooperative military actions. In 2013 Russia and Kazakhstan signed a new
Military cooperation agreement, which ratified processes of organizing joint
military supplies and maintained preferential cooperation in acquiring new
equipment.[57]
Additionally, the International Security Assistance Force spearheaded by NATO
withdrew from Afghanistan in 2014, prompting the CSTO to take over responsibility
for the region and conduct joint military exercises to test their capacity to
respond to local threats in the area.[58] However, by 2015 the
political tensions had seeped into military affairs. In October, Russia
announced the need for a CIS border force that would be deployed in Central
Asia in response to potential spillover from Afghanistan.[59] While officially in the
interests of regional security, the force also allowed Russia to increase its
number of troops and equipment in the region. Following their increased
militarization complicated the relationship by acting as a veiled threat of
their capacity to quickly intervene in any one of the surrounding areas should
the ‘need’ arise.[60] Although this move does
fall in with the desire for regional security, it simultaneously tightens the
Russian geopolitical grip on the region by discouraging dissent. Genuine and
bilateral cooperative action between Russia and Kazakhstan in the past was
based in mutual interests, however increased militarization following the
events in Ukraine reflect Russian political interests more than shared security
fears.
Continued
economic integration further represents an application of increased pressure by
Russia on the region. To some degree, all post-Soviet economic integration
efforts were extensions of Russian geopolitical ambition.[61] No exception to this was
the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which came into force on 1 January 2015 as
an evolved state of the ECU. Its official goal was the intensification of trade
and deeper integration between member states.[62] One key element of the
EEU was the redistribution of revenues from export duties on oil and gas,
meaning that member states had economic incentive to join the union and receive
gains from trade from Russia. This scheme was unprofitable for Russia, but
highlighted the superseding desire for integration and political influence.[63] Further, initial Russian
conception of the EEU saw a convergence of political, security, and economic
cooperation; a true union, similar to Nazarbayev’s previous vision.[64] However, such thorough
integration no longer served Kazakh interests, as well as others. Nazarbayev’s
initial conceptions for a union were based in desires for equal partnership and
security.[65]
Post-Ukraine Russia with its vigorous imperial tendencies was a threat to the
Kazakhstan’s regional presence; too close interaction would harm their regional
presence as opposed to help them. Russian desire and regional strength would
see that further integration did occurs, but Kazakhstan was able to leverage
itself in the Astana Treaty and limit the EEU to have only an economic role.[66] Thus, while Russia was
able to garner an increased geopolitical presence through the EEU, it was in
part limited by Kazakh interests. The EEU remains even more controversial as it
becomes increasingly economically disadvantageous for member states resulting
from Russian sanctions/counter-sanctions spillover and declining oil prices.[67] Such economic integration
ignores the common sense protest of members such as Kazakhstan, as the region endures
harmful economic conditions for the sake of Russia’s political ambition.
Throughout the
implementation of aggressive tactics and increased pressure, Kazakhstan and
Russian still have maintained the image of having a special relationship.
However, there has been a reflexive Kazakh response to Russian actions, manifesting through increased openness and
shows of resistance. Starting in 2014, Kazakhstan began to pursue more
independent foreign policy even in the face of Russian disapproval. Most notably,
during times of high tension between Russia, Ukraine, and Turkey, Kazakhstan
actively pursued diplomatic relations and economic deals with them.[68] Further, Putin’s comments
in 2014 about the longevity of the Kazakh state prompted swift backlash from
Nazarbayev. He announced a new national holiday celebrating 550 years of Kazakh
statehood, stemming back from the first Khanate in 1465, and called on Kazakh
patriotism to defend their sovereignty should the need ever arise.[69] Similar sentiments were
expressed in relation to the controversial EEU, with Nazarbayev committing to
leave the EEU should it impede on Kazakh sovereignty or independence.[70] On the surface these
appear to be meaningful deviations from the traditional alliance. However, they
are closer to symbolic demonstrations focused on building domestic nationalist
support rather than aimed attempts to challenge Russia. While rhetorically
powerful, the practical extent to which Kazakhstan can deviate from Russian
authority are minimal. Not only are they held in place by the post-Ukranian
coercion measures- militarization, ethnic tension, economic cooperation- but
also by two other key factors: lack of alternative regional authority and the
continued rule of Nazarbayev. Changes in either of these two conditions could
further upset the Kazakh-Russian relationship, and both remain highly
contentious.
Growing
influence of China in Central Asia is one such situation that could see a new
authority emerge. Historically, common fears of growing Chinese influence in
the Central Asian region have inspired bilateral action between Russia and
Kazakhstan. However, the increased neo-imperial actions of Russia since Ukraine
have seen a reversal of fears and a more openness towards cooperation with
China.[71] Even when fears were
high, some degree of cooperation did exist. The SCO was preempted and timed
with allowing US military into the region in 2001, signifying shared fears and
common emphasis on territorial sovereignty.[72] Additionally through the
SCO in 2012, China made available nearly $10 billion towards developing
infrastructure and energy projects to limit effects of the financial crisis on
Central Asia.[73]
Kazakhstan was a primary target due to its economic and political significance.
This initial desire to promote regional economies and develop transportation
infrastructure has been furthered with China’s decision to embark on the new
Belt and Road Initiative, which will see even greater surges of investment and
political cooperation with Kazakhstan.[74] However, speculation
remains about whether or not China has the political will to challenge Russia’s
hold on the region. While they have maintained economic and border security
interests, a further willingness to establish a firm geopolitical presence remains
in doubt.[75]
Regardless, Kazakhstan’s multi-vectored foreign policy appears to have only two
favored options- the economically declining but authoritative Russia, or the
potential rising star China.
Discussion
around Kazakhstan’s future must involve the key consideration of regime change
and its resulting impacts. Nazarbayev is in his seventies, and has had rumors
circulating about his declining state of health.[76] Kazakhstan has not
experienced presidential leadership beyond his authoritarian approach, and even
he acknowledges that the transition will be challenging both domestically and
internationally.[77]
These fears correlate directly to Kazakhstan’s relationship with Russia, as
Nazarbayev personally has been reliably pro-Russian. Amidst fears of a Kazakh
color revolution during the 2004-2005 presidential election, Putin extended
political support and helped Nazarbayev to stabilize the situation.[78] Further, the two have a
personal friendship. Thus, Nazarbayev’s resignation, or more likely death, will
raise significant concern regarding the allegiances of his successor and the
orientation of their foreign policy objectives.
This is even more prudent when acknowledging the growing advancement of
Kazakh nationalism, which could promote a President who is anti-Russian and
encourage Separatist action.[79] Such dramatic shifts in
personal politics
As the situation stands, the influence of China and
unpredictable future of Kazakh politics must be taken into account as the
greatest two future influneces on the post-Ukraninan relationship.
Conclusion
Relationships between
sovereign states are rarely stable as they experience shifts relating to
changing foreign policy goals. After an initial turbulent post-Soviet period,
Russian foreign policy goals have strayed very little from their renewed
interest in region building in Central Asia to achieve great-power status.
Similarly, Kazakhstan’s foreign policy has remained consistently open to
multi-vector relationships to promote Kazakh sovereignty. Mutual interests
between the two encouraged Russia’s shift towards Central Asia. The following
period saw increased political and security related bilateral actions, which
further developed and maintained a cooperative relationship built on coinciding
objectives. However, Russian fears of Western incursion and tightening grip on
its post-Soviet sphere of influence highlighted digressions between Kazakh and
Russian interests. Russian actions towards Kazakhstan mirrored their actions
towards Ukraine and forced Kazakhstan to act out in show of their commitment to
maintaining independence while still relying on Russian support.
Unpredictability of Chinese engagement or post-Nazarbayev policy shifts
illustrate the potential for even further divergence of interests. Further
research focusing on domestic situations, competing identities between the two
nations, or more economic based approaches could further benefit an
all-encompassing view of the shifting relationship dynamics. Although the
official relationship between Kazakhstan and Russian remains stable and
friendly, with an emphasis on mutual interests, unofficial tension and future
unpredictability reflect the image of a dog on a leash- progressing forward
with little alternative choice.
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[1] Michael Mandelbaum, The New
Russian Foreign Policy (New York: Council on Foreign Relation Books, 1998),
4-6.
[2] Ted Hopf, Social
Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies,
Moscow, 1955 and 1999 (New York: Cornell University Press, 2002), 155.
[3] Andrei Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity
(London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2013), 4-8.
[4] Margot Light, “Foreign Policy Thinking” in Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Peter Duncan, “Westernism, Eurasianism
and Pragmatism: The Foreign Policy of the post-Soviet States 1991-2001” in The Legacy of the Soviet Union (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 231.
[5] Eugene Rumer, “Russian Foreign Policy Beyond Putin.” In Adelphi Paper Series (2007), 7.
[6] Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation” (28 June
2000); Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Concept of the Foreign Policy of
the Russian Federation” (12 February 2013).
[7] Samuel Charap and Jeremy Shapiro, “A New European Security Order:
The Ukraine Crisis and the Missing Post-Cold War Bargain” Foundation for Strategy Research n15 (2014), 2.
[8] Lena Jonson, Vladimir Putin
and Central Asia: The Shaping of Russian Foreign Policy (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2004), 7.
[9] Valerie Pacer, Russian
Foreign Policy Under Dmitry Medvedev, 2008-2012 (New York: Routledge,
2016), 7.
[10] Ibid., 6
[11] Michael Clarke, “Kazakhstan’s Multi-vector Foreign
Policy: Diminishing Returns in an Era of Great Power ‘Pivots’?” The ASAN Forum (2015).
[12] Stephen Walt, Taming American
Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York: W.W. Norton and
Company, 2005), 126.
[13] Clarke, “Kazakhstan’s Multi-vector Policy,” 2015.
[14] Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan, “The Constitution of the
Republic of Kazakhstan” (30 August 1995).
[15] Sally Cummings, “Eurasian Bridge or Murky Waters between East and
West? Ideas, Identity and Output in Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy” Journal of Communist and Transition Politics
(2003), 139.
[16] Mikhail Alexandrov, Uneasy
Alliance: Relations Between Russia and Kazakhstan in the post-Soviet Era,
1992-1997, (London: Greenwood Press, 1999).
[17] Yelena Zabortseva, “Transformation of Russia-Kazakhstan post-Soviet
Political Relations: From Chaos to Integration?” Two Decades Without the Soviet Union: Transformations in Eurasian
Space (Canberra: Australian National University, 2011), 7.
[18] 1995 Decree President Russian Fed
[19] Embassy of the Russian Federation to the Republic of Kazakhstan, “Russia-Kazakhstan”
2016.
[20] Yelena Zabortseva, Russia’s
Relations with Kazakhstan: Rethinking ex-Soviet Transitions in the Emerging
World System, (New York: Routledge, 2016), 75.
[21] Jonson, Vladimir Putin and
Central Asia), 6.
[22] Zabortseva, Russia’s
Relations with Kazakhstan, 105.
[23] Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign
Policy, 137.
[24] Cummings, “Eurasian Bridge or Murky Waters,” 152.
[25] Rosoboronexport,
“Cooperation with Kazakhstan,” http://roe.ru/eng/export/kazakhstan/.
[26] Roy Allison, “Regionalism, Reginal Structures, and Security
Management in Central Asia.” International
Affairs (2004), 471.
[27] Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign
Policy, 158-159.
[28] Evgeny Vinokurov, “Eurasian Economic Union: Current State and
Preliminary Results,” Russian Journal of
Economics (2017), 56.
[29] Clarke, “Kazakhstan’s Multi-Vector Foreign Policy.”
[30] Ayagan Burkitbai, “Defining the New State Borders in 1990-2005 as
Key Foundation of Statehood,” Astana
Times (12 May 2014).
[31] Alec Rasizade, “A Propos of the Georgian War: Reflections on
Russia’s Revanchism in its Near Abroad.” Journal
of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies (2009), 22.
[32]Zabortseva, Russia’s Relations
with Kazakhstan, 125.
[33] Ibid., 127.
[34] Murat Laumulin and Mukhtar Shaken, “Kazakhstan and Russia:
Relations as Part of Russia’s Foreign Policy Strategy,” Central Asia and the Caucuses (2008), 120.
[35] Richard Rousseau, “Kazakhstan’s Strategic and Military Relations
with Russia,” Diplomatic Courier (20
July 2011).
[36] Sebastien Peyrouse, “Security Sector Reform in Kazakhstan.” In Security Sector Reform in Central Asia:
Exploring Needs and Possibilities, (Groningen: Centre of European Security
Studies, 2010), 20.
[37] Clarke, “Kazakhstan’s Multi-Vector Foreign Policy.”
[38] Laumulin and Shaken, “Kazakhstan and Russia,” 120.
[39] Viachaslau Yarashevich, “Post-Communist Economic Integration:
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia.” Journal
of Economic Integration (2014), 598.
[40] Rousseau, “Kazakhstan’s Strategic and Military Relations.”
[41] Laumulin and Shaken, “Kazakhstan and Russia,” 121.
[42] Vinokurov, “Eurasian Economic Union,” 57.
[43] Rilka Dragneva and Kataryna Wolczuk, “The Eurasian Economic Union:
Deals, Rules, and the Exercise of Power.” Chatham
House Research Paper (London: Chatham House, 2017), 4.
[44] Yarashevich, “Post-Communist Economic Integration,” 585.
[45] Zabortseva, Russia’s
Relations with Kazakhstan, 139.
[46] Mohammed Ahrari, The Great
Powers Versus the Hegemon, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 137.
[47] Rousseau, “Kazakhstan’s Strategic and Military Relations.”
[48] Robert Donaldson, Joseph Nogee, and Vidya Nadkarni, The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing
Systems, Enduring Interests (2014), 212.
[49] Ibid., 213.
[50] Charap and Shapiro, “A New European Security Order.”
[51] Licinia Simao, “The Ukrainian Conflict in Russian Foreign Policy:
Rethinking the Interconnections Between Domestic and Foreign Policy
Strategies,” Small Wars and Insurgencies
(2016), 493.
[52] Ibid., 500-502.
[53] Rufiya Ospanova, “Nazarbayev, Putin sign Treaty of Good
Neighborliness and Alliance in 21st Century,” The Astana Times (12 November 2013).
[54] Zabortseva, Russia’s
Relations with Kazakhstan, 159.
[55] Casey Michel, “Putin’s Chilling Comments,” The Diplomat (3 September 2014).
[56] Ibid.
[57] Zabortseva, Russia’s
Relations with Kazakhstan, 163.
[58] Patrick Nopens, “The Impact of the Withdrawl from Afghanistan on
Russia’s Security,” Egmont Security
Policy Brief (2014).
[59] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Putin Says CIS States Could
Create Border Force for Crises,” (16 October 2015).
[60] Richard Weitz, “Russia, China, and Central Asia: Time for a
Decision,” The ASAN Forum (23
December 2015).
[61] Yarashevich, “Post-Communist Economic Integration,” 586.
[62] Vladimer Papava, “A Eurasian or a European Future for Post-Soviet
Georgia’s Economic Development: Which is Better?” Archives of Business Research (2017), 162.
[63] Ibid., 162.
[64] Dragneva and Wolczuk, “The Eurasian Economic Union,” 4.
[65] Lyaiya Nurgaliyeva, “Kazakhstan’s Economic Soft Balancing Policy
vis-à-vis Russia: From the Eurasian Union to the Economic Cooperation with
Turkey,” Journal of Eurasian Studies
(2016), 95.
[66] Dragneva and Wolczuk, “The Eurasian Economic Union,” 7.
[67] Papava, “Eurasian or European Future,” 163.
[68] Nurgaliyeva, “Kazakhstan’s Economic Soft Balancing,” 101.
[69] Joanna Lillis, “Kazakhstan Celebrates Statehood in Riposte to
Russia,” Eurasianet (2 January 2015).
[70] Zabortseva, Russia’s
Relations with Kazakhstan, 163.
[71] Cummings, “Eurasian Bridge or Murky Waters,” 146.
[72] Ahrari, The Great Powers,
137.
[73] Olga Dzyubenko, “China to Expand C. Asian Presence with $10 Billion
in Loans,” Reuters (5 December 2012).
[74] Weitz, “Russia, China, and Central Asia.”
[75] Clarke, “Kazakhstan’s Multi-Vector Foreign Policy.”
[76] Thomas Ambrosio, “Leadership Succession in Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan: Regime Survival after Nazarbayev and Karimov,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies (2015), 55.
[77] Sergei Shenin, “The Transfer of Power in Central Asia and Threats
to Regional Stability,” Partnership for
Peace Consortium on Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes
(2014), 143.
[78] Donaldson, Nogee, and Nadkarni, Foreign
Policy of Russia, 212.
[79] Shenin, “Transfer of Power,” 146.
