Abstract
Before the people of Britain voted to leave the EU, UK
and other members of the EU collaborate through common policies in dealing with
international issues or in forming relationship with the rest of the world. By
leaving the EU after 43 years of involvement, there is likely to be an economic
consequence for Britain and international development. This essay links the
possible changes that may occur in Britain affairs post-Brexit linked with the
possible impact on developing countries and international development in terms
of trade, Oversea Development Assistance, remittance and migration.
INTRODUCTION
Brexit is an issue of great concern for developing countries and international development. It will have major implication for developing countries (Mendez-Parra, Papadavid and Willem Te Velde, 2016). The impact could come through different pathways such as international trade, Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), migration and remittances. Yet Brexit may offer a “silver lining” precisely because new trade agreement will need to be negotiated, which provides developing countries with an opportunity to restructure and improve their trade relations with UK (Jones, 2016). International development experts worries that Britain’s exit from European Union (EU) may result in a lower UK aid in sterling and dollars, because a lower Gross National Income (GNI) will result in a lower budget deficit (Gavas, 2016). Despite reports that the UK government has drawn up plans aimed at restricting immigration, Mendez-Parra et al., suggest that migration might actually increase on the basis that lower migration into the UK will mean less UK growth which will affect development negatively. While there are many articles presenting that Brexit will reduce the value of remittance that migrant send home due to a fall in the value of pound, there are evidence (Yang, 2006) that suggest migrants sending money back to their household in developing countries may work extra hours to counter the exchange rate shocks.
Brexit may create opportunities and challenges for
developing countries, but It is uncertain the kind of economic or international
arrangement that Britain may have with developing countries after leaving the EU.
Such relationship may depend on how international policies are conducted and
the growth of Britain economy post-Brexit
CONCEPT OF TRADE WITH DEVELOPING STATES
Granting of trade preference by industrialised
countries to developing countries has been a common practice since the early
1970s. The trade preferences involve the removal or reduction of trade
regulations such as tariff and quotas and is enshrined in the international trade
law of World Trade Organisation (WTO). For example, the EU offers Everything
but Arms (EBA) initiative with ‘Zero’ tariff for Least Developed Countries and
also the Generalised System of Preferences (GSPs) plus tariffs for developing
countries that respect human right and other international conventions. (Klasen et al.,
2016). Dirk Willem te Velde analyses the scenario
of UK not forming part of a custom union with the EU. He gave an instance
whereby UK reduces the margin of preference for developing countries which may
increase the amount of duties paid by countries dependent on such preferences.
L. Alan Winters, calls for a simple rational approach with forgiving rules of
origin when UK makes policies towards developing countries (Mendez-parra, Willem and Winters, 2016)
Brexit may also have significant impact on the terms of trade of developing countries. A country’s terms of trade measures a country’s export price in relation to its imports price. The terms of trade are favourable when every units of exports sold can yield more units of imports. It is a key determinant for developing countries’ macroeconomic performance (Al-abri and Gani, 2016). According to Prebisch-singer hypothesis, terms of trade does not favour developing countries producing and exporting primary products and for them to maintain the gap with developed economies they must continually increase output. In the short term the threat of Brexit led to currency and stock market fluctuation which have not spared Emerging Markets (EMs) and poorer countries (Mendez-Parra, Papadavid and Willem Te Velde, 2016). Britain’s decision to leave the EU may cause the UK economy to slow down for some period of time due to uncertainties in its economy, and it could lead to a decline in UK’s demand for foreign goods, directly affecting those EMs that have high exposure to the UK in terms of exports. (Jan Willem Velthuijsen, Halûk Yalçın, 2016).
IMPLICATIONS OF BREXIT IN TERMS OF TRADE
The EU and developing countries have existing trade
arrangement that may be affected by Brexit due to the large involvement of UK
in the arrangement. This arrangement includes free trade agreement, EU General
System of Preferences, Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and African Caribbean and Pacific Preferences
(ACP preferences) (Panagariya, 2002)
The UK Department for International Development (DFID)
published its post Brexit trade approach towards developing countries in 2017.
According to the DFID the UK government pledges to secure the existing
duty-free access to UK market of which 48 countries across the globe from
Bangladesh, to Sierra Leone, Ethiopia and Haiti exports all their goods except
arms and ammunitions also known as Everything but Arms (EBAs) duty-free. Most
of These countries already benefit from the EU’s EBAs deal, hence UK’S pledge
here simply amounts to maintaining the status quo for this group and is not
actually an improvement (Dr Peter Holmes, 2017). Although this
access is important for developing countries terms of trade as it reduces the
cost of their product in EU market making them more competitive and creating
demand for them.
The EU existing duty- and quota-free access is part of
its GSPs programme which grant full removal of tariffs of over 66 percent on
items listed in its tariff schedule for developing countries. It is designed to
help developing countries comply with a number of key international conventions
on human and labour rights, environmental protection and good governance.
Beneficiaries include Armenia, Bolivia, Cape Verde, Mongolia, Kyrgyzstan,
Pakistan, Paraguay and the Philippines (Commission, 2017). The preference
of the beneficiaries of this package are likely to be affected if Britain does
not keep the EU GSPs. For example, Pakistan which is UK’s largest trading
partner within the EU, accounting for 20% of its trade within the bloc is
likely to lose preferential access to the UK market (Council, 2017) if Britain does
not keep the EU GSPs. It would make more sense for Pakistan if UK keeps the
existing EU GSP’s. Another issue with the GSPs is that the rules of origin are
very complicated. Rules of origin is defined by the World Trade Organisation,
as the criteria needed to determine the national source of a product. To take
advantage of the tariff preference, exporting countries must meet certain rules
of origin to substantiate the claim that it indeed produced the export product
rather than import it from another country excluded from the GSP privileges.
Hence, if UK decides to implement its own GSP’s for Pakistan and other
developing countries this would create double standard requirement for
Pakistan’s goods coming into the EU market and UK market. It would make more
sense for Pakistan if UK keep the EU GSPs.
In the case of UK forming a Post-Brexit trade policy,
there could be a major implication for the existing EPAs between the EU and ACP
countries. The EPAs are also tariff negotiations between the EU and its former
colonies in the group of the ACPs. The rules of origin are more generous in
this agreement as it allows developing countries to source for input from other
countries that are excluded from the GSP privileges. The impact of Brexit on
EPAs could come in two ways. Firstly, certain product could face higher most
favoured nation tariffs and secondly export from ACP developing countries could
be exposed to competition from non-APC developing countries (Vickers, 2004).
Developing countries would have to pay double tariffs to access the EU market
and UK market, although UK might endeavour to make its trading terms to be
almost as favourable like that of the EU EPAs. Take for instance the Dominican
Republic (DR) export of banana into the EU market. DR is a major beneficiary of the EU EPAs with
75 percent of its trade with EU exported to UK. lack of equivalent EPAs to UK
market could lead to higher tariffs for DR. On the other hand, it is likely
that UK grant free trade access to non-ACP developing countries that produce
banana (such as Latin America) at a lower cost than the DR making them lose
competition in the UK market. In order words large developing countries are
likely to benefit more than less economical developing countries post-Brexit.
IMPLICATIONS FOR
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TERMS OF TRADE
As earlier discussed the terms of trade for most
developing countries is not always favourable because they export mainly
primary product (raw materials) which is cheaper than secondary product
(manufactured product) in the international market and for them to benefit from
free trade access they would have to increase their exports in international
trade.
The impact of Brexit on developing countries terms of
trade could come through two different pathways. Firstly, the value of
developing countries exports to UK might increase due to a fall in the value of
pounds. Conversely this may be countered by an increased interest rate set by
Bank of England (BOE) in order to curb inflation. After Brexit referendum the
British pounds fell to values not seen since 1985, (BBC, 2016). This implies
that the value of export coming into UK would increase relative to British
pounds which may be favourable for developing countries balance of trade. On
the other hand, high price of developing countries export could be upset by
lower demand from UK due to inflation. The rise in inflation could raise the
chances of the BOE to increase interest rate. In other words, developing
countries terms of trade could improve in the short run, but this may be
manoeuvred by UK’s economic policies that involves raising interest rate in
order to normalise inflation.
Secondly increased competition for UK market through
negotiations of more trade deals could reduce the terms of trade for developing
countries trading with UK in the EU. According to the DFID published, the UK
government aims to provide new opportunities to poorer countries by increasing
trade links. If the trade links covers other developing countries that do not
trade with UK before Brexit, then there will be higher competition for UK
market. Based on the assumption of Bertrand Competition in a competitive
market, firms always have incentives to cut prices, which actually leads to a race
to the bottom (a situation in which companies compete against each other by
paying lower wages to workers or making work condition worst). Another case
under the assumption is where there is free entry that drives profit to Zero
(Helpman & Krugman, 1985). Here Brexit may create more trading opportunities
for developing countries, but at the benefit of UK economy (getting the
cheapest commodities) and at the cost of developing countries terms of trade
(competitive price for their product) which is likely to get worse after
Brexit. Another issue is that developing
countries, particularly least developed countries may struggle to compete with
other efficient producers from large developing countries.
POSSIBLE
IMPACT OF BREXIT IN TERMS OF OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
CONCEPT OF OVERSEA DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
War against poverty and underdevelopment is a major
issue in the contemporary world. ODA is the means by which developed countries
and international donors assist countries that are less developed. It is
defined as resource flows to developing countries and multilateral
organisations, which are provided by official agencies or their executive
agencies and each transaction is aimed at promoting economic development and
welfare of developing countries (DFID, 2016). Traditional
development economics view foreign aid as a tool for overcoming the saving gaps
in developing countries based on the view that developing countries are poor
because they lack capital to make income-generating investment while mainstream
economic literature suggest that aid can help developing countries by closing
their financial gap that otherwise leave them stuck in poverty trap (Abuzeid, 2009). Aid can also be
given in form of trade. This is known as aid for trade. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) describes
aid for trade as the means of helping developing countries to build the trade
capacity and infrastructure they need to benefit from trade opening. It is part
of the overall official development assistance that includes grant and
concessional loans targeted at trade related programmes and projects. Mendez et
al., analysed how aid for trade can be used to reduce trade cost for developing
countries in the case where UK adopts independent trade policies after leaving
the EU. They proposed that it can be used to complement trade and investment
agreement and compensate vulnerable countries whose preference margins are
eroded. According to the UK Department for International Development the ODA
provided by UK government has increased over the past years by 10 per cent to
£13,348 million in 2016. In 2015 it was £12,138. It comes in form of financial assistance or
aid, military assistance in term of the fight against terrorism and
humanitarian assistance. Sachs and Stiglitz believe that levels of aid has
historically been too low and that large increase in foreign assistance could
be greatly effective in helping reducing poverty (Edwards, 2015). The European Union (EU) is recognised as the largest
aid donor in the world, with UK among the largest three contributors to EU aid
budget. Britain’s decision to leave EU would reduce the impact of EU’s aid that
helps in reducing poverty in developing countries. (Actionaid, 2016).
Implications for Overseas Development Assistance
The UK government meets the United Nation calls for
countries to spend 0.7 per cent of their Gross National Income (GNI) on
overseas development aid. The GNI is the value of goods and services produced
by all the citizens of a country during a certain period of one year. Even
after the referendum the DFID published that UK met it ODA in 2016. The possible
impact of Brexit on developing countries in terms of ODA going forward can be
viewed through the changes in the value of UK’S GNI, changes in the way UK
decides to spend its aid and UK economic outlook.
GNI can be derived by the summation of all the
expenditures made in a country within a year. It includes government
expenditure, private individual expenditure and household expenditure. This
implies that GNI depends on a prosperous economy. If Britain economy continues
to prosper after Brexit then there could be no significant change in Britain
0.7 percent aid but if Britain economy growth declines then it is likely for the
value of UK ODA to decline. Maurice Obstfeld, International Monetary Fund (IMF)
chief economist said the IMF had long predicted that Brexit would have negative
long-term effect on Britain and things could get worse depending on the outcome
of EU-UK negotiations (CONNOR MURPHY, 2017). The effect of EU-UK negotiation on
UK’s economy would merit study in the future as nothing is really certain for
now. In contrast to what IMF believes a group called “A think thank” has held
steady on its prediction for continued economic growth in the UK with the
cheaper pounds increasing prospect for exports (Isaac, 2017). Also, the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) maintains the same view.
Although the value of the aid is likely to reduce in
pound. Assuming that UK 0.7 percent aid was reckoned at £13,348 million pounds
and given as cash to developing countries in 2016 as discussed earlier. If the
same amount is paid to developing countries in 2017 and the value of the pounds
declines by say 10 per cent. This means that £13,348 million has reduced in
size by £1,334.8 and cannot be as effective as in 2016. In this sense aid has
declined in value.
There is the possibility that ODA would be used as a
bargaining tool to encourage developing countries to open up their markets for
the UK (HARRIS, 2016). After Brexit, UK may seek to change from the traditional
approach of giving aid to securing trade deals, an approach referred to as Aid
for Trade (AfT). The traditional form of aids come in form of grants and it is
likely that ODA post-Brexit could come mainly in form of concessional loans.
These are loans extended on terms substantially more generous than market
loans. The terms could be in form of lower interest rate than market rates and
longer grace periods to pay back. Britain may give this type of loans to
developing countries in order to boost their production capacity, by investing in
industries and sectors so they can diversify exports and build on comparative
advantages. The loans can be used to build infrastructures such as roads, ports
and telecommunications that links domestic and global markets. Aid for trade
include technical assistance that help developing countries to develop trades
strategies that could result in positive outcomes. And it delivers adjustment
assistance that helps reduce cost associated with tariff or declining terms of
trade.
There are some concerns about AfT that is worth
inspecting. Firstly, we could inspect if AfT is given at the interest of
Britain’s economy whereby developing countries sell their product in the UK
market at a cheap price or where developing countries open up their economy for
Britain investment to flourish. Another issue is whether it increases the
indebtedness of developing countries to developed countries. The effectiveness of aid itself on developing
countries growth is a remarkable debate among scholars but AfT could be given a
chance. Over time Africa has received a substantial amount of foreign aid but
statistics shows an inverse relationship between aid and growth in Africa.
Britain decision to leave the EU will lead to a
decrease in the impact of the EU aid budget for developing countries. The UK
channels funds for development co-operation and humanitarian aid to two budget
lines, which are both managed by the European commission. The first line is the
development part of the EU Budget which target Asia, Latin America, Middle East
and North Africa. while the second line is channelled to the European
development fund for the most vulnerable ACP countries. If the UK was to
maintain its level of aid, this would mean either that money will be spent through
less effective multilateral organisation, or would be spent bilaterally
reducing its efficiency (Actionaid, 2016). According to the OECD record, the EU
is the largest donor in the world accounting for about half percent of the
world’s ODA. The UK is recognised as one of the three largest contributors to
the EU aid budget with $13,670 million of its aid disbursed through the EU in
2016. Hence, developing countries that benefit from EU aid may be negatively
affected especially if UK decides to channel its aids towards specific states
not benefiting or receiving only little from the EU aid such as the
commonwealth states. Barder, et al., 2016 assumed that UK’s relationship with
partner countries might be reshaped with an increase in aid to commonwealth states
among British aid recipients or alternatively by deepening ties with least
developed countries (EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 2017).
POSSIBLE
IMPACT OF BREXIT IN TERMS OF MIGRATION
Concept of Migration
In the contemporary world migration is recognised as
an important factor of international development, based on the assumption that
migrant do not cut ties with their country of origin, their households
communities back home and in the process important exchange take place in the
form of money, knowledge and ideas between the host and home countries through
migrants (Vargas-Silva, 2012). Many scholars
believe that “international migration and remittance play an important role in
economic and social development of the developing countries as it helps in
achieving the gains of globalization”(Siddique et al.,
2016). In contrast, some authors views of
migration are that it leads to ‘brain drain’. Brain drain is the emigration of
highly trained or qualified citizens from their country to another. In the 21st
century migration is regarded as an era of fluidity and openness in which
changes in transportation, technology and culture are making it normal for
people to think beyond boarders and to cross them frequently (Urry 2007).
People move for the purpose of studying, professional advancement, marriage,
retirement or lifestyle (Castles, 2010). People from
developing countries also migrate to UK because of high economic benefits.
Implications for Migration
According to a senior government in London, the
British government, in planning its industrial strategy for UK will consider a
new EU visa scheme that will aim at reducing the number of workers entering
Britain (POLITICO, 2017). British Election Study suggests that
the reasons people voted to leave EU in 2016 were relatively split between
sovereignty and immigration control. (YouGov UK, 2016). If Britain would
restrict immigration for its neighbouring countries then its immigration policy
could be stricter for people in other developing countries hoping to come and
work in the UK.
Alternatively, Brexit could offer developing countries
a break in brain drain. According to the UK Home Office immigration statistics
for granted settlement to non-European migrants, people settling for employment
reasons represent 40 per cent of the total category of settlement in 2016.
Indian and Pakistan nationals and young people receive the most grant of
settlement (Blinder, 2017). According to
a global survey of more than 42,000 employers titled Talent Shortage Survey, 40
percent bosses were experiencing difficulties filling roles. In India for
example, 48 percent of the employers reported that they had difficulties
filling job vacancies dues to talent shortages (TIMES, 2016). The expected
income gap between UK and India could be the reason why many Indian nationals
migrate to UK for work. Another example is the case Poland Prime minister made
when addressing the press in 2017. He expressed that he would like have one
million Polish citizens in Britain return to Poland and occupy the job
vacancies. According to him the wages in Britain is high but the cost of living
in Poland is lower. In the context of Brexit, there is the likelihood that
workers in developing countries looking
to come and work in UK because of the income gap could be restricted, making
them to remain in their countries and fill the fill the labor deficit.
Notwithstanding, it is also possible that the UK adopt
a relatively liberal system of migration whereby it accepts an increase in
skilled migrants from outside the European Economic Area and at the same time
reducing EU migration (Portes & Forte, 2017). This approach to migration
could give people from developing countries more hopes of coming to UK to work
enhancing the contribution of remittance in globalisation.
Brexit could have less impact on international student
coming to study in the UK except maybe EU nationals that benefit from student
finance in the UK. In a public poll conducted by Universities UK on more than
2000 adults, 75 percent expressed the view that they would like to see the same
number or more of international students coming to study in UK, while 25
percent expressed the view that international students are immigrants (UK,
2016), signifying that reducing foreign student migration might not be on top
of the British government agenda when making immigration policy.
Over the past several years, the number of Indian
students coming to study in UK has decreased. There are conceivable different
reasons for the decline including a drop in the value of the rupee relative to
the pound (Hajela & Sumption, 2017). A drop in the value of the sterling
post Brexit may have a positive impact on students of developing countries
(example; India) that would want to study in the UK. In contrast student fees
may be revised upwards by UK universities in order to compensate for the loss
in the value of pounds. Inflation in UK may make living in the UK costly for
international students from developing countries.
POSSIBLE
IMPACT OF BREXIT IN TERMS OF REMITTANCES
Concept of Remittance
Remittances is a source of development financing that
is three times the size of all ODA, while the UK is estimated to be the world’s
fourth largest sender of remittances and well within the top 10 senders to
developing countries. Hence the implication of Brexit on remittance is an issue
of significant concern (Juden, 2016). De Hass and
Ruttan, observed that migrants from developing world bring labour, skills and
Know-how to the countries where they settle, while continuing to contribute to
development in their countries of origin by sending by remittances, investing
in business, introducing knowledge and skills and contributing to charity (Levitt and Lamba-nieves, 2011). Key factors that
may affect remittances after Brexit are “migrants income level, economic
conditions in host country, inflation rate, exchange rate, real interest rate,
government migration policy and political stability in host country” (Abbas, Masood and Sakhawat, 2017).
Implication for Remittance
Amazingly, despite the economic downturn in UK (2015/2016)
the UK recorded a median household disposable income of £26,300 in the
financial year ending (2016) which was £600 higher than the previous year (Wells and Thomas, 2017). Assuming
households where migrants live in UK are among the estimated disposable income
calculated, then the amount of remittance they send is not likely to be affected.
This is based mainly on the fact that the Brexit referendum had just taken
place. It is uncertain what the household disposable income will be after Britain
really exit the EU, but if it decreases significantly then the amount of
remittance that migrant send to developing countries might reduce
significantly.
In august 2017, the UK’s inflation rate climbed to its
joints highest in more than five years (BBC, 2017). One of the
factors responsible could be the falling value of the pound since Brexit vote occurred.
This shock may reduce the amount of money that migrants send to developing
countries, as they have to adjust their expenditure pattern to suit the
economic circumstances. Also, if the pounds continue to fall, then the value of
remittance that developing countries receive will decline when they convert it
to their local currencies. On the other hand, it is also possible that migrant
increase their working hours in response to the exchange rate shocks.
CONCLUSION
Britain’s approach to international trade with
developing countries is likely to have the most significant impact on international
development post-Brexit. In the modern world trade is the most important factor
for growth in either a least developed or a developed country. It provides
jobs, it provides revenue and it affects the welfare of everyone living in the
society. It is difficult to evaluate how Brexit will affect international
trade, but it is easy to mention that it may lead to losers and winners if UK
expands trade links to countries not on the EU preferential system. For clarity
purpose, large economical developing countries are likely to benefit while
least developed countries are likely to be on the losing side in terms of
competing for UK market.
The impact of Brexit in terms of remittance, foreign
aid, and migration may not have a serious impact on the growth of developing
countries. In view of foreign aid, the impact depends on Britain’s economic
performance and commitment to International development goals. Britain is one
of the most generous country in the world and it has stated her commitment to
continue the contribution of 0.7 percent of its GNP post-Brexit. The level of
remittance also depends the growth of Britain economy post-Brexit. Nonetheless,
migrants sending money back home are unlikely to tarry with the amount they
send to their loved ones in their home of origin, some may even work extra
hours make up for any impact that Brexit may have on the value of their
remittances. Migration has remained strict for non-EU nationals before Brexit
and it is likely to be the same post-Brexit. The main people that may be
affected in terms of migration are the nationals of the other EU and they are
likely to migrate to other regions in the EU where there is economic benefit.
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