Rivalry Between Iran and Saudi Arabia: The Proxy Case of Syria

The rivalry
between Iran and Saudi Arabia: The proxy case of Syria

What are the interests of the two possible Middle Eastern hegemons Iran and Saudi Arabia in Syria since the Arab Spring and how are they enforced?

CONFLUENCES PAPER FR

Iran: from 2011
(12.353 billion) to 2016 (12.383 billion) stable.

Saudi: rise from 2011
(54 billion) to 2015 (87 billion), but sharp decline of 30% in 2016 (61
billion) to fourth largest spender world-wide probably due to decrease in oil
prices.[1]

Abbreviations

• b/d                               –                                   barrels per day
• CIA                             –                                   Central Intelligence Agency
• EU                               –                                   European Union
• FSA                             –                                   Free Syrian Army
• G20                             –                                   Group of Twenty
• GCC                            –                                   Gulf Cooperation Council
• GDP                            –                                   Gross Domestic Product
• HNC                           –                                   High Negotiations Committee
• IEA                             –                                   International Energy Agency
• IMF                             –                                   International Monetary Fund
• IRGC                          –                                   Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
• LAFA                         –                                   Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas network
• NAM                           –                                   Non-Aligned-Movement
• NATO                         –                                   North Atlantic Treaty Organization
• NC                  –                                   National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and                                                             Opposition Forces
• NDF                            –                                   National Defence Force
• OIC                             –                                   Organization of Islamic Cooperation
• OPEC                          –                                   Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
• SNC                            –                                   Syrian National Council        
• UN                              –                                   United Nations
• UNSC                         –                                   UN Security Council
• UNSG                         –                                   UN Secretary-General
• US(A)                         –                                   United States (of America)
• USD                            –                                   United States dollar                           

Introduction         

The first diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia were first established in 1929 following the signing of a Saudi-Iranian Friendship Treaty. Following the Iranian Shah’s rule, relations were relatively friendly. However, ever since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, relations between the two possible Middle Eastern hegemons Iran and Saudi Arabia have been strained, with a possible low point of the First Gulf War in 1980 when Riyadh supported Iraq’s war against Iran. Other mile stones in increased animosity include the 2003 US invasion in Iraq which gave Iran the unique possibility to influence Baghdad, the rise of al-Maliki’s pro-Iran government in Baghdad in 2015 and the Iran Nuclear Deal in 2015.[2] Nowadays, Riyadh-Tehran relations are increasingly characterized by a strategic rivalry about the regional struggle and hegemony in the Middle East. This situation is further complicated by the recent agreement between Saudi Arabia’s traditional ally, the United States and Iran, which saw the lifting of sanctions on Iran. Moreover, Saudi-Iranian relations are embittered by mutual mistrust and growing religious-ideological hostility between the dominate Shia power Iran and the Sunni hegemon Saudi Arabia.[3]

The foreign policy
approach of both hegemons is highly diverging. While Saudi policy can be
characterized as conservative, seeking to
preserve the status quo in the Middle East as well as welcoming the US-American
presence in the region, Iran has been seen as
a revisionist actor, having ties to Russia and China, supporting revolutionary
non-state movements, while seeking an end to the US-American presence in the region
as well as an end to Israel’s existence.[4]

While the two countries
do not share a common border, they have been engaging in various conflicts in
the Middle East to various degrees – from Central Asia, to Iraq, Bahrain and
Palestine and more recently Syria and Yemen, which led to the Saudi feeling of
increasingly being surrounded by Iran and its vassal states, as Iran had the
control over four Arab capitals: Damascus, Beirut, Baghdad and Sanaa.[5]
Some scholars have called their clash a new Cold War.[6] As
with the original Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States, the
conflict does not (yet) involve direct military confrontation between the main
rivals, but there was certain block-building, denial of involvement and support
for non-state-actors.
[7] [8]
However, the ongoing conflict constitutes diplomatic, ideological, and economic
fights – especially in the oil markets – and ultimately proxy wars.
Accordingly, both Riyadh and Tehran have been striving for regional dominance,
ideological and religious supremacy as well as strategic prevalence –most
heavily in Syria due to its role in the Arab World and its geo-strategic
position.[9] [10]

The Syrian civil war
had its roots in the Arab Spring, which began all over the Middle East in 2010.
The Syrian people’s struggle began much as the uprisings in other Arab
countries throughout the Arab Spring, where average citizens went to the street
to claim back their freedom and prosperity. The initial peaceful protests were
answered by government brutality and the civil war increasingly evolved into an
international war, inter alia drawing in the United States, Russia, the United
Kingdom, France and Iran as well as Saudi Arabia. Having been coined the
biggest atrocity since World War II, the ongoing war in Syria so far resulted
in more than 250.000 deaths and over 12 [11]  million refugees and displaced Syrians, which
is more than half [12]
of the original Syrian population.[13]
It constitutes another strategic alteration of powers and chance to form the wider
region in their own interests, as both Tehran and Riyadh are trying to fill the
newly formed void. With their diametrical geopolitical goal Iranians and Saudis
both have diverging sectarian, political, economic and strategic goals. It is
estimated that by now more than 1.500 armed rebel groups are fighting in Syria,
thereby complicating a political solution.[14],[15]

It is increasingly
sectarian and ethnic, as both players try to legitimize their brutal
involvement. The conflict began rather as a regime vs. opposition movement, but
is now a fight between Shias vs. Sunnis.[16]
As the Assad regime always tried to stay secular due to their minority rule,
their Baathist party – pan-Arab, secular and socialist – got increasingly drawn
into the sectarian clash. [17]
[18]

Besides being
ideological and political enemies, Iran and Saudi Arabia are also portraying
themselves as the protector of all Shias and Sunnis, respectively. Of all
Muslims, around 10-15% identify themselves as Shia, while the remaining vast
majority belongs to the Sunni creed.[19]
As Iran is the only predominately Shia power, it sees itself as the protector
of all Shias and supports all its Shia allies in the Middle East. These range
from Iraq (especially after the US left after Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003), Lebanon with its Hezbollah militia/party,
Bahrain, Yemen, Azerbaijan and Syria. King Abdullah II of Jordan has coined the
negative term Shia Crescent for the
Shia dominated countries ranging from parts of Lebanon, Syria and Iraq to Iran
and Bahrain.[20]

The confessional
proportions in Saudi Arabia are somewhat opposite of those Iran: around 80% of
Saudis are Sunni. This also represents the global proportions, as around 80-85%
of all Muslims consider themselves as Sunni.[21]

Both countries have
around 10% of their population belonging to the respective other creed. While
the Shias in Saudi Arabia live in the oil-rich north-eastern part (important
for oil revenues) of the Kingdom, Sunnis in Iran are mostly spread throughout
the whole Islamic republic. Due to these circumstances, both countries
constantly accuse each other of trying to inflame unrests among the other’s
religious minorities so as to domestically weaken their counterparts.[22]

Then there is the
difference between Alawites and the other Muslim denominations. While Alawites
are commonly mistaken or portrayed, especially by Western media, as part of the
Shia community, they are essentially not. Being religiously closer to Shias,
however, their link to Shia Islam and the Alawite name (given to them by the
French colonizers, which were called Nusayris before)[23] are derived from Prophet Muhammad’s cousin and
son-in-law Ali. [24]
^[25]
On the other hand, Alawites do not fast during Ramadan nor are they considered
to do the pilgrimage to Mecca. Moreover, Alawites are allowed to drink alcohol
and celebrate some Christian as well Jewish festivals. Although around 75% of
all Syrians are Sunnis, the Assad clan and the ruling elite in Syria belong to
the Alawite creed, which has been in power for about five decades. They make up
around 7%-10% of the Syrian population.[26]

By fuelling the
conflicts in Syria and the wider region in confessional terms, both Tehran and
Riyadh are responsible for fragmenting
the Muslim communities along sectarian lines worldwide.[27]
As both aspiring superpowers increasingly indoctrinate confession and frame
their geopolitical proxy conflicts in sectarian terms, they further complicate
the war in Syria.

Theory and Methodology

This thesis will deal with the latent rivalry between Saudi Arabia and
Iran and will consider their proxy conflict in Syria. As the conflict is rather
recent, there are constant changes and the dynamics on the battlefield are ever
turning. That is why this paper is only a snapshot, taking into account the
beginning of the conflict in 2011 until around 2016. Another aspect of this and
every war is that facts are hard to verify, as each side is denying involvement
and are using propaganda to manipulate the masses.[28] The Syrian war,
nonetheless, is an important war, as the whole Middle Eastern region is
somewhat affected and increasingly being torn apart. The chaos and
destabilization and its eventual transformation will be dealt with in the next
decades. Moreover, the whole region is of strategic importance to the world
economy due to its vast oil and gas reserves and touches European national
security as it brought forward spill-over effects of the terrorist threat Daesh
and the refugee crisis in the Old World. Lastly, it offers some lessons for the
future as it might be the first war in a new multi-polar world.

This paper is meant to
explain the chaotic situation in Syria and to comprehensively clarify the
current shift in the balance-of-power. To do that it will first set the
theoretical background to be able to academically analyse the situation in
Syria. Then this paper will analyse the various interests the Iranians and
Saudis have in the war in Syria in Chapter 3. Their role in supporting
confronting sides in this already 7-year old bloody civil war will then be
analysed in Chapter 4 and 5, after which a conclusion will be drawn. This paper
used mainly secondary and some primary sources; most often journal articles,
books and think-tank papers, but also government sources; mostly in English,
but some in French and German as well as translated ones from Arabic and Farsi.

In order to properly
analyse Iran’s and Saudi Arabia’s state behaviour, a close theoretical and
methodological look at foreign policy theories on interstate rivalries and
their comportment in Syria is needed. As geo-politics is an ever occurring
trend, systemic rivalries and the rise and fall of powers is occurring in the
Middle East as well.

Iran is often portrayed
as a highly ideological state due to its Axis of Resistance image, its
animosity towards the West, Israel and other Arab countries as well as its will
to export its revolution, rather than securing the survival of the state.
Challenging the status quo, Tehran is regularly mapped as irrational.
Constructivism would come close to explain this behaviour, which stresses that
state identity is essential in forming the behaviour of a state. For Tehran, it
was its Persian identity, its revolution linked to its version of Islam that
had to be exported, sometimes leaving the survival of the state fragile.

But it was Khomeini,
Iran’s first Supreme Leader and moral authority who proclaimed that at times
the interests of the state should count more than the interests of Islam and
the revolution.[29]

Iran can therefore be
identified as conducting neo-classical realist foreign policies. As systemic
pressures cannot check Iran, it is rather the domestic scene that determines
Iranian foreign policy outcomes. While the concepts of power and anarchy are
central in neo-classical realist theory, it also takes into account the
domestic level and its norms and values in order to analyse the international
decision a state takes. It is a more holistic approach as it foreign policy is
explained both by the international system and domestic constraints. As
international change has a dynamic effect on the national level, a good example
for Iran’s constructivist behaviour is when Tehran moved resources from
Hezbollah into Syria, thereby leaving Lebanon and Iran itself prone to external
attacks.[30]
Moreover, by supporting Hamas, a Sunni Palestinian movement, Tehran showed its
pragmatism that guided it to aid Hamas so that it could further harm Israel.
Here, religion is just seen as an extension of Iran’s ideology and is proof of
the flexibility of Iran’s foreign policy.[31]

In the case of Iran and
Syria, that results in the strategic Iranian culture of furthering its
revolution in Syria and protecting its defensive alliance with Assad, one of
its longest and closest allies. Although the strong leader images of Rouhani
and Khamenei are of less importance (they are more important in medium and long
term considerations), it has to be considered that Iran has a highly
complicated domestic decision finding mechanism and therefore has to take into
account various domestic sentiments and actors.[32]

Sometimes also dubbed Islamic
pragmatism, when given the choice, Iran takes neo-classic realist choices
in accordance with the survival of the state and with the domestic audience, as
the Nuclear Deal and the recent diplomatic efforts to curtail Daesh have shown.[33]

Lastly, it has to be
considered that Iranian foreign policy towards Syria under Ahmadinejad
(2011-2013) and the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) (2014-today)
was rather ideological, while Rouhani was driving a more neo-classical realist
approach, when he considered the economic revival and the Nuclear Deal as his
top priorities and his Syria policy (2013-2014) was rather seen as a secondary
objective, sometimes even hindering his economic goals.

The Saudis on the other
hand are the classic status quo regime and state survival actor, securing their
defence with the decades old US-Saudi alliance and, more in general, relying on
the West to protect its interests.

The Saudis have to
consider the domestic audience, however, a lot more than Iran does, because of
the commonly found tribal and familial ties still intact within Saudi society.
On top of that, the Saudi national identity is not strong, so that the social
unrests especially in the North-East with its Shia minority have to be
constantly be taken into account.[34]

When conducting foreign
policy, which is mostly conducted by the Royal Court, the Saudi Arabia has to
consider therefore its external partners and the domestic scene. The Kingdom’s neo-classical
realist approach in maintaining the regional stability and being able to
continuously follow its national interest with the help of (regional) allies
has also inspired its approach to the Arab Spring. However, the Kingdom also
diverged from its usual path, as the examples of Tunisia and Egypt have shown,
where the Saudis helped to oust regimes and thereby disrupting the regional
stability.

When forming its
strategy on Syria, Saudi Arabia behaved neo-classical realist, as it wished to
remove Assad, enemy of the Saudi state, and install a Sunni- and Saudi friendly
regime in Damascus. Initially the Saudis behaved more pragmatic when they
supported the Syrian rebels and not the status quo Assad regime, although
Riyadh aimed to maintain its regional influence.[35]
Riyadh increasingly considered systemic factors in forming its strategy. The
Saudi King wanted to appear assertive and as a strong leader when he condemned
Assad to stop killing fellow Sunnis.[36]
Moreover, it claimed to defend Islam when conducting foreign policy in Syria
and it considered the rising domestic rebellious tendencies about the Syrian slaughtering
machine, the state-society relations, when it commenced to act against
Assad. Lastly, the strategic culture and the domestic institutional framework
allowed the Saudis, as the traditional Gulf hegemon, to act in Syria.

The Value of Syria for Riyadh and Tehran

As the next weakened
state in the Middle East, Syria offers a new opportunity for both Iran and
Saudi Arabia to expand their influence as well as check the other’s rise in
influence, as both countries are authoritarian theocracies that claim
leadership of the Middle East and the Islamic ummah (community), as well
as trying to export their respective version of authoritarianism where- and
whenever they have the opportunity.[37]

This Arab-Persian
animosity plays out in Syria mostly because of its geo-strategic value. Its
proximity to the Mediterranean Sea as well as to Israel makes it an important
actor for the wider region of the Middle East.[38]

Syria also plays a huge
role in cultural and political terms. This is because Syria is seen as the birthplace
of Arab nationalism; the first pan-Arab state had its capital in Damascus. This
gives both Tehran and Riyadh additional legitimacy as they portray their
campaigns in Syria as the righteous struggle.[39]

Iran and Saudi Arabia
have diametric interests in Syria. The two see Syria as a so-called zero-sum-game:
most of Iran’s gains are the losses of the Saudis and vice versa. Their goals
are therefore the opposite of the other’s.[40]

Iran’s viewpoint and interests   

At first glance, the
alliance between Iran and Syria does not seems stable. On the one side there is
a Persian Islamic theocracy with robed-and-turbaned mullahs and on the other a
pan-Arab secular republic with Western-suited Ba’athists. Therefore not being
ideologically aligned, neither are both of the same religious creed, which just
reinforces both their pragmatic approach, although they stress the religious
and nationalistic nature of their alliance.[41]

Besides a few hick-ups
however (such as the lack of criticism of the Saudi invasion of Bahrain in
2013), the geo-political and strategic Tehran-Damascus alliance has persevered.
Being portrayed as the Axis of Resistance, Iran and Syria, together with
Hezbollah, share a common animosity towards the Western world as well as
towards Israel and US hegemony in the Middle East.[42]
Having their alliance for over 30 years now, Iran and Syria used said alliance
to check against Iraqi, Israeli and US hegemony in the Middle East. Its
longevity can be explained by its rather defensive character, Iran’s and
Syria’s different ideologies and their division of influence in the Levant and
the Persian Gulf, which all actually account for less arguments and less
struggle for hegemony within and outside of the alliance.[43]

Syria was the second
country (after the Soviet Union) to recognize the new Iranian government after
its revolution in 1979 and moreover was the only Arab country[44]
to support Iran in its devastating 8-year war against Iraq in the 1980s (Syria
closed its border to Iraq in order to close their joint oil pipeline, which
resulted in huge economic losses for Iraq (40% of its oil revenues)).[45]
This political and military alliance was gradually strengthened and ultimate
resulted in the 2006 Iran-Syria defence and military pact.[46]

Iran’s traditional role
as a land-mass empire, always made it prone to rule the wider Middle East and
the Persian Gulf so as to ensure its territorial integrity. Not having been
colonized, Tehran sees itself to be entitled to dominate the region due to its
long history and geography as a natural state.[47] [48]

Due to the religious
proximity of Shias and Alawites as well as Tehran’s sectarian portrayal of the
conflict in Syria, one reason why Iran supports Bashar al-Assad is religious
cohesion against the Sunni threat coming from Saudi Arabia, as Assad’s minority
government of Alawites are controlling and ruling over the majority Sunni
population in Syria.  This allows Iran to
control a huge Sunni population and to strike a blow to its main contender
Saudi Arabia. In order to keep this cultural and religious proximity on a
long-term basis, Iran is trying to strengthen bonds between the two countries
by promoting i.e. subsidized travel to Syria often carried out by Iranian bonyads,
charitable trusts responsible for Iranian soft power and cultural diplomacy.[49] [50]
Moreover, regular student exchanges are carried out between the two countries
so as to secure future bonds.[51]
Of many cultural centres, the bonyads have also erected Iran’s most
important one in Damascus in 1983.[52]

The increasing
sectarian aspect of the conflict in Syria gives Iran furthermore the legitimacy
it needs to fight the Saudi monarchy and Sunni influence in the region. As Iran
portrays itself as standing in for Islamic rights (and to a lesser extent Arab
and Shia interests) and by instrumentalizing and widening the sectarian
division, Tehran draws big use out of the conflict in Syria as it can portray
Sunni extremism and Saudi support for jihadist groups as a motivation and
reason to fight for the Shia cause. 

Moreover, Tehran uses
the threat of jihadi group such as Daesh or al-Nusra as an excuse and to
further legitimize its combat of extremism and terrorism in the region and
Syria. Using the Salafi (or its synonym Wahhabi) threat as a propaganda tool,
Tehran also uses it to amass more Shias for its proxy militia groups, as these
extremist rebel groups seek the annihilation of all Shias.[53] To
further instrumentalize this propaganda opportunity, Soleimani posed on several
occasion with minority groups on social media.[54]

Another reason to fight
such extremism for Tehran is the distant possibility that these groups could
widen the chaos in Syria and therefore make the pro-Iranian regimes in Iraq and
Syria implode and remove two of its main allies.[55]
Iranian officials also claim to fight Daesh in Syria, so that they do not have
to fight a strengthened Daesh closer to Iranian borders or even within the
Islamic Republic.[56]
In deterring these groups within Syria, Tehran strongly indicates its will to
protect its interests, population and territory.[57] As a last thought, Iran could use its terrorist
argument to maintain its forces in Syria, even when the war may already be
over.[58]

As much of the Iranian
public and most of its officials see the jihadi threat coming from Saudi Arabia
and its Wahhabi ideology, Iranians paranoingly see the wars in Iraq and Syria
more and more as intertwined and as a joint effort from the West and the Sunni
community so as to destroy Syria and its axis with Iran.[59]

Iran also derives
further religious legitimacy by portraying itself as the sole protector of all
Shias and thereby being the only power to guarantee the safety of Shia holy
shrines and other sites in Syria, such as the al-Sayyidah Zaynab Shia shrine
close to Damascus.[60]^,[61]

All in all, the
sectarian argument gives Tehran further legitimacy to portray itself as the
good Islamic country, protecting Shia, Arab and Islamic interests in Syria,
although the rising sectarian nature of the Syrian struggle limits its scope of
representing the whole Islamic ummah.

Far more important to
Iran is, however, Syria’s strategic value. As some official close to Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei once put it: Syria is Iran’s “35th province…if we
lose Syria we won’t be able to hold Tehran.”[62]

Since there is no
border between Iran and its allies such as Palestine and Lebanon, Iran needs
the Syrian thoroughfare in order to be able to continuously transport money,
people and arms between the Iranian motherland and its allies in the region,
where Syria serves as a conjunction between Iran, Iraq and Lebanon.[63] Syria
actually made the Tehran-Baghdad-Damascus-Hezbollah-Hamas axis possible in the
first place, with which Iran wields influence in the Israel-Palestine conflict,
the Middle East and parts of the Mediterranean.[64]

Especially Iran’s most
important puppet, the Lebanese Hezbollah (party of God), profits from Iranian
deliveries through Syria. Hezbollah is a political party and militant group
based in Beirut, which Tehran established in 1985 as a proxy group and
non-state-actor so as to influence domestic Lebanese politics and deter,
threaten and fight Israel.

Actually, Iran’s
alliance with Syria gave it the opportunity to establish Hezbollah in the first
place. Controlling Syria gives Tehran therefore the possibility to keep arming
and funding its most important proxy. Hezbollah has this huge importance to
Iran because of its credible threat to Israel and as a deterrent towards the US
its Sunni partners from attacking Iran.[65]
Within Syria, Iran uses Hezbollah to control a land belt ranging from Syria’s
southern common border with Lebanon and therefore Hezbollah all the way towards
Damascus and the Mediterranean coast and to the historic Alawite settlements in
Latakia.[66]
This is partly why resources and personnel from Hezbollah were moved into
Syria, thereby leaving Lebanon dangerously weakened. Tehran, however, saw the
struggle in Syria and its land corridor as more important and strategic at the
time.[67]
In Syria, Hezbollah became maybe the single most effective force and has three
goals: training Syrian force, advising the regime militarily, and actual
fighting besides Assad’s forces, smuggling arms as well as establishing
readiness to hit Israel from the South of Syria.[68]

Furthermore, Syria
serves to arm, fund and send personnel to its other militias and proxies in the
region. Being able to support the Sunni Palestinian movement Hamas gives the
Iran the possibility to further influence the Israeli-Palestinian struggle by
arming inter alia Hamas.[69] Having the land connection to Syria is a long term
objective and eventually Iranian officials want to connect it to Bahrain and
Yemen.

The establishment of
these proxy groups throughout the Levant has allowed Iran therefore to
strengthen and preserve its regional influence as well as to maintain a strong
posture domestically. Losing Syria would therefore remove Iran’s land bridge
between its allies in the region, its connection to the Mediterranean, and
ultimately its ability to influence conflicts in Israel, Yemen and beyond.[70]

Without the Assad
regime in power, Iran would not just only lose the flexibility and capability
that having a friendly Syrian government brings to the proxy groups mentioned
above, but Iran would lose regional geopolitical leverage as well. This is why
any change in the political structure of the Syrian regime would have
implications for all the above relationships, especially those in connection
with Iran’s role in the region. Should Syria go through regime change, it is
unlikely that the new regime would be supportive of the Iranian government to
the same extent as the current regime does. Undoubtedly, a new Syrian
government with its Sunni majority (the mentioned 75% of the Syrian population)
would be more sympathetic to the rest of the Arab world rather than to Iran.
Iran would furthermore loose its ability to project power. The prospect of a
future hostile Sunni Syria towards its minority Shia and Alawite population is
another reason why Iran fears the vengeance and wrath Sunnis could take upon
the then unprotected Shia and Alawite minorities.[71]

Since Assad’s father
Hafez al-Assad took over Syria in 1971, Iran and Syria have been close allies,
cooperating on several important and strategic issues. Therefore, Syria works
as a bulwark against enemies such as the USA, Israel or Saudi Arabia. The
influence of these hostile countries can be pushed further back and Iran itself
has more scope to form Syria in the way it wants. One reason therefore why Iran
supports Syria is to counter the attempts by the Gulf countries and especially
Saudi Arabia to support Sunni militias in Syria with the ultimate goal to
topple Assad, a nightmare for Iran. Iran’s support for Syria is a consequent
response to the Gulf arms, weapons and ammunition shipments to rebel groups in
Syria. Additionally,
Syria acts as a buffer towards the Iranian motherland and its proxies. It is
not as easy for these enemy countries to attack or shape Iran and its allies to
the extent they would like, for example, when it comes to flying over Syrian or
Iranian airspace. In the case of Iran’s airspace, Israel and its army
considered for a long time to fly over Iran and bomb certain areas in order to
wipe out the Iranian nuclear program. In the end, Israel never realized this
military move as it was deterred by risk concerns and the looming Iran Deal.[72]
This is why a senior foreign affairs advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader named
Syria as “a golden ring of resistance against Israel”.[73]

That is why, even
before to the civil war in Syria broke out, Iran had already between 2.000 and
3.000 IRGC personnel in Syria, further underlining its strategic importance to
Tehran.[74]

Ultimately, the Iranian
strategy is therefore to encircle its arch-enemy Saudi Arabia by building up
proxy capabilities in Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and more recently in Syria,
which is the logistical hub for the Iranian Republic to take influence in the
whole region.

To a lesser extent,
Tehran is also interested in Syria’s economic potential and its geo-economic
importance. This expresses itself in the energy question between Iraq, Iran,
Syria and Lebanon, which have common pipelines, for which Iran needs the land
connection towards the Mediterranean Sea and aid each other with subsidized
petroleum. Moreover, the Hormuz strait question is crucial for Iranian
interests. Lastly, Tehran has substantial investments already in Syria and by
losing the current regime, sunk costs would eventually face an already weakened
Iranian economy.

When the conflict broke
out, Iranian officials and clerics portrayed the Syrian struggle first and
foremost as an outside job. Moreover, they increasingly stressed the sectarian
aspect. Lastly, they portrayed the civil war in Syria as not part of the Arab
Spring or Awakening but rather as part of an Islamic Awakening, which can be
seen as a prolongation inspired by the Iranian Revolution of 1979.[75]
Here, however, Syria is the exception rather than the rule, as Tehran portrayed
all Arab uprisings as such prolongation inspirations, only Syria was influenced
outside powers.

Both Riyadh and Tehran also need and utilize Syria, so
as to divert domestic attention away from their enormous problems at home.
Having a huge social inequality, rising (youth) unemployment as well as a
sanction crippled economy (the Nuclear Deal raised huge expectation among
younger generations), Iran desperately needs a diversion and has found it in
Syria. Using Syria as an image and tool of success of Iranian influence and
engagement, Tehran uses this to divert attention away from its growing young
generations.[76]
Although domestic factors have a rather limited explanatory power over the
Iran-Syria axis, it is nonetheless a powerful tool to influence domestic
opinions.[77]

Dubbed as being Iran’s first
line of defence[78],
Syria has religious, legitimate, strategic and economic importance to Tehran.
Iran sees Syria as yet another ground to counter and fight Saudi and Sunni
influence and to maintain its Tehran,-Damascus-Baghdad-Hezbollah-Hamas axis.
Syria is central to Iran’s ability to project power in the region and it
supports the Assad regime to the bloody end due to the possible prospect of a
toppled Assad and a future Syria ruled by vindictive Sunnis.

Saudi Arabia’s viewpoint and interests

As does Iran, Riyadh
has multiple interests in Syria. First and foremost, it wants to draw a major
blow to its religious counterpart and regional contender Iran by installing a
Sunni and therefore more Saudi friendly regime in Damascus. Besides that, the
Saudis want to remove any ideological threats extremist, terrorist and jihadist
groups such as al-Nusra or Daesh pose to the religious legitimacy of the Saudi
monarchy. Lastly, Riyadh sees Syria as an ideological window of opportunity to raise
its voice for the Sunnis and accuse the Syrian regime of slaughtering fellow
Sunni believers. As Saudi officials have admitted, the handling of protests
following the Arab Spring, especially in Syria, was one of the hardest as well
as most strategic challenges since the Iranian revolution in 1979.[79]

Syria always has been
an uncomfortable country for Riyadh, with occasional personal insults coming
from the Assad rulers directed directly at the al-Saud.[80]
Since the 2005 assassination of then Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri allegedly
by Syria, a close Saudi ally, bilateral relations continuously worsened.[81]

Ever since the Iranian
Revolution of 1979 and the following Iranian claim to represent the interests
of all Muslims, which has been the traditional Saudi duty thus far, Riyadh was
alarmed by the blatant Iranian claim to be the only legitimate leader in all of
Islam. This resulted in a newly flare-up of the inner-Muslim struggle, that was
again reinforced during the Arab Spring when Iran and Saudi Arabia both
intensified the sectarian character of the uprisings.[82]

As the majority of
Syrians are of the Sunni creed, the Kingdom saw a chance that a new Syrian
regime would be dominated by Sunni and would therefore be friendlier to
Damascus than Assad.

Riyadh also instrumentalized
the sectarian issue so as to be able to recruit more Sunni-formed militias and
thereby countering the rising recruitment by Iran and the resulting upper hand
of the regime and its militias. Using anti-Iranian propaganda at home and in
Syria (as again explained below) such as despicably referring to Iranians as
Safavids (a reference to an old Persian empire in the 16^th/17^th
century) and the exploitation of martyrdom as well as pointing out the
brutality by the Syrian government against fellow Sunni believers were used by
the Kingdom to try to contain Iran on this sphere to limit Shia militia
mobilization while counting on more Sunni recruitment.[83],[84]

If Riyadh would have
framed the conflict solely in sectarian terms, then it would have to support
the Muslim Brotherhood due to their ideological similarity. Because the Saudis
did not, they rather behaved pragmatic.[85]

But besides being
religiously confronted by an ever more powerful Iran, the Kingdom was
religiously and ideologically challenged by the emergence of extremist militias
within Syria, such as Daesh or al-Nusra. As these groups draw on the same branch
of Islam as does the state-sponsored version of Islam in Saudi Arabia, namely
Wahhabism, also called Salafism, these radical groups constituted a serious
threat to the legitimacy of the Saudi monarchy as they claimed to be more
zealous and more representative of Islam as well as rejecting the theological
justification for the Saudi political system. If these groups would become part
of a future Syrian government, the Saudis would have to live with a rather
hostile player in Damascus, which would therefore be both an external as well
as internal threat to the Kingdom.[86]

As they became more
powerful and conquered more and more territory in Syria, thereby replacing the moderate
Free Syrian Army (FSA) as the so far most powerful single Sunni militia, Saudi
officials were more and more concerned these militias could question the
Wahhabi ideology and therefore ultimately the Saudi monarchy itself, as the
Salafi belief system of Daesh resembles the Wahhabi one of Saudi Arabia to a
dangerously high extent. Some scholars even called Daesh the Fourth Wahhabi
state, in line with the three Wahhabi states the al-Sauds built over the course
of time.[87]
Although it far exceeds the Saudi ideology when it comes to radicalism, Daesh
even went so far as to declare war on the Saudi Kingdom on several occasions
from 2014 on. As it managed to carry out at least 15 terror attacks on Saudi
soil with over 50 casualties, Daesh went on and claimed to be the only true
representative of Islam and Wahhabism.[88]
All this challenged Saudi Arabia domestically and around the Muslim world as
well as it damaged its well-constructed image as the main Sunni power.
Therefore, Riyadh needed Salafi militias to win the sectarian ideological war
against more radical militias such as Daesh. This is why Riyadh had to act in Syria on
religious and ideological grounds, as the biggest and most serious threat
Riyadh could face was the questioning of its internal legitimacy which
therefore constituted a threat to its domestic stability.[89]

Moreover, Riyadh saw Iran
behind the growing rise of Daesh and felt further threatened by the increasing
interference from Tehran in its so far usual zones of influence.[90]
Both the ideological and religious threats by both Iran and Daesh to the Saudi
throne can therefore be linked to the growing domestic problems Saudi officials
face. When King Salman ascended the Saudi throne in the beginning of 2015, he
was faced by inter alia a high (youth) unemployment rate and the decreasing oil
price, which led the Saudi to the conclusion that an external distraction was
needed, paired with the image of a strong leader, Salman increasingly presented
himself as the strong man distracting from domestic problems by acting more
assertive in Syria.

Another constant
domestic worry for the Kingdom is the Shia minority in Saudi Arabia, which
mostly lives in the North East of the Kingdom, where there is most of the
Saudi’s important petroleum infrastructure. Having been uneasy ever since
(Saudi officials suspect Iran behind the inflaming), this minority was further
agitated by the vents in Syria. Saudi Arabia therefore feared a spill-over from
Syria to its domestic problems and had to present itself as assertive in Syria;
in combination with suppression and anti-Iranian propaganda at home, the
Kingdom tried to grind down on its domestic feelings of rebellion.[91]

As Saudi Arabia is one
of the most important countries in the region due to its vast petroleum and gas
reserves and production with which it can set oil prices, as the custodian of
the two holy cities of Mecca and Medina as well as the representative of all
Muslims, the only Arab and OPEC member in the G20 and domestically on of the
most stable countries in the region, the wider Middle East region and its
stability is crucial to the geo-strategic and geo-economic viability of the
Kingdom.[92]
As it has a rather weak military historically, although heavily equipped,
Riyadh usually prefers to work behind the scenes, using diplomacy and coercion.[93]

In order to reverse the
growing Iranian influence, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was formed mostly
by the Saudis to rally Arab support against Tehran. As the regional balance
shifted more and more in favour of the Iranians, especially after the Nuclear
Deal in 2015, Syria was one of the most relevant battles in their proxy war to
establish control in the region and in one of the most strategic countries in
the Middle East.[94]

Being already on a
losing streak in this proxy war, Riyadh did not want to lose more allies such
as Jordan. The importance of regional stability for the Saudis and their status
quo mentality was in fact so crucial, that Riyadh shifted its foreign policy
towards emerging powers as it had to learn that its traditional Western allies
were no longer there for it. As the regionalization of the Syrian conflict
proceeded, many observers saw the Sunni monarchies of the Gulf and Saudi Arabia
especially as driven by fears over the hegemonic ambitions of Iran.

Their most simple reason to act in Syria was therefore
just to counter Iranian interests and balance against them. The Arab Spring
therefore presented a unique opportunity for Riyadh to ditch Assad for good and
install a Sunni and Saudi friendly government in Damascus and therefore take
advantage of the demographic realities in Syria, as more than 70% of Syrians
are Sunnis.[95]

Contrarily and in line
with the zero-sum-game, the fall of Syria into Sunni hands would be a hefty
loss for the Islamic Republic and its ally Hezbollah, removing both their
prestige and influence in the region as well as destroying their dream of
creating a coherent Shia bloc.[96] Before the revolution, it was not feasible for Riyadh
to influence Syria neither could the Saudis try to change things in political
or military matters. With a weakened Syria in exactly these two terms, Riyadh
now has a unique chance to balance against Iranian regional ambitions. This
considerable opportunity would mean the end of a hostile regime to Riyadh and
would moreover allow Saudi Arabia to reassert itself as the leader of the Sunni
and Arab world again.[97]
Moreover, it would aid the Gulf States to wield more influence in Lebanon
again.

Related to Riyadh’s
struggle to oppose Iranian clout in Syria, another major goal for the Saudi
monarchy in Syria is to counter the Syria/Russia/Iran axis. Even though this
means supporting sub-optimal radical groups, Riyadh’s interest in Syria is to
remove all actors who support this axis and to reverse the Iranian winning
dynamic following the 2003 invasion of Iraq.[98]

As Iran especially
supported non-state-actors, another major concern for Saudi officials were the
Shia militias acting outside of state supervision as well as the Iranian
military presence in Syria.[99]

There are multiple
goals for the Saudis in Syria: first and foremost does it want to check Iranian
influence and balance against their growing regional power in a shifting new
world order. Sectarian as well as external and internal political aspects add
to the Saudi interests. Being usually cautious foreign actors with an interest
to maintain the existing international state sovereignty order, Riyadh’s
approach to Syria was unusual as it could and did not supported the regime this
time.[100]
Besides Iran, however, Riyadh had to look out for radical Islamists with
trans-national tendencies in Syria, which increasingly threatened Saudi Arabia
militarily and domestically.[101]

Tehran’s Strategies Towards Syria

Therefore, Iran deploys
an extensive range of measures including logistical, technical and financial
support, as well as military training, combat troops and lastly significant
political support in order to hold Assad and the Syrian Government in power.[102]
But at the same time Iran takes precautionary measures for a future Syria
without Assad.

Political Support for Bashar Al Assad

During the onset of the Syrian uprisings, which were then somewhat peaceful, Syria’s forces responsible for monitoring the Syrian people were increasingly overstrained. Iran stepped in by mid-2011 to ramp up the Syrian surveillance apparatus and by providing riot control expertise, so that Assad could keep monitoring and controlling internet activities and outside behaviour of ordinary Syrians, angry crowds and uncertain activists, while being able to maintain his repressive regime.[103] Assad was furthermore provided with public security knowledge to tap e-mails, social media accounts and mobile phones. Attached to the political control of the Syrian uprising and especially the opposition, Tehran gave technical and further political support to neutralise the opposition and contain their assemblies.[104] Iran’s anti-rebellion and security forces, such as the IRGC, police and intelligence agents were sent to Syria, as they assembled valuable experience during the recent 2009 Iranian Green Revolution, which they used to give political advice to Assad’s forces to be able to dissolve the political networks of activists and the opposition.[105] Their know-how in oppressing mass uproars in rural areas within Iran, moreover resulted in supplying the Syrian secret police with technical support, political advice, riot control equipment and intelligence monitoring systems.[106] Furthermore, Iranian personnel coming from inter alia Iran’s intelligence services, such as the Ministry of Intelligence and Security were send to Syrian to advise their Syrian counterparts. Evidence for that is the unusual sighting of highest-ranking Iranian commanders, generally authoritative only for internal domestic security matters within Iran.[107][FH1] 

Further evidence of political support for the Assad regime was verbally
uttered by numerous members of the Iranian political elite to show that Assad
was not diplomatically isolated. “The removal of Assad
is a red line for us”[108]
is one of the more direct examples, while Iranian officials repeatedly said
that Assad should stay until the end of his democratic elected term in 2021.[109] Every
chance Iranian officials got, especially in the Syrian peace talks, they
stressed the central role of Assad for any political deal.[110] The
(highly contested) Syrian elections in 2014 were in fact enough political show
for Tehran to renew its unconditional support to its most stalwart ally.

In late 2015, Tehran
decreased its political support somewhat stating that it was interested in
finding a political solution, although as per usual it stated that there would
not be any future Syria without Assad.[111] Even after the chemical attacks on Syrian civilians,
Tehran still publicly stood firmly behind Assad, although stressing to
dismantle his chemical stocks, which was the only time Tehran publicly criticized
Damascus.[112]
Related to this, Tehran always denounced any foreign interference in – in its view
– domestic Syrian affairs.

Besides that, Tehran
had meetings with Assad, supported his reforms, ideas and (peace) plans,
criticized no-fly-zones over Syria and was the only country that diplomatically
and politically backed Syria by holding its own peace conferences in Tehran in
2012 and 2013 and it instrumentalized the Non-Aligned-Movement’s (NAM) meeting
in Tehran in late 2012 to rally support for Assad’s Syria. It was furthermore
the only country that contested the suspension of Syria from the Organisation
of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).[113]

Through its influence in Lebanon, Tehran also managed to push Lebanese
politics in the direction of helping Assad politically, when Lebanon voted
against or abstained from politically condemning Syria and Assad in the Arab
League or in the United Nations as well as not carrying out the Arab League
sanctions.[114]

By its use of portraying the Syrian struggle as one against Zionism and
one initiated by outside powers such as the West (and not against
Sunnis), further political
reasoning is built for Assad.[115]

Linked to its military
aid, which results in more battles won by regime forces, Tehran wants Assad to
have a stronger political position in future diplomatic talks.[116]

The responsible
domestic actors for the strategy in Syria have to be mentioned: from Ahmadinejad’s
second term towards Rouhani’s first six months in office and then back to the
hard-line position again.

First and foremost,
domestic Iranian politics is characterized by the dualism between the secular
President and the Supreme Leader the ultimate religious authority, resulting in
a dichotomy of political consent finding.[117] [118] This
results in a complex chaos of bureaucratic agencies working at times against
each other, in tension between the elected and unelected institutions, multiple
centres of power, which makes decision making and policy implementation rather
difficult.[119]
For foreign policies, the Supreme National Security
Council, was created after the Iranian constitutional reforms in 1989,
which coordinates all institutions as the highest
secular institution in Tehran.[120] Not having ended elite political fights
over important topics such as the Iranian strategy in Syria, there is more over
the sectarian Council of Guardians. Ever since, important
decision in foreign policy matters were done by such religious elements, the
same goes for Syria.[121]

Ahmadinejad and his
hard-line approach to Syria was in line with these sectarian elements in Tehran
and therefore largely run by the clergy. Until the end of his term in 2013, Ahmadinejad
always was a stark supporter of Assad, not wanting to abandon the Axis of Resistance.[122]

While Rouhani was a
rather moderate political regime insider, he was elected by popular desire and
promised economic change and the use of more modest language towards Israel and
the West.[123]
Distancing himself somewhat from prior conservative views, Rouhani and his
foreign minister Zarif had the unique blessing by the Supreme Leader and
therefore a rare opportunity to focus on economic development as well as to
take the initiative and end the crippling sanctions and the will to conclude
the Nuclear Deal. To reach these goals, Rouhani saw Syria rather as an obstacle
and presented Iran as a more reliable and responsible actor. Rouhani even underlined
the importance of bettering relations towards the Saudis, being proud to having
concluded Iran’s first security agreement with Riyadh back in 1998.[124]

Finally being invited
to the Vienna peace talks in 2015, after Iran was not invited in Geneva 2013 and
2014 was a small success for Rouhani.[125]
But due to the domestic opposition by the IRGC and the increasing hostile international
environment towards Tehran, Rouhani did not manage to permanently steer Iranian
politics away from hard-line and conservative elements. Having constantly
tried, after six months in office, the invitation and following exclusion to
the Geneva (II) talks by UN Secretary-General UNSG Ban-Ki Moon gave Rouhani the
rest and the IRGC and the hard-liners took over the Syrian strategy again.[126]
[127]

This new policy power
over Syria was revealed in 2014, when Zarif told Kerry that not his but rather
the IRGC and Supreme Commander’s offices were responsible for the Syrian
strategy.[128]
[129]
It also revealed the limits of an Iranian President’s power.

Direct and Indirect Military Aid             

With the onset of the
actual war in Syria itself, beginning in 2012, Iran had to step its military
aid to help the Syrian army fight an actual full-scale war. In the beginning of the conflict in Syria, Iran led
more from behind as it was advising and coordinating Syrian military personnel.
Besides that, Tehran also continuously sent vast quantities of military
equipment. Only later on did it commit boots on the ground so as to relieve the
Syrian army, which was plagued by defections, deaths and non-deployment of
Syrian Sunni soldiers and has supposedly lost one third to half of its pre-war
personnel strength.[130]
That is because due to its minority ruling elite, around 80% of the Syrian
officer corps are Alawites.[131]
By mid-2015 Tehran also made clear, that it could active the Syrian-Iranian
defence pact of 2006.[132] But again, as with other external help, Damascus
denied any outside help.[133]

As the Syrian civil war
caught Iran by surprise, Tehran initially concentrated on advising and leading
from behind. As time passed by, Iranian advisers were more deeply inserted in
Assad’s military institutions.[134]

The Armed Forces of the
Islamic Republic of Iran are divided into the Islamic Republic of Iran Army or Artesh
(350.000 men) and the Sepah or IRGC (125.000 men), the latter comprising
the Quds Force, Iran’s Special Forces.[135]
The Quds force, Arabic for Jerusalem,
are led by the powerful Qasem Soleimani, who reports directly to the Supreme
Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei.[136] Iran’s army lacks modern equipment, but with its
organizational capability and the high moral and loyalty of its soldiers, it is
nonetheless a powerful actor in the region and should not be underestimated.[137]
All Iranian forces in Syria seem to be under the supervision of the Quds forces
and therefore of Soleimani, who was voted man of
the year 2015 in Iran and who is a celebrated hero in Iran. His popularity is
often used to defuse domestic unease with the Iranian engagement in the war in
Syria.[138]

It was also Soleimani
who was sent to Damascus in the beginning of 2012 to discuss and secure the
full scale Iranian strategy to save the Assad regime, which was then punt into
practice and after which a gradual and persistent increase in Iranian military
aid was reported.[139]

Iranian military
presence was first made publically indirectly in May 2012 and then directly in the
July of 2013, after which an often-cited prisoner swap between the Syrian
regime and some rebel groups ensued.[140]
After months of negotiations, 48 Iranians, later unconvincingly declared
pilgrims by Tehran, were freed in substitution for over 2,000 prisoners
captured by the Syrian regime.[141]
It was also the first time that non-Syrians were liberated, clearly showing
Iran’s prominent role in the war and its sway over the authorities in Damascus.

Besides deploying
Iranian Special Forces such as the Quds Force, Tehran also send the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Ground Forces. As with all other Iranian backed forces,
their duty was to support pro-Assad forces in fighting rebel forces,
coordinating attacks and training new recruits as well as further instruct
current members of the Syrian high command. The number of IRGC ranged
considerably, from a few hundred men in the beginning as confirmed by Western
intelligence[142]
to around 700 in the middle of 2015[143] to around 2.000 men in 2016.[144]

To further coordinate military movements and attacks, Tehran deployed
members from various Iranian intelligence organizations to the Syrian
battlefields, such as the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security.[145] It was also reported
that Iran created a whole 8th Najaf Ashraf Armoured Division solely for the
purposes and needs of the war in Syria.[146]
Having collected and shared valuable intelligence on various rebel groups,
Iranian advisers were commanding operations, coordinating between the various
domestic and external military forces and they were even commanding a whole
Syrian platoon.[147] [148] Syrian
commanders were moreover advised on how to retake strategic parts of Syria,
eased by the fact both sides could draw on their recent fighting experience in
Lebanon, they were able to employ similar tactics and were therefore more
efficient.[149]
[150]

By 2015, numerous reports proved the vast Iranian presence in Syria. Hundreds
of troops send by Tehran arrived and reinforced Syrian and Hezbollah forces
waging a major ground offensive. By that time, they were also backed by Russian
bombings in strategic parts of the country.[151]

Again by 2015, Iran was said to be in charge of Syrian military
operations, effectively controlling as well as coordinating attacks in Syria.
All in all, it was estimated that Tehran had sent roughly 10.000 military
personnel to the Syrian battlefield (besides its already stationed IRGC
personnel strength of 2.000-3.000 prior to the war) but had suffered at least
over 1,000 casualties in Syria – proofing their huge involvement. [152]
120 Iranian troops were reported dead; and that only in the second half of
2015.[153]

However the price,
Iran’s vast deployment of its various military branches and its strategic
supervision over the war in Syria resulted in Assad’s government forces regaining
strength and taking back strategic parts of Syria, reclaiming former rebel-held
territory. These battles included the fighting around al-Ghab, the Daraaya
attacks, the offensives around Aleppo and the al-Qusayr invasion that all
restored pro-Assad rule over vast parts of Syria, thereby reconnecting the
strategically important border crossings from Lebanon to Syria.[154]

Next to sending
military personnel, Iran also transported various military equipment via sea,
land and primarily air channels into Syria, which reached the Syrian army on a
regular basis.[155]

While equipment from
Iraq was brought in by land trough the only remaining land connection between
Baghdad and Damascus, the al-Walid-at Tanf border crossing,
weaponry was also transported through Lebanon to arm Syrian rebels. Proof that
Iranian shipments were being brought into Syria was an Israeli
airstrike bombing a weapons convoy in 2013 supposedly moving SA-17
anti-aircraft missiles coming from Lebanon. These routes still play an
important role in Iran and Hezbollah’s grid to move equipment into Syria.[156]
Shipments were also made through the Turkish-Syrian border on various occasions
from 2011 on.[157]
Proof were numerous seizes by the Turkish authorities, such as in 2012 when
Ankara seized a truck carrying numerous types of rifles, machine guns,
explosives and detonators as well as 60mm and 120mm mortar shells and varied
other military equipment, allegedly coming from the regime in Tehran.[158]

Using the sea route, Iranian shipments were made through the Suez Canal
towards Syrian ports, which meant that
Iranian ships traversed the Suez Canal for the first time since the
1970’s. In 2012, two ships then docked in the Syrian port of Latakia after transiting
the Suez Canal. In the same year, two boats coming from Iran made the same
journey but docked at the more southern Syrian port of Tartous. Moreover,
tankers – often reflagged – from Iranian petrol companies frequently crossed
the Suez Canal to transport oil between Syria and Iran in order to by-pass
sanctions on Iran and Syria. [159]^,[160]

Primarily, however,
Iran shipped equipment by air, using its military as well as civilian aircrafts.
Commercial airlines such as Yas Air and Iran Air and to a lesser extent Mahan Air
were used to deliver military equipment to Syria and were for that reason
designated by US entities as trying to circumvent sanctions on Syria. Moreover,
military aircraft such as the Soviet made Ilyushin-76s, were used by the air
forces from Damascus and Tehran to further transport military equipment.[161] Until
their closure in late 2015, the civilian and military airports in Damascus were
the nexus to smuggle arms into Syria.[162]

It should be noted that the major reason why Iran used air transport is
due to risk constraints and blockades on land and sea. On the other side, it
was mainly Iraqi airspace that was used to fly equipment from Iran into Syria
due to its relative fragility, which was – in spite of United Nations sanctions
– easy to trespass by Iranian aircraft as the Iraqis were not capable of
effectively controlling their own airspace after the Americans had left. Moreover,
the Iraqi government reportedly turned a blind eye on numerous Iranians flights
making their way through Iraqi airspace.[163] This way tons of military
equipment were delivered to the Assad government via the air-route that
Damascus and Tehran unitedly launched.[164]

All this shows that
Syria was and is the receiver of clandestine Iranian arms and military shipments.
From minor gun shipments, to rockets, mortars, shells and tear gas as well as
chlorine bombs and Iranian manufactured Falaq-1 and Falaq-2 rocket systems were,
various military equipment was brought into Syria and reportedly used by its
armed forces.[165]

However the price,
having deployed Iranian military personnel and vast quantities of external and
Iranian manufactured military equipment all brought in via land, air and sea,
Tehran proved its extensive deployment of its various military branches and its
strategic supervision over the war in Syria. It eventually resulted in Assad’s
government forces regaining strength and taking back strategic parts of Syria,
reclaiming former rebel-held territory. These battles included the fighting
around al-Ghab, the Daraaya attacks, the offensives around Aleppo and the
al-Qusayr invasion that all restored pro-Assad rule over vast parts of Syria,
thereby reconnecting the strategically important border crossings from Lebanon
to Syria.[166]

These enormous efforts
from Iran’s side, however, had the effect of a total Iranian control over the
Syrian army. It, moreover, risked to dismantle the secular nature of Syria’s
regime and army, thereby putting its decade-old secular narrative in danger.[167]

Even in the case that
the Syrian regime does fall, Tehran is determined to have a say in any future
government by supplying these military aids to Syria, as it was trying to build
up parallel security institutions that would survive a regime fall, so as to be
able to secure its interests even in a post-Assad Syria.

Deployment of Shia militias

Most prominently, Iran
ordered Hezbollah, Arabic for Party of God, a Shia party and a militia located in
Lebanon, to the Syrian battlefield. It is Iran’s best equipped and trained
militia supporting Iran militarily where- and whenever needed with its
tremendous number of personnel and serves as Iran’s force multiplier.[168] On
the other hand, various Shia militias from around the Middle East were
recruited by Tehran and sent to help the Syrian cause.

Hezbollah became maybe
the single most effective force and has three goals in Syria: training Syrian
force, advising the regime militarily, and actual fighting besides Assad’s
forces, smuggling arms as well as establishing readiness to hit Israel from the South of Syria. The head of Hezbollah,
Hassan Nasrallah declared in 2013, that Iran and his force had effectively the
same goals in Syria.[169]

Iran send Hezbollah forces to
advise Syrian officials to ensure better military training and
coordination between the various pro-Assad actors.[170]^,[171] Moreover, Hezbollah was responsible for facilitating
the general Iranian activity in Syria, such as securing arms shipments to
Syria, providing logistical support, training, advising as well as easing
Iranian ground forces activity inside Syria. Due to their native Arabic
language and battlefield acquaintance with guerrilla tactics as well as
skirmishers which Hezbollah achieved during its battles and wars before, it was
perfectly suited to complement the Syrian army, a rather heavy and mechanized
force, which lacked the skirmishing competence indispensable for withstanding a
conflict against lightly armed foes.[172]

Following the springs of 2012 and 2013, Hezbollah officially stated that it was active in
Syria during the two strategic battles of al-Qusayr, whose second battle
resulted in a decisive Hezbollah win. [173] At that time, its forces were estimated at 5.000 –
7.000.[174]
Next to its initial goal of advising, Hezbollah therefore now employed its
manpower into Syria.[175] Its
main purpose was to directly support al-Assad’s forces militarily by sending
its willing soldiers over the border where it carried out various military
tasks so as to relieve the Syrian army after it suffered defections and losses,
helped by the adjacency of Lebanon and the Syrian battlefield.[176] Consisting
of (counter-) sniper operations, military passage safeguarding, concerted
clearing action as well as head-on combat with opposition and rebel troops,
usually in coordination with pro-government troops and militias, Hezbollah
greatly relieved the Syrian army (with those it had its first joint offensive
around Qalamoun in the end of 2013) as it was deployed especially in the south
of Syria; later even in Aleppo demonstrating its vast geographical deployment.[177] [178]

By the end of 2013
then, as most Iraqi militias were being withdrawn from Syria and were
re-deployed to Iraq, Hezbollah played a more decisive role again, when it
redeployed its forces and personnel over the Lebanese border into Syria.[179] Hezbollah
then had reportedly up to 8,000 fighters in Syria.[180]  It was reported then, that at least 865
Hezbollah fighters died in Syria.[181] Its
goal at that point was to have the oversight over strategic parts of Syria in
order to disturb logistic lines by Syrian rebels as well as its long-term aim
to assist Syria’s military forces in regaining ground. After Hezbollah achieved
these goals, then with the help of Russian bombings, Hezbollah deployed its
manpower back to Lebanon, however while still upholding some
personnel in Syria to train and advise the Syrian’s regime military forces.[182]

The first Battle of Idlib in 2012 was the turning point. The Syrian army
was perceived as getting weaker and weaker. This is when Iran stepped up its
support to Syria by sending and recruiting Shia militias, Iran’s most powerful
and valuable asset to Assad and the cause to regain strategically relevant
sectors of the country.[183]

The National Defence
Force (NDF), a congregation of pro-regime militias, was established by Iran and
to a lesser extent Syria at the beginning of the conflict with Iranian money
and expertise and had up to 100.000 loyal Syrians serving as a reserve force
for the Syrian army.[184]
IRGC personnel boasted to have established yet another Hezbollah.[185]

Besides this militia consisting of Syrians, various Shia militias from
around the Middle East were recruited by Tehran and sent to help the Syrian
cause. They were motivated by the outlook to defend Shia shrine, by the
apparently less extreme Iran version of Islam than the perceived extreme Saudi
one and by salaries ranged between 500 and 1.000 USD.[186]

Rebellious Shia groups that Iran supports are many
such as Ansar al-Haq, Liwa Kafil Zaynab, Kataib Hezbollah, Kataib Sayyid
al-Shuhada, Quwet al-Shahid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, Liwa Ammar Ibn Yasir, Liwa
al-Hamad, Liwa al-Imam al-Hassan al-Mujtaba, Saraya al-Aqidah, Faylaq Waad al-Sadiq,
Saraya Talia al-Khurasani, Harakat al-Abdal and Liwa Fatemiyoun, which all
mostly operate and originate from Iraq and which are ideologously based on
Khomeinism, Iran’s founding father’s theocratic ideology. [187]

The Damascus based
LAFA, or the Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas network,
has been established by Iran in 2012/2013 and was Syria’s first major Shia
militia, closely linked to Hezbollah and the Sadrist Movement, a religious
Iraqi Shia movement and political party.[188]
It itself consists of more than ten subgroups- and organizations, which fight
on Tehran’s behalf.[189]
Another al-Abbas brigade, the Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Brigade, a pro-Assad militia
that seemed to be an accumulation of Syrian and foreign Shia troops, was formed
in 2012 and supported the recruitment, logistics, arming and funding of various
Shia fighters travelling to Syria from Iraq; later on it then served more in an
active and direct combat manner.[190]^,[191]

Groups fighting in Syria then also included Jaysh al-Shabi, Arabic for The People’s Army, a supposedly 50.000 strong army battling besides the
Syrian armed forces. By the end of 2012, US authorities designated and then
sanctioned Jaysh al-Shabi, implicating that the Iranian military forces were
assisting this Shia militia with military drills, weaponry, other army
equipment as well as major funding.[192]

Besides the above
mentioned groups there are
various other rebel militias (more than 20), which were steered by Iraq, but at
the same time, however, highly influenced and supported by Tehran.[193]
Most of these groups can profit from their fighting experience against US
forces during the Iraq war.[194]

These groups were
mainly deployed in and around of
(Rif) Damascus, its suburbs, in Aleppo, inside of Homs and between important
supply lines, such as the one ranging from Damascus to Homs to Aleppo. In
general, this shows, that these groups were mainly deployed in- and outside of
the big cities as well as close to the border to Lebanon. That is why Tehran
wants to keep its land corridor to Lebanon so as to be able to further supply
Hezbollah.[195]

The military equipment these groups received,
mainly from Iran, ranged from light to heavy. Various forms of artillery were
deployed as well as mortars and various forms of (improvised) rockets. Endless
types of small arms and rifles were given to rebels, supposedly coming from the
Iranian and Syrian government. Numerous armoured vehicles and even tanks were
also seen. Most of this equipment is Soviet and Russian made and found its way
into Syria through Iraq and Lebanon. But besides being used for the actual
fighting of rebel forces, these weapon system were also propagated on social
media as a propaganda tool to lure more fighters. What this shows, is that
Tehran was trying to establish regular‐style fighting groups, which ultimately
were designed to relieve the Syrian army plagued by defections and casualties.[196]

In order to recruit so
many Shias, Tehran and its proxies relied on various tactics, such as internet
and direct recruitment: recruitment-posters,
-videos and -photos, all appealing to young Shias to join the Syrian cause.
These were mainly posted on social media, such as Facebook, YouTube and
occasionally Twitter.[197]

This recruitment, which
started rather slow in 2012, but was continuously broadened, also reflects on
the increasingly heavy deployment of these rebel groups, as only the end of 2012 saw the beginning of mostly Iraqi
Shia militia deployments, which Iran sent to advise Syrian
officials to ensure better military training and coordination between the
various pro-Assad actors.[198]^,[199] More of these militias were then trained and equipped
inter alia in Iran, which resulted in the capability to go for the major
offensives seen in 2013, which resulted in the major strategic wins i.e. in the
second battle of al-Qusayr. Then, Iran coordinated the deployment of mainly Iraqi and Lebanese
units, which trained and fought in Syria. Besides being trained in Syria,
thousands of Shias were sent to a military camp near Tehran and then redeployed
to Syria.[200] By summer 2013, with the help of Tehran,
new and more powerful Shia militias started to emerge on the Syrian
battlefield.[201] With Iranian backing, funding and arming various Shia militias with fighters as well as
immigrants living in Iran from Pakistan and Afghanistan[202]
(respectively constituting the Fatemiyon and the Zaynabiyun Brigades) and other
countries were set up.[203]
Iran even lured fighters in exchange for salaries and citizenship in an
arrangement similar to the concept of the Foreign Legion. Recruitment was,
however, also achieved via internet and especially during Shia holidays to
reach high numbers of possible recruits and fighters.[204]
While the importance of Shia militias was minor in the beginnings of the
conflict, their importance grew rapidly with the ongoing of the Syrian war and
the resulting deaths and defections the Syrian army had to process.[205] At
the end of 2013 then, most Iraqi militias were being withdrawn from Syria and
were re-deployed to Iraqto participate in Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki’s
Anbar offensive, as the advances made in Syria were judged to be sufficient for
the time being and were needed more in Iraq,[206]
only to be back in Syria by late 2014.[207]
In 2014 and ongoing, more and more groups emerged. With the help of Iran, Iraqi
groups such as the Badr Organization (itself claiming to have 1.500 fighters)[208],
Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Saraya Talia al-Khurasani, and Faylaq Waad
al-Sadiq as well as Syria-based Liwa Assad Allah al-Ghalib were announced.[209]
Moreover, Iran assisted the Shia militia group of Asaib Ahl al-Haq.[210]

All in all, Tehran
drilled these militias in Syria and abroad, sending them to training camps
simply for supplying them with weaponry as well as teaching them military
techniques.[211] Experts estimate that up
to 20,000 Shia foreign fighters were send to Syria by Tehran, thereby
supporting Assad and his army with crucial assistance in regaining the upper
hand in Syria again.[212] Most
of these groups were supervised by the IRGC, thereby often working together.
These auxiliary forces soon came to save the regime and demonstrated a structured
geo-political as well as ideological approach by Tehran.

Economic and financial backing

Although exact data is
hard to quantify and there is a lack of reliable data in times of war, there
are numerous reports and indications that Iran aided Syria financially so as to
keep economic pressure from further constraining the Syrian regime.

In the course of the
war, the Syrian economic output has dropped by half in real terms.[213]
Moreover, in absolute terms, the total economic deprivation since 2011 is
estimated at 202 billion USD.[214]
Especially, the loss of oil fields has hurt the regime, because petroleum
accounts for 50-60% of government revenues.^[215]

Other economic
indicators that underline the drastic fall of Syria’s economy is the fact that
the official exchange rate of the Syrian pound has plummeted by around 78%
since 2011.[216] Moreover, the inflation rate reached around 120% in
2012.[217]
Both indicators subsequently eased, however, indicating the increasing Iranian
economic help.

Official bilateral
trade has never been that tremendous between Iran and Syria.[218] In
2011, Iranian exports to Syria were on the 24^th place, while imports
were at the 64^th place. That situation has not changed considerably
in 2016: exports were at the 34^th place and imports at the 57^th. [219]
It has to be considered, however, that official data does not consider military
sales.[220]
The shadow industry and the unofficial numbers point another picture, as Iran
was Syria’s 4^th biggest trading partner in 2015.[221] The discrepancy
between the official IMF and the unofficial data therefore comes most likely
from illicit trading in military equipment and illegal trade circumventing the
sanctions, again proving Iran’s unconditional support for Syria.

As the regime is coming
under serious economic pressure, a Free-Trade-Agreement was signed in 2012.[222]
Additionally, a series of economic and trade talks were held between Iranian
and Syrian officials, which resulted in the mid-2015 agreement to strengthen
their economic bilateral ties and Iran having a far more dominant role in
Syria’s economy.[223]
Iran started to supply Syria with food, medicine, equipment for its energy
sector, but more importantly with oil and credit lines, although it has to be
said that this rather accounted for a war lords economy rather than
normal bilateral trade relations.[224] [225]

As the daily Syrian oil
production decreased from 387.000 barrels per day (b/d) to less than 10.000 b/d
recently, Iran send its crude oil, which as a prolongation of its oil shipments
since the Iraq-Iran war when Syria close its border for Iraqi oil, as mentioned
above.[226]
Syria then refined in its oil refineries to be able to sufficiently supply
regime-held areas with energy.^[227]
Iran send this oil either straight as part of other deals or sold it to Syria
under market prices, therefore supplying the regime with essential energy and
increasing its chances of survival.[228] [229]

The International
Energy Agency (IEA) Iranian oil sales and shipments to Syria commenced in 2014
when they stood at 30.000 b/d, slowly increasing to 60.000 b/d at the end of
the year. However, there is a lot of amplitude as crude shipments fell to 30.000
b/d in the beginning of 2015, but then maxed at 125.000 b/d in March. The IEA
suggested that in 2014 alone, Syria bought around 1 billion USD worth of oil
from Iran.[230]

Beside these energy
shipments, Iran’s most crucial economic aid were the credit lines it extended
to Syria.  Most prominently, in 2013
Tehran gave Damascus a 3.6 billion USD credit line for oil imports as well as
another 1 billion USD for all food and other commodities, which was probably
already used by late 2014, when economic indicators worsened again.[231] [232] [233] Besides
numerous unproved reports of further credit lines, another 1-billion USD loan
was again provided to Damascus in 2015 to counter these trends.[234]

The exact number of
other financial backing is disputed, but the United Nations and Arab League
Envoy to Syria Staffan de Mistura conservatively declared that the Iranian
government spends at least 6 billion USD annually on maintaining Assad’s
government. [235]

Other estimates from
various sources and time spans for a total amount given to Assad over the years
range from 9 billion to 15 billion to 19 billion USD total.[236] [237]

Monthly estimates,
again from various sources and different time spans, range from 500 million[238], to 600–700 million[239] to 1.5 billion USD per month[240].

Another often cited
source for Iranian economic aid to Syria is The Economist, which reported
that, next to shipping fuel to Syria, Iran had sent the Syrian government 9
billion USD by February 2012 in order to help it withstand Western sanctions.[241]

As sending the cash
itself is not so easy, especially after US, EU and UN sanctions were imposed on
Syria and are still imposed on Iran and particularly on their banking sectors,
Iran seemed to be sending the money and funds through the border with Iraq.[242]^{,[243] [244]}

The Syrian sanction
regime proved to be the world’s most complicated and holistic as it was
amended, extended and widened 19 times.[245] Helping
to circumvent Western sanctions proofed vital to keeping Assad alive, as they
continuously crippled the Syrian economy.[246] When
also Arab sanction were imposed on Syria, Iran further facilitated
circumvention for Syria’s central bank and other state institutions.[247]
Moreover, it aided Damascus economically by helping to ship its petroleum to
China.[248]

Iran has provided huge
financial assistance, military aid and oil supplies to Assad to preserve its
strategic position in Syria. These measures were, however, complicated by
sanctions both on Iran and Syria and the low growth of the Iranian economy
paired with historically low oil prices.[249]
Rather dwarfed by military aid coming from Tehran, Iran showed that its focus
is rather on military than on economic matters.

A coalition of the willing in formation

Iran is not alone in
its struggle to keep Assad in power. Besides Iran’s own allies such as Lebanon
and Hezbollah, Russia, Iraq and to a lesser extent China make up the pro-Assad
coalition.

Supporting Assad’s
government and forces militarily, Tehran is closely working and coordinating
with Russia. There have been several high-level meetings between Iranian and
Russian officials discussing about military strategies and about reaching a
political consensus on how to process in Syria. Especially after the loss of
Idlib province in the beginning of 2015, when the survival of the Assad regime
was concluded as becoming more and more uncertain, the Russian-Iranian
cooperation and coordination on ministerial level greatly increased.[250]

Both share the common
goal to keep Assad in power as well as reinforcing his army.[251]
Moreover, both parties want to be cardinal in a future diplomatic solution and
both share a common animosity against the Western world.[252]
For Russia it is also important to keep its Tartus naval base, which is the
only one outside of the ex-Soviet Union and in the Mediterranean Sea and that
serves as an intelligence hub.[253] Having declared that there is no difference in
Russian and Iranian interests in Syria and Russia being one of the few powers
not to have declared Hezbollah a terrorist organization, there is still a
healthy portion of mistrust between the two powers.[254]
That is because Moscow does not always stand behind Assad as Tehran wishes.

Therefore, in the
course of 2015 several meetings took place. In summer 2015, major general and
commander of the Quds Force Qasem Soleimani visited the Russian capital to talk
about the details on joint and coordinated military attacks in Syria.[255] This resulted in
a task sharing between Russia and Iran as of 2015. The Russians started their
bombings in Syria on September 30^th as Russian airstrikes and these were
accompanied with Iranian ground offensives in northwest Syria.[256]
Iran is therefore responsible for sending ground troops and making land gains
after said Russian bombings on strategic parts in Syria, together with
intelligence sharing and coordination.[257]
As Russia claims to hit terrorist organizations such as Daesh, around 80% of
its bombings hit rebels, however.[258] And
that, although a commercial plane was shot down, supposedly by Daesh over the
Sinai island.[259]
This task sharing was established in 2015, when Soleimani visited Moscow.[260]  This essentially has saved Assad and showed
that the two are willing to escalate militarily when the situation is not in
their favour. It also resulted in Russian soldiers being celebrated in Syria
and having counterfeits of Putin all over Syria.[261]

Later that year, even
Russian president Vladimir Putin and Supreme Leader of Iran Ali Khamenei met up
in Tehran after which the two countries were said to have harmonised their
position on a political solution for Syria. This backing from the two aspiring
hegemons along with deliveries of munitions and equipment is helping to
stabilize the Syrian regime. Iranian militaries were also invited in 2015 to
the Russian Tsentr military exercise. [262]

There are also economic
interests involved.[263]
The Iranian and Russian defence industries are highly linked, which makes the
two countries geo-economic interests.[264]
As Russian arms have ended up in vast amounts in Iran, Moscow also uses these
weapons to present its own arms hardware. Apparently, after international
sanctions will be lifted, Tehran already has a list prepared worth 8 billion
USD for Russian arms.[265]

Concerning direct
military cooperation, Tehran and Moscow also agreed on using Iranian military territory.
Moscow was also allowed to use Iraqi and Iranian airspace for its bombers and
cruise missiles from their way from Russia to the Syrian battlefield. For the
first time in the history of the Islamic Republic, Tehran allowed an exterior
power to use its airbases in Noje and airspace (which sparked a lot of
controversy since the Iranian sectarian constitution forbids any military
involvement inside Iran).[266]

Both Tehran and Moscow
would like to prepare for a future without Assad and a multi polar world order,
reasserting themselves as regional and global players, respectively. However,
Russia is bound to Assad than Iran and even weakened the Iranian position in
Syria, because Damascus has long sought to weaken Iranian dependence and
because Syria saw Iran often as too sectarian.[267] [268]

For China, Syria and Iran are also vital because of
economic aspects. As the Strait of Hormuz, located opposite the Iranian coast,
roughly accounts for a quarter of the world’s petroleum, Beijing would like to
secure future oil shipments.[269] Two of its state-owned
oil companies also had shares in Syria’s petroleum companies.[270] Moreover, China helped
Syria to circumvent sanctions by buying oil straight from Damascus.[271] In addition, China is
one of the biggest arms suppliers to Iran.[272]

Both Russia and China have interests in Syria
as they use it to soft-balance against US hegemony. They do so most notoriously
by vetoing UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions calling for the ousting of
Assad or any military action in Syria due to the recent example of Libya where
the West overstepped its UNSC resolution mandate by promoting regime change.
Countering any Western effort to punish Assad, this was valuable political and
military backing for Syria as the world community had to stand idle by and
cannot legally intervene in Syria.[273] Thereby, both keep
their Axis of Resistance image and can counter-balance against any US
or Western foreign policy initiative in the Middle East.[274]

Together with Iran and
Iraq, Moscow also helped to initiate the Russia–Syria–Iran–Iraq coalition, also
referred to as the 4+1 coalition with Hezbollah as the fifth member in Baghdad.
It is a joint intelligence-sharing cooperation and its purpose is officially to
oppose Daesh in Syria, having been formed in 2015 to coordinate and share
intelligence about terrorist groups.  [275]

Iran, Hezbollah, Russia
and Iraq and to a lesser extent China have shown to deploy considerable
resources to prop up Assad and keep him in power. Wishing to defy Western
regional hegemony in the Middle East, they have given the regime in Damascus
somehow unlimited support.[276]

Riyadh’s strategies towards Syria

Riyadh is employing a
wide range of measures in order to achieve its goals in Syria. Being opposed to
the Assad regime, Saudi Arabia uses its vast financial reserves to massively
fund armed rebel forming the anti-Syrian opposition. Like Iran, Riyadh also
supplies military equipment and advice to various groups involved in the war in
Syria. Moreover, the Saudi monarchy uses its diplomatic weight on the
international scene to nudge countries and actors towards its own will.

Political Support of rebel groups

The secretly leaked Saudi
Cables by WikiLeaks have revealed that the Saudis and other Arab allies are
concerned not only by Iran’s Nuclear Deal, but also in general by its
re-emergence and the resulting rise of Shiism. This is why Riyadh wants to be
precautious and counter an Iranian backed Syria by using its political leverage
to provide major political and diplomatic support to rebel and opposition
groups as well as non-state-actors such as
tribes, militias or other political parties in Syria, also due to Riyadh’s
concern of Syria as a threat to its national security.[277]

Firstly, Riyadh helped
by mirroring the opposition’s goal for a future Syria without Assad. Riyadh was
and is sticking to that position also due to Assad violently killing Sunnis,
which sparked sectarian outrage in Saudi Arabia.[278] The Saudis furthermore echoed another rebel demand
that Assad can never be part of any political situation, a position on which
even the Obama administration weakened. The Saudis later had to learn, nonetheless, that finding a
credible and legitimate replacement for Assad after decades of political
repression of all the opposition was not that easy.[279]

Riyadh’s main job,
however, was to unify the fragmented opposition. Furthermore it helped by fully
recognising opposition groups and by boosting their diplomatic status and capabilities.[280]^,[281] Riyadh
enjoys great influence and is valued among the Syrian opposition, where it
supports all groups making up the anti-Assad and anti-Iranian front: from the
relatively moderate FSA to the jihadist Jabhat al-Nusra front.[282]

There is, however, an
important trend in the foreign policy approach Riyadh had towards Syria. Being
a careful and conservative player, Riyadh waited some time to be sure where and
when to interact in Syria. That was in the beginning of 2012, when Saudi Arabia
started to form and support the more secular FSA. The group however was a
conglomeration of various hundreds of rebel groups, without a clear command
structure which often fought for their own benefit. The various FSA leaders
were often supported by different Gulf countries, which led to a further
diffusion in their battle strength. [283]
Their number was estimated at between 50.000 – 80.000 fighters in 2013.[284] [285] [286] As
Riyadh grew tired of its infectivity, Saudi foreign policy moved towards more
radical rebel groups with Islamist, Salafi/Wahhabi or Jihadi ideologies. What
was crucial for political support from Saudi Arabia was the fact that groups
would not question or challenge the domestic authority of the al-Sauds and to
oppose Daesh and al-Nusra, because Riyadh (as a status quo actor) especially
feared their trans-national character. To further harm these entities as well
as boosting the status of other groups, the Kingdom designated Daesh and
al-Nusra as terrorist organizations in 2014.[287] The same followed for the Muslim Brotherhood as well
as al-Qaeda and its various affiliates.[288]

Later on, the Saudis coordinated Jaysh al-Islam, a
conglomeration of seven radical Sunni rebel groups and other coalitions of
Sunni rebels, most notably the Syrian National Council (SNC).[289]
This conglomerate was, however, too Brotherhood-dominated for Riyadh, which is
why it formed the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition
Forces (NC) stressing rather minority, secular and nationalist movements.[290]
Ultimately, the Saudi-supported Ahmad al-Jarba became its president in 2013.[291] The
more radical groups of Jaysh al-Islam went on to form the al-Jabha al-Islamiya
or Islamic Front, also rumoured to be supported by the Saudis.[292] In advocating
recognition for these groups, the Saudis upgraded the reputation, the status
and the capabilities of the political opposition to the Syrian regime.

This political support
to various Sunni groups had several effects. On the one hand, Riyadh nudged
groups to unite, thereby increasing their efficiency. But at the same time,
this led to groups undermining if not directly opposing the efficiency of the
less radical FSA. Lastly, Saudi support was often thwarted by Qatar and to a
lesser extent Turkey, who both backed the Muslims Brotherhood, a grouping
Riyadh hated ever since.

Another important
element for a political solution for Syria are the various peace talks
initiated by numerous actors, most notably the so far four Geneva Peace Talks.
Here as well, the Saudis supported the opposition by advising and cooperating
with them. As an example of the political power Riyadh had over these groups,
Riyadh persuaded rebel groups in the aftermath of the Aleppo offensive to leave
the Geneva Peace Talks so as to send a strong and unified political signal to
the Syrian regime. Its role during these talks was in general very prominent as
Riyadh eased as well as nudged rebel participation for these peace talks and
again stressed that there cannot be a political solution with Assad.

Besides the all-present
Geneva Peace Talks, the Saudi government also held its own peace conference
late in 2015 with more than a hundred Syrian opposition leaders participating. Eventually, these talks produced the High
Negotiations Committee (HNC) representing a rather united opposition for talks
with the Assad regime so as to achieve a pluralistic Syria with free and fair
elections. Riyadh invested a lot of political
and diplomatic capital in the HNC, which might have been its most ambitious
project to counter the fragmentation of the Syrian opposition.[293]
As the Saudis were the main actor responsible in creating and aiding most
groups, they also had privileged access to most of them, which they used to
further influence these groups in their will.[294]

The Saudis also tried to give a come out for defected Syrians. It welcomed several regime insiders as well as generals. Riyadh held talks with the controversial Rifaat al-Assad, an uncle of Bashar al-Assad.[295] Moreover, the Saudis welcomed the prominent defected Syrian brigadier general Manaf Tlas in mid-2012. Besides these prominent defections, the bulk of defected common Syrian soldiers was used to form FSA battalions, which Riyadh gave special attention by aiding them inter alia politically and lastly Riyadh joined the Friends of Syria, an informal international group that was formed in the wake of Russian and Chinese UNSC vetoes and which actively encouraged defections as well as legitimizing the SNC.^[296]

Direct and indirect military aid

The Saudi military can
be characterized as a historically well-funded, yet rather ill-prepared for
operational warfare. Since Saudi Arabia has no constitution, its sectarian basic
laws define the king as the ultimate authority over all defence matters,
including the war in Syria.[297]
Decades of enormous funding resulted in Saudi Arabia having the second highest
import share of global arms after India from 2011-2015.[298]
The reliance on foreign military protection, most importantly from the US, is
cause and effect of its inefficiency. The Saudi army still seems to run on
tribal and regional bases.[299]
This and corruption could outweigh decades of modernization and the possession
of the latest high-tech military technology. As it has only fought a few wars
and these rather inefficient, such as in Yemen 2009, Riyadh cannot count alone
on its own military to win the war in Syria. Felling more and more isolated,[300] Saudi Arabia invested heavily in its army, spending
more than 13% of GDP (in comparison to around 2% for Iran) on military expenses
in 2015.[301]
This will rise to 27% of GDP by 2020.[302] From 2003 on, the Saudi military grew remarkably: its
army has grown from 100,000 to 200,000 men and its air force now ranks second
behind Egypt in the Arab world, while its navy has grown from 15,000 to 25,000
men over the last decade. Riyadh also invested in new material: US supplied
M1A2 Abrams main battle tanks and M2 Bradley armoured fighting vehicles for the
army; F-15S Strike Eagles, Eurofighter Typhoons and some older Tornados for the
air force.[303]
This shows that the Saudi government is anticipating a war or wants at least be
prepared for one.[304]

As an actor known for fighting for the status-quo and
an US presence in the Middle East, Riyadh was impatiently waiting for a
stronger US involvement during the outset of the Syrian war. When this did not
happen and even worse, the Obama administration hesitated to intervene in Syria
after Assad had reportedly used chemical weapons against his fellow citizens,
Riyadh appealed to the US numerous times to intervene, provided Washington with
intelligence that proofed the use of chemical weapons, and the Saudi King
proclaimed that US credibility was at stake if the red line Obama drew about
chemical weapons would not be drawn.[305]
In the beginning of 2016, the Saudi military spokesman Brig. Gen. Ahmed al
Asiri announced that the Saudis were ready to send ground troops into Syria, at
a time when Assad’s forces were making ground gain.[306]
And again, the Saudis spoke out for a more active US role in Syria. All these moves
by Riyadh were made so as to draw the US into the Middle East again and to
renew their commitment to Saudi Arabia. Additionally, Riyadh wanted a US
commitment to Saudi Arabia in the wake of the Iran Deal. The US is, however,
still processing its engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq and does not want to
be dragged into another war that quickly again, plus it lists the Libyan
example as proof that boots on the ground are not always needed. All these
steps, however, did not work to reengage Washington to act in the Middle East
and retake its role as the traditional ally and protector of all Saudi causes;
Riyadh had to change their usual cautious, defensive and passive foreign policy
role into a more assertive, interventionist policy.

Initially, Riyadh also
starkly supported the FSA, having some of their units under Saudi trainers and
advisers.[307]
In February 2013, sizable small arms shipments that Saudi Arabia financed and
provided to anti-Assad fighters in Syria were given to the FSA. Heavy arms for
example came in from Croatia and were smuggled through the Jordanian border to
reach the FSA in early 2013.[308]
However, due to its overlapping support for numerous rebel groups, Saudi
efforts have at times undermined the FSA on the battlefield.

As Riyadh grew tired of
its inefficiency the FSA was dropped and the Kingdom started to support other
groups. Groups which were militarily supported are all anti-Iranian and ranged
from secular to radical, from Ahrar al-Sham, Jabhat al-Nusra, Jaysh al-Islam to
Jaish al-Fatah. Some, such as al-Fatah, were initiated and armed by the Saudis
in 2015 with small arm shipments and later heavier equipment.

Especially after
Assad’s increasing reliance on the Iranian-backed Hezbollah militia beginning
in summer 2013, Riyadh stepped up its military support and increasingly
provided significant assistance to these Syrian rebels in the form of weaponry.
Using arms shipments as well as arms sales to support the rebel groups trying
to topple Assad, Riyadh also provided training at military camps in Jordan,
where it also equipped the Syrian and Sunni opposition with well-needed
military equipment. Moreover,
old Yugoslav weapons were acquired by the Saudis and then brought to Syria
through Jordan.[309]
More examples include weapons that were purchased from Turkey, Chechnya and
other locations.[310]
Having in general also smoothed the transfer of weaponry for all anti-Assad
groups, Riyadh increasingly supplied heavy machinery such as US made anti-tank
missiles, rather than continuously relying on small arms.[311] [312]
These examples of receivers of Saudi military support and coordination would
not have been able to win over Idlib in May
2015,[313]
or declare a joint military command due to Saudi pressure for rebel groups
fighting around Damascus without the help from Riyadh.

During the onset of the
war, besides military support to rebel and opposition forces, Riyadh also tried
to coordinate and streamline its intelligence and military cooperation with
other Gulf countries and its traditional ally the USA. As early as June 2012,
Riyadh, Ankara and Doha were paying for weapons being funnelled through secret
channels to Syrian rebel fighters. This cooperation, however, died out quickly when it became
clear that all participating countries in Syria were increasingly fighting
their own fight. As a reaction, the Kingdom tried to reinforce their Southern
Strategy, aiding moderate rebels from the Jordanian border so as to build a
counterweight to the Northern Turkey-Qatar-supported Jihadists.[314]

As there is an
unprecedented number of Saudi foreign fighters in Syria, this paragraph will
briefly talk about it, considering it an indirect military aid. The case of foreign
fighters in Syria has constantly risen, with Saudis representing the majority
of foreign fighters. Saudi officials have claimed that at least 1,200 Saudi
fighters have travelled to Syria in order to fight the regime. This only
happened, however, after Hezbollah joined the conflict and after the battle of Qusayr in late
May 2013. Following and intensifying this Saudi inflow, Saudi
clerics, as mentioned above, have reminded the Sunni population of their holyduty to support the Syrian rebels. Most Saudis joined extremist,
jihadist and Wahhabi groups such as al-Nusra or Daesh, which worried
the Saudi government of ramifications when these fighters would return to Saudi
Arabia – but Riyadh nevertheless did not apply all
measures in order to discourage its citizens to travel to Syria.[315]

Moreover, Riyadh
frequently cooperated with the US and more regularly with the CIA to ease the
shipments. Together with Washington Riyadh provided material, financial, and organizational
support to Sunni anti-Assad forces.

Lastly, Riyadh
participated in several military operations with its allies to weaken Assad.
The Saudis took part in the air campaign spearheaded by the US against Daesh in
Syria, although only a few Saudi bombings were flown.[316]
Together with Turkey, the Saudis set up a committee for military affairs to plan and cooperate future operations into Syria
coming from Turkish border and it was announced that the first Saudi F-15s
would arrive at the Incirlik airbase in Southern Turkey.[317]
Rumours had it, that there were, however, more Saudi troops stationed.[318]
All this seems to underline that the Saudi kingdom is now in charge of the
military cooperation between its Gulf allies, since Prince Salman bin Sultan
and his brother Prince Bandar now oversee both private and state support for
Syria.

In conclusion, Riyadh
allowed the armed opposition to hold back Assad’s forces in several areas
during 2015. With a
rather strong presence in the south of Syria across the Jordanian, Riyadh
wanted to shift the tide, which eventually failed.[319]
Ultimately, Riyadh’s military support was not enough; or rather, Iran and
Russia too strong, with the result that rebel forces are losing major battles
and that they can no longer even hold their ground and their previous land
gains.[320]
Another result was that more radical entities increasingly overcame the secular
movements in Syria due to their superior funding and equipment.[321]

Economic and financial backing

Due to its massive oil
revenues, Riyadh is capable to use its vast financial reserves to massively
fund and finance various Sunni rebel groups.

It has to be added,
however, that due to the recent Saudi ruling
family’s move to a younger generation in the succession of the Saudi throne as
well as the defence establishment and the foreign ministry, there are many
changes happening in Riyadh. A centralization of power combined with a more
decisive policy make for a more streamlined approach, apparently focusing more
on domestic rather than foreign affairs. Moreover, the country’s economic
challenges, intensified by the decrease in oil prices (its break-even oil price
rose from 35 USD in 2005 to 90 USD
per barrel in 2012)[322] from 110 USD in 2014 to 30-50 USD in 2016,[323] mean that Riyadh had and has to fiscally plan more cautiously, cutting a
lot of subsidizes and funding to Syria.[324]

The decreased state
spending due to a record state deficit and political changes will result in a
competition between domestic spending on education and healthcare versus
foreign spending on defence and Syria, which will make foreign policy decisions more debated as scarcer resource will draw on more
attention and will bring about social upheaval.[325]
[326]

Nevertheless, Riyadh
spends a lot of money on Sunni rebel groups and the Syrian opposition so as to
politically and militarily weaken Assad. Most of the Saudi funding went to the
National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces and the FSA,
but funding, mostly in the form of paying salaries of rebels, also went to
almost all the major opposition groups.[327]

Although Riyadh is
officially outspoken against funding extremist groups such as al-Nusra, Daesh
or al-Qaeda and has designated these groups as terrorist entities in 2014 as mentioned
above, there are numerous reports of Saudi state money designated to benefit
the Syrian cause that is being channelled by wealthy private donors. Coming
mostly from Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia itself, these donors fund mostly the
more radical groups within Syria, which results in more fragmented and
extremist rebel groups, who furthermore have to compete for funds, thereby
surpassing each other in radicalism.[328]
Often these groups just pretend to be radical or Jihadi in order to attract
more Saudi money.[329]
What is moreover interesting for Riyadh, is that some of these groups are also
fighting and have links around the Iranian vicinity.[330]

State funding coming
from Riyadh is mostly accompanied by funds from Qatar and the United Arab
Emirates, resulting in a fragmentation of rebel groups as mentioned above. But
Riyadh also allowed Islamic fundraising networks to collect money for the
Syrian cause within the Muslim community.[331]

Besides sending money
itself, funds also are designated for rebel arms purchases.[332]
Examples for Saudi state funding to Syria include a CIA deal, where the Saudis
bought and financed arms trough Croatia, eventually sending them to Syrian
rebels.[333] Another example is a joint economic package coming
from Doha and Riyadh, generously sponsoring the FSA.[334]
The rivalry between Riyadh and Doha is also problematic here, as rebel groups
compete for funding.[335]
The goal is two-fold: one the one hand, Riyadh wants these groups to fight the
Syrian regime as the Saudi army is not strong enough for that task and on the
other hand, Riyadh wants to strengthen these groups so it will have a say in
the future scenario that Assad might be ousted out of office and a political
solution will be needed.

Next to rebel and
opposition groups, there are also links to Syrian tribes, religious institutions
as well as executives and managers, which have been funded by the Saudi
monarchy. Even here, actors pretended to be jihadist simply to attract wealthy
Gulf sponsors, which are the main sources of funding for them.[336]

Directly and
indirectly, through the state and trough private donors, funding went
increasingly to radical groups, but could ultimately not halt the regime
regaining of strategic parts of Syria.

Use of diplomatic channels

Riyadh has enormous
diplomatic heft which results from Saudi Arabia’s role as the leader of the
Arab and Muslim world and its huge oil reserves with which it can set the oil
price. This is also partly based on Saudi soft power, which it derives from its
role as a cultural power, being the custodian of the two holy cities of Mecca
and Medina and its religious legitimacy spread by its respected clerics. In
addition, Riyadh is founding member and part of international organizations
such as the Arab League, the GCC, and the OIC as well as in economic
international organizations such as in OPEC or the Arab Monetary Fund. Through
these means, Riyadh can exercise tremendous diplomatic pressure, which it also
used in the case of Syria.^[337]

Historically, the
Kingdom has had a leadership role in these multilateral organizations, as the
Saudis are regarded as protecting common Gulf interests and are seen as driving
a foreign policy for the good of the wider region.^[338] They have so done in Syria by coordinating and
leading Gulf engagements in various international organizations.

Saudi Arabia has the
second highest proven oil reserves and the highest daily crude oil production
in the world.[339]
This provides Riyadh with the possibility to influence and at times even set
the crude oil price. In the case of Syria, Saudi Arabia used the oil price to
threaten Iran and Russia into supporting Assad less as well as nudging Russia
into reducing their arms sales to Iran. In
order to reach an agreement on Syria it was reported that Riyadh would consider
a crude oil price around 60 USD in exchange for a serious commitment from
Tehran to a peace process for Syria.[340]

It can be argued that
the GCC itself was created in 1981 by Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates mostly to balance against the power of Iran
in the Persian Gulf and around the Middle East. Saudi Arabia as the leading
actor in the GCC was and is also tasked to protect the goals of smaller GCC
members such as Bahrain. [341]
[342]
In the wake of the Syrian war the GCC called upon the United Nations to
intervene in Syria and it opposed Russia’s role in the conflict to counter
Iranian hegemony. Moreover, in 2011 it called upon Assad to end the “deadly
suppression of citizens”.[343]
This was succeeded by the famous quote from King Abdullah to “stop the killing
machine” in Syria. [344]

Saudi Arabia also used
the Arab League to their ends. As its leading member, Riyadh nudged the other
members to suspend Syria’s membership in the Arab League in 2011.[345]
As a former member of the United Arab Republic and a strong advocate for Arab
unity, the suspension was a strong blow to Damascus with its Pan-Arabian
philosophy. Additionally, the League used the threat of NATO intervention in
Syria, as it had done with Gaddafi in Libya to further strain Assad to bow to
reforms.[346]
Saudi Arabia additionally increased the political pressure by rallying Arab
support in the Arab League to further condemn and politically isolate Assad in
the Arab world.[347] In 2011 the Arab League
also imposed economic, trade and financial sanctions on Syria, combined with
asset freezes and travel bans and the League tried to refer Syria to the
International Criminal Court in The Hague for committing crimes against
humanity.[348]

Furthermore calling
upon Assad to step down, the Arab League proved to be firmly in the hands of
the Saudis. It called upon the UNSC for a resolution, which was vetoed by China
and Russia, however.[349]
This resulted in Riyadh’s decision in 2013 to turn down its seat in the UNSC,
which it long aspired and worked hard for. Thereby Saudi Arabia became the
first country ever to do such a thing, criticizing the international community
for its undemocratic and unmoral behaviour towards Syria.^[350]

As a last example of
the use of multi-polar diplomacy, the Kingdom was responsible for excluding
Syria also from the OIC.[351]
Plus, the GCC and the Arab League listed Hezbollah as a terrorist organization
in March 2016.[352]

Saudi Arabia also went into bilateral diplomatic
negotiations to better the outcome of the Syrian conflict. In the beginning of
2012, Riyadh withdrew its delegation from the Arab League’s peacekeeping
mission in Syria (which was equally done by other Gulf countries).[353]
Moreover, the Syrian ambassador was expelled from Riyadh and the Saudi embassy
in Damascus was closed down later that year (which was copied by Bahrain and
Kuwait).[354]
As US engagement faded in the Middle East, [355]
Riyadh offered Russia not to use a future Assad-free Syria as a hub for their
competing natural gas shipments to Europe, if Moscow would disengage its
military backing to Assad.[356]
Additionally, the Saudi Intelligence Chief, Prince Bandar bin Sultan tried to
persuade Russia into decreasing its support for the Syrian regime.[357]
Moreover, various high level meetings took place between Riyadh and Moscow in
2015 and 2016.[358] These meetings resulted in an agreement to slow up
oil-production and numerous concords in strategic areas such as energy,
military and nuclear were concluded.[359]
Disappointed by the US, this was also a major change in Riyadh’s foreign policy
realizing Moscow’s regained strength in Syria.[360]

The Saudi monarchy even
went so far as to diplomatically encourage the Syrian regime to put a stop to
its alliance with Tehran in return for improved diplomatic and economic
relations with the Gulf States.[361]
It approached Iran directly by stating that Iranian officials could visit Saudi
Arabia anytime.

Besides various appeals
towards the UN, the US and France to engage militarily in Syria,[362]
Riyadh approached Israel to balance against Iran in the wake of the
Iranian-American Nuclear Deal.

A Sunni alliance in formation

In order to gain more
support for its goals in Syria, Riyadh instrumentalized the sectarian aspect
and forged an image of we vs. them, of Sunnis vs. Shias so as to rally support
from all Sunnis and further demonize Iran as the one enemy. As it presented Iran’s
engagement in Syria as meddling in a traditional GCC area of influence, the
steady rise in sectarianism is used to polarize the denominations.[363]

Since Riyadh sees
itself as the representative and guardian of all Sunnis and even the global
Muslim ummah as well as being the guardian over the two holy sites
Media and Mecca including the holy pilgrimage, Saudi clerics wield a high moral
and religious authority among the global Muslim community. These so-called ulamas (scholar) have always been outspoken against Iran – especially
after the Iranian revolution in 1979 – and the regime in Syria as they portray
the Shia community as infidels and paint them as the main external (Iran) and
internal (Shia minority in Saudi Arabia) enemy of the Saudi state. In the context
of the war in Syria, these mostly conservative scholars stressed the religious
schism between the Sunni and Shia denominations and denounced the Alawite
violence against fellow Sunni brothers. Initially they even went so far as to
call for the killing of Shias and Alawites. As these clerics are mostly in line
with the thinking of the Saudi regime, they moreover stressed Assad’s and
Iran’s connection, saying that on the expense of Sunnis, Iran was expanding its
influence in the Middle East. Here the institution of the Saudi Grand Mufti
should be stressed, who declared both Hafez (in 1982) and Bashar (in 2013) as
infidels and enemies of Islam. To further support the Syrian cause and Riyadh’s
efforts, these clerics formerly declared jihad upon Syria (as did the World
Ulama Council), and called upon their followers worldwide to send out prayers
as well as financial and military aid. Having initially even called for Sunnis
to join the fight in Syria, the Saudi government then forbid Saudis from
travelling and fighting abroad, fearing external radicalization, as Riyadh had
learned from the dark history of Saudi foreign fighters, which constituted 15
out of 19 fighters that planned the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Subsequently,
Riyadh’s endorsements of Syrian rebel groups found its way into the mouths of
these ulamas as they declared support
for various groups fighting the Syrian regime, initially especially the FSA and
later more radical groupings. Furthermore, they were supposedly
instrumentalized as they called for a boycott of Iranian products and later for
Arab governments to fight Assad.[364] [365] [366]

Besides working with
its traditional Sunni allies, such as Bahrain, Kuwait and Jordan, Saudi Arabia
had its difficulties with finding a common ground with Doha and Ankara.  The original idea was that Turkey and Qatar
would be responsible for northern Syria, while Saudi Arabia and Jordan (with
their intelligence) would take matters into their hands in the south.[367] This agreement, however, fell apart.[368]
On the other hand, the mighty Gulf media constantly called for the ouster of
Assad, thereby rallying Arab and international support.[369]
Especially with the help of its controlled media and TV setups such as the
Qatari Al-Jazeera the conflict was framed in a sectarian picture and narratives
were devised.[370] [371]
Assad was increasingly portrayed as slaughtering innocent Sunnis to mobilize
more rebels as well as try to get more funds from the Syrian diaspora.[372]

Unusual for Riyadh,
this more assertive and prominent role resulted in the announcement of a 34
member strong Muslim alliance against terror, the third attempt to
institutionalize military cooperation among the Muslim and Arab world after a
2013 GCC military force and a 2015 common anti-terror force by the Arab League.[373]
Riyadh claimed that its purpose will be to counter-balance Iranian influence in
the region, restore Saudi Arabia’s somewhat flawed reputation in the Muslim
world and to create military synergies. The first purpose can be seen in its
composition. While all of its members all also in the Organisation of Islamic
Cooperation, Iran and Iraq as Shia majority countries are absent. It therefore
is a de-facto Sunni alliance and a unified Muslim front claiming to be the
newest and only true Sunni Muslim representative.[374]
But there are also several other reasons why Riyadh was establishing its Muslim
Coalition in the first place, besides its anti-Iranian character.[375]
Its lack of combat experience and military strategy is one, since Riyadh only
took part in military operations during the US-led liberation of Kuwait from
Iraq and more recently the Saudi campaign in Yemen. Moreover, Riyadh faces
budget constraints due to the low oil price with an estimated state deficit of 87
billion USD in 2016. In addition, the Saudi army, like its civilian labour
force, is highly reliable on foreign personnel.[376]
Taking advantage of its great influence in the Muslim world, Riyadh therefore
invited all countries into its alliance, even though some reportedly did not
even agree to join.[377]
By doing so, the Kingdom wanted to seem assertive in fighting not only Daesh,
but rather Iran and its allies as the collation will coordinate not only in
Syria but also in Iraq and Lebanon thereby bringing Sunnis together to counter
Shia hegemony.[378]

In the context of
reasserting themselves regionally, the Saudis also pushed to form GCC and Arab
League single commands and undertook the Northern Thunder military
exercise, a massive joint military exercise near the Iraqi border with 20
mostly Muslim Sunni countries and hundreds of thousands of troops
participating. [379]
[380] Its goal was to
train for a possible future land invasion of Syria as part of the Saudi
coalition and under the supervision of Riyadh, thereby proving that Riyadh is
capable and willing to defend itself and Gulf interests.[381] [382]

Comparative analysis of Iranian and Saudi employed resources, capacities and limitations

It is in this sectarian and geo-political context described above, that
both parties tried to outsmart one another, employing vast ranges of their
state capacities while trying to limit their constraints.

Iran has invested heavily in multi-dimensional support so as to prop up Syria’s
minority regime. While constantly supporting Assad publicly, even in the wake
of chemical attacks, Tehran formed a coalition of the willing around its
own forces that it deployed to the Syrian battlefield. As Iran had so many
interests in Syria, it was willing to deploy all of its proxy Shia militias, which
resulted in Iran having control over Syria according to high-ranking defected
Syrian regime insiders.[383]
To form another puppet state and build up regional
leverage, Iran’s policies were by far more complicated, pro-active and
assertive than those of Riyadh.[384] As the rebellion materialized, Iran’s experience
in supporting non-state-actors in fragile states to increase its influence and holding non-state-actors in power in weak states,
gave it a huge advantage over the Saudis who lacked that experience and who had
to work outside of existing state institutions in Syria.[385]
More advantages for Tehran included the geographical proximity of Hezbollah to
the battlefield in Syria, its established land and air bridge through Iraq, as
well as the readiness and combat acquaintance these seasoned groups acquired
over the last years and who regarded the IRGC as their role model. All
that resulted in several major strategic wins for the Iran-led axis. Having had the organizational and
institutional capacities it could rely on in Syria, Iran had the capability for
a long and enduring civil war in another country, with considerably more
diplomatic and intelligence resources at their hands than Riyadh.[386]

Because Iran has proven considerably more committed, competent and
coherent than its Gulf rivals in fighting its cause in Syria, Tehran made
itself indispensable in future talks and was able to reserve a better position
for these talks that will eventually determine the political outcome in Syria,
as any deal now will most probably have some form of regime preservation,
though which Iran will be able to continuously assert influence.^[387]

Having been on a losing
streak in conflicts in the Middle East, Saudi officials wanted to prove a point
by applying all their state resources in Syria.[388] Nominally the Saudis had the vast Sunni Syrian
population as well as most international support on their side. Willing to sway
Iran from the US, Saudi Arabia went to great lengths in order to discredit Iran
as an alternative partner for the West. This partly resulted in Iran constantly
not being invited to diplomatic or peace talks concerning Syria. But just
because Tehran was absent, did not mean that Riyadh could freely determine the
outcomes of diplomatic talks. On the contrary, the Kingdom’s efforts in uniting
the opposition anew and forming coalition after coalition never really
materialized (from the SNC to the NC to the Friends of Syria) and the slim
chances of a political solution diminished due to the Kingdom’s feuds with
other Gulf monarchies, which were partly reflected in the Syrian opposition’s
rivalries. These groups were also missing military training, operational
supervision and intra-Arab intelligence sharing, all of which ultimately
resulted in a deepening fragmentation of the opposition forces, which was at
long last too weak and uncoordinated to oppose Assad’s forces.[389]

Riyadh faced
considerably other constraints, as it rather reluctantly acted due to the war’s
uncertain dynamics, waited for a US response and knew of its own standing and
limitations.^[390] Being the traditional
ally of the US brought both advantages as well as disadvantages for Riyadh. As
the Saudis relied on the West to solve the crisis for them, Riyadh joined the
US-led coalition against Daesh, but quickly had to learn that Obama did not
want to enforce his red-line after the chemical attacks in 2013. This was the turning
point for increased Saudi aid, when Riyadh realized that it had to act on its
own.[391]
In contrast to Iran, however, Saudi Arabia was not used to fight proxy wars and
conduct complex intelligence operations during chaotic civil wars. It lacked an
understanding of the Syrian society and groups involved and of the dynamics at
hand. As a result, Riyadh had to overly rely on external actors, which were
less efficient, less watchable and less controllable.[392] The Saudi engagement can therefore be briefly characterized
as too little, too late, as the Saudi role in Syria was important and
influential but in the end not decisive due to their numerous constraints and
the lack of engagement by its traditional US ally.

An advantage for the
Saudis was its economic pool of petro dollars to supply, fund and arm rebel
groups. While Iran was constrained on this matter by sanctions and a weak
economy, as the sanctions removed around 50% of Iran’s oil revenues or 5
billion USD per month.[393]
Tehran nevertheless managed to efficiently support rebel groups, although its
focus clearly laid on military aid. That was because Tehran was effectively the
only instance who did so and could therefore better coordinate than Riyadh.

In contrast to the
Kingdom, Iran had relatively few constraints in fighting in Syria. Because many
Muslims increasingly saw the Syrian regime as a killing-machine, Iran’s image
as a mediator and fighter for pan-Muslim causes got lost, as it continuously
supported Assad. Iran’s popularity was decreased substantially as it was increasingly
seen as a sectarian actor, willing only to further the Shia cause. No longer was
Iran seen as a guarantor for minority and Sunni struggles, such as the one in
Palestine.[394]
Iran tried to downplay the sectarian character of late, but it was – again –
increasingly isolated internationally and in the Muslim world. Paired with its
revolutionary Islamic ideology, Iran’s soft power was dealt a hefty setback
when this sectarianism impaired its image as an Islamic state.

The sectarian rise also
saw disadvantages for Saudi Arabia. Firstly, because the West saw Sunni
extremism as more dangerous than Shia radicalism. Secondly, because the Saudi
fuelled sectarianism gave ideological rise to Daesh and al-Nusra, which
threatened the Saudi legitimacy at home and which already resulted in terrorist
attacks on Saudi soil. All that means that the Saudis had to take into account
their domestic audience more than Tehran.[395] Domestically,
Tehran portrayed the conflict as
fighting radical Sunnis that would eventually reach Iranian soil if Tehran
would not take care of them now. Although the support for Assad was rather
unpopular in Iran due to Syrian regime brutality and the high Iranian human
loss in Syria, Iran also lacked media coverage about the conflict at home,
which resulted in a weak domestic counter-front to Iranian engagement in Syria.[396]

Unlike Iran, Riyadh had to cooperate with other involved actors such as
the West, other Gulf countries or Turkey. One of the biggest
constraints for the Saudis were the inter-Gulf quarrels, which ultimately led
to the current Syrian opposition being too weak and too fractious. There were a
lot of disagreements especially with Qatar and Turkey on how to handle the
Syrian crisis. Their biggest point of contention was the Muslim Brotherhood, a
group that both Doha and Ankara traditionally supported and which Riyadh
historically loathed.[397] As the Saudis worked to discredit the Brotherhood and
marked them as a terrorist organization, the two others actively supported it.[398]
This drained important resources away from balancing against Iran and revealed
the vastly divergent approaches and interests of the Gulf States.[399]
Riyadh’s hegemony in the region is often contested in general and met with
resentment, which further limits the Kingdom’s scope.[400]

As Iran got it weapons
mostly from the third world, the Saudis acquired most of their weaponry from
the West. Due to the rise of radicalism and Daesh in particular, most Western
arm contracts included clauses and restrictions that made it illegal to hand
over or resell these weapons, so that they would not end up in the hands of
radical rebel groups.[401] This
limitation resulted in a lack in ground-to-air weapons as well as long-range
rocket that would have inter alia ended the Russian Air Force’s supremacy and
which the Saudis continuously demanded from the US government.[402] [403] Only after some time did the Saudis manage to get new
weaponry, however with inferior quality and quantity.[404]

Conclusion and Outlook

After more than seven
years of intense fighting, the war in Syria is raging as violently as ever.
With the Iranian/Shia/Russian/Syrian axis on one side and the Saudi/Sunni/US
coalition on the other side, the conflict has had profound regional and
international implications. As sectarian dichotomy was used to polarize and
legitimize, it became clear that this proxy conflict and Middle Eastern Cold
War (although there is so much direct Iranian military involvement in Syria by
now that one can argue about the war still being cold) is rather about
political and economic hegemony. Fighting for supremacy, it seems to be that
the Syrian army is gaining back strategic grounds in Syria thanks to Iranian
militias and Russian air strikes. But it has to be considered that this thesis
is only a snapshot in this dynamic and ever-changing conflict and considers the
situation in Syria from 2011 to around 2016. New trends emerge sadly almost
every week, as new chemical attacks, the first direct US involvement and the
ever looming Kurdish question show.

But why is the conflict
going on for so long already? And why are there so many dead and misplaced
Syrians?

These questions were
partly answered in chapters two and three, which explained that both sides,
Iran and Saudi Arabia, have massive and above all diametrically opposed
interests in Syria. Because these interests are so diverse and opposing, there
is no end for the Syrian proxy war in sight. Historically, the analogy of the
Lebanese Civil War too can help to answer these questions, as the war would
have ended earlier without new Syrian, Israeli, Iranian and Western
involvement. A Lebanisation of Syria therefore should have been avoided.
But the stakes are too high now as it gets more complicated and more players
join in.[405]

For Iran, there is a lot
at stake in Syria. For one, Tehran needs the Syrian proxy as a legitimation to
fight for the right cause and against the right enemy – Saudi Arabia. Moreover,
it provides the Iranians with additional legitimacy as it strengthens the
religious cohesion within the Shia and Iran-backed community around the Middle
East. More importantly, Syria is of high strategic value to Tehran as it serves
as a thoroughfare to Iranian backed allies in Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine. With
Assad in power, Iran therefore portrays regional geopolitical leverage and can
act as a strongman to an increasingly impatient domestic electorate. Lastly,
losing a friendly regime in Damascus would remove a stalwart Iranian ally and
most probably install a Sunni friendly government. For Iran, a frozen conflict
or a latent conflict with a low intensity is desired, as it will allow Tehran
to be able to stay in Syria with its own military forces and to show its
fundamental, yet unwelcome capability to safeguard regional stability.[406]

On the other side,
Riyadh wants to counter Iran’s hegemonic ambitions, especially after Iran is
regaining strength in the course of the completion of the Iran Deal in 2015.
Assad’s fall would be a strategic blow to Iran and its allies in the region,
thwarting their dream of a coherent Shia bloc. Riyadh can no longer allow a
Syrian proxy with a Tehran friendly regime or worse a Syria dominated by
extremist groups such as Daesh or al-Qaeda who question the Wahhabi ideology
and therefore ultimately the Saudi monarchy itself. On the contrary, by
toppling Assad Riyadh could reassert itself as the leader of the Sunni and Arab
world. Riyadh has, moreover, realized that the real danger is not always Iran,
but more likely its own restless population and ideological threat coming from
Daesh.

The classic assumption,
therefore, that Iran is a revolutionary power and Saudi Arabia is not, is
accordingly false as the Syrian case shows.[407]

To achieve their
respective goals, both Iran and Saudi Arabia employ similar means. Aiding opposing
rebel and opposition groups with Syria as well as supplying logistical,
financial, political and military support to various proxy groups, Iran and
Saudi Arabia furthermore are trying to build their respective coalition or axis
so as to more efficiently fight their enemies. Moreover, both sides are
fiercely battling for their interests and trying to be second to none which
results in more means being employed every day. With all the vast means already
employed in Syria, both sides have a lot to lose and can and will not back
down, thereby dangerously throwing the Middle East into long term instability
and chaos around confessional tensions.

This is, sadly, one of
the latest trend of the conflict, as there are reports of ethnic cleansing and
changing local populations, in an effort to redraw the Syrian map along
confessional borders and to be better prepared for a post-war Syria. [408]

What the future will
bring is uncertain. There will be elections in Iran and Russia in the beginning
of 2017 and 2018, respectively. Here, both Rouhani and Putin will have the
possibility to reassert themselves again, maybe willing to be seen as strong
international leaders, as reckons neo-classical realism, and therefore willing
to escalate the conflict again. Or we will two new leaders, who will have
different strategies in mind for Syria.

What the conflict,
however, showed is that we are in a new era. As the US increasingly distances
itself from the world scene, countries such as Iran, Russia and Saudi Arabia
are trying to position themselves to be prepared for an uncertain future. Syria
is probably the first conflict in a multi-polar world and therefore maybe a
glimpse into future conflicts and wars. What the conflict already showed is
that there are grave human rights violations, block building with memories from
the Cold War and the drastic failure of diplomacy and soft power.

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[1]
http://visuals.sipri.org/

[2] Cf. Akbarzadeh,
Conduit (2016c), p. 2f.

[3] For whole paragraph cf. Badeeb (1993) and Wehrey et
al. (2009).

[4] For whole paragraph cf. Kinninmont (2016).

[5] Cf. Ibish (2016), p. 9.

[6] Cf. Hove (2017), p. 13.

[7] Cf. Hughes (2014), p. 530.

[8] Cf. Gause III (2014), pp. 5-9 and 19.

[9] Cf. Djalili, Kellner (2016b), p. 16.

[10] For whole paragraph cf. Gause III, (2014), pp. 5-15.

[11] Cf. Lucas (2016), p. 12.

[12] Cf. Hamid, Byman (2015), p. 9.

[13] For whole paragraph cf. Amnesty International (2016),
p. 350.

[14] Cf. Zuhur (2015), p. 144.

[15] Cf. Hassan, Tabrizi (2016), p. 33.

[16] Cf. Nasser-Edine (2016), pp. 105-124.

[17] Cf. Akbarzadeh (2016), pp. 128-142

[18] Cf. Gupta (2016), p. 32.

[19] Cf. Blanchard (2005),
pp. 3-7.

[20] Cf. Ismail (2016), p.
87.

[21] Cf. Blanchard (2005),
pp. 3-7.

[22] Cf. Blanchard (2005), pp. 3-7.

[23] Cf. Fildis (2012), p. 150.

[24] For whole paragraph cf. Blanchard (2005), pp. 4-7.

[25] For whole paragraph cf. Bhalla (2011), p. 2f.

[26] Cf. Blanchard (2005), pp. 3-7.

[27] Cf. Saikal (2016b), p. 167.

[28] Cf. Hughes (2014), p. 524.

[29] Cf. Walt, (1996), p. 220.

[30] Cf. Akbarzadeh (2016), pp. 129-139.

[31] For whole paragraph cf. Ripsman, Taliaferro, Lobell (2016).

[32] For whole paragraph cf. Ripsman,
Taliaferro, Lobell (2016).

[33] Cf. Saikal (2016a), p. 24.

[34] Cf. Legrenzi, Lawson (2016),
p. 37f.

[35] Cf. Quamar (2014), p. 157.

[36] Cf. Quamar (2014), pp. 142 and 149f.

[37] Cf. von Soest (2013), p. 629.

[38] Cf. Ibish (2016), p. 4.

[39] Cf. Ibish (2016), p. 11.

[40] Cf. Djalili, Kellner (2016b), p. 16.

[41] Cf. Ansari, Tabrizi
(2016), p. 1.

[42] Cf. Ansari, Tabrizi
(2016), p. 3.

[43] Cf. Goodarzi (2013a), p. 267-273.

[44] Cf. Ansari, Tabrizi
(2016), p. 3.

[45] Cf. Ehteshami,
Hinnebusch (1997), p. 207f.

[46] Cf. Akbarzadeh (2016),
pp. 128-141.

[47] Cf. Ehteshami,
Hinnebusch (1997), p. 27f.

[48] Cf. Djalili, Kellner (2016c), pp. 25-27.

[49] For whole paragraph cf. Sadjadpour (2013).

[50] Cf. Jenkins, (2016), pp. 163-167.

[51] Cf. von Maltzahn (2015), pp. 144-152.

[52] Cf.
Mozaffari (2013), p. 215.

[53] Cf. Al-Khoei (2016), p. 2.

[54] Cf. Esfandiary, Tabatabi (2015), p. 5.

[55] Cf. Esfandiary, Tabatabi (2015), p. 7.

[56] Cf. Akbarzadeh (2015), p. 50.

[57] Cf. Tabatabai (2017), p. 23.

[58] Cf. Ansari, Tabrizi (2016), p. 7.

[59] Cf. Goodarzi (2013b), p. 28.

[60] For whole paragraph cf. Jenkins (2014).

[61] For whole paragraph cf. Lawson (2014), p. 1353.

[62] Fulton, Holliday, Wyer (2013), p. 26.

[63] Cf. Djalili, Kellner (2014), p. 396f.

[64] Cf. Djalili, Kellner (2016b), p. 16.

[65] Cf. Ansari, Tabrizi
(2016), p. 7.

[66] Cf. Nasser-Edine
(2016), p. 114.

[67] Cf. Akbarzadeh (2016),
pp. 128-144.

[68] Cf. Joshi (2016), p.
27.

[69] Cf. Olanrewaju, Joshua
(2015), p. 46.

[70] Cf. Hokayem, (2012),
p. 9.

[71] For whole paragraph cf. Jenkins (2014), pp. 3 and 6.

[72] For whole paragraph cf. Fulton, Holliday, Wyer
(2013), p. 26.

[73] Fulton, Holliday, Wyer (2013), p. 26.

[74] Cf. Pantucci, Stephens (2016), pp. 49f and 51.

[75] Cf. Monshipouri, Dorraj (2013), p. 141.

[76] Cf. Ansari, Tabrizi (2016), p. 6.

[77] Cf. Ehteshami, Hinnebusch (1997), p. 97.

[78] Cf. Goodarzi (2013b), p. 27.

[79] Cf. Odinius, Kintz (2013), p. 648.

[80] Cf. Hokayem, (2012), p. 12.

[81] Cf. Steinberg (2014), p. 24.

[82] Cf.
Ehteshami, Hinnebusch (1997), p.
30.

[83] Cf. Ismail (2016), p. 90.

[84] Cf. Legrenzi, Lawson (2016),
p. 38.

[85] Cf. Gause III (2014), p. 7.

[86] Cf. Quamar (2015), p.
83.

[87] Cf. Bunzel (2016), p. 8.

[88] Cf. Bunzel (2016), p. 12.

[89] For whole paragraph cf. Gaub (2016b), p. 2f.

[90] Cf. Pasha (2016), p. 393.

[91] Cf. Ennis, Momani (2013), p. 1130f.

[92] Cf. Quamar (2015), p. 76.

[93] Cf. Gause III (2014), p. 13.

[94] Cf. Bardaji (2016), p. 90.

[95] Cf. Adelphi Series (2013b), p. 118.

[96] Cf. Jenkins (2014), p. 1.

[97] Cf. Hokayem, (2012), p. 12.

[98] Cf. Hassan (2013), p. 17.

[99] Cf. Stephens (2016), p. 44.

[100] Cf. Ennis, Momani (2013), p. 1130f.

[101] Cf. Hassan (2013), p. 21.

[102] Cf. Chatham
House (2012), p. 9f.

[103] Cf. Hokayem, (2012), p. 8.

[104] Cf. Goodarzi (2013b), p. 26.

[105] Cf. Djalili, Kellner (2014), p. 400.

[106] Cf. Sadjadpour (2013).

[107] For whole paragraph cf. Fulton, Holliday, Wyer
(2013), p. 11.

[108] Press TV (2016).

[109] Cf. Geranmayeh, Kadri (2017), p. 86.

[110] Cf. Djalili, Kellner (2016b), p. 18.

[111] Cf. Ansari, Tabrizi (2016), p. 6.

[112] Cf. Djalili, Kellner (2014), p. 399.

[113] Cf. Dajlili, Kellner (2014), p. 398f.

[114] Cf. Hokayem, (2012),
p. 11.

[115] Cf. Alam (2016), p.
13.

[116] Cf. Hassan, Tabrizi (2016), p. 35.

[117] Cf. Wastnidge (2015), p. 364.

[118] Cf. Saikal (2016a), p. 21.

[119] Cf. Monshipouri, Dorraj (2013), p. 134.

[120] Cf. Tabatabai (2017), p. 15.

[121] Cf. Ehteshami, Hinnebusch (1997), p. 33ff.

[122] Cf. Akbarzadeh,
Conduit (2016a), p. 136.

[123] Cf. Akbarzadeh.,
Conduit (2016a), pp. 2-10.

[124] Cf. Monshipouri, Dorraj (2013), p. 142.

[125] Cf. Djalili,
Kellner (2016b), p. 22.

[126] Cf. Ansari, Tabrizi
(2016), p. 4.

[127] Cf. Akbarzadeh,
Conduit (2016a), pp. 139-145.

[128] Cf. Akbarzadeh (2016),
pp. 129-144.

[129] Cf. Akbarzadeh.,
Conduit (2016a), p. 9.

[130] Cf. Zuhur (2015), p. 144.

[131] Cf. Bhalla (2011), p. 5.

[132] Cf. Djalili, Kellner (2016a), p. 4.

[133] Cf. International Crisis Group (2013), p. 17.

[134] Cf. International Crisis Group (2013), p. 17.

[135] Cf. Djalili, Kellner (2016c), p.
288.

[136] Cf. Akbarzadeh (2015), p. 45.

[137] Cf. Saikal (2016a), p. 27.

[138] Cf. Ansari, Tabrizi (2016), p. 4.

[139] Cf. Adelphi Series (2103b), p. 125.

[140] Cf. Djalili, Kellner (2014),
p. 400.

[141] Cf. Akbarzadeh, Conduit (2016a), p. 136.

[142] Cf. Tabatabai (2017), p. 12.

[143] Cf. Djalili, Kellner (2016a), p. 2.

[144] Cf. Djalili, Kellner (2016b), p. 18.

[145] Cf. Djalili, Kellner (2014), p. 400.

[146] Cf. Ansari, Tabrizi (2016), p. 5.

[147] Cf. Ansari, Tabrizi
(2016), p. 5f.

[148] Cf. International Crisis Group (2013), p. 17.

[149] For whole paragraph cf. Al-Khoei (2016), p. 10.

[150] Cf. Alam (2016), p. 11.

[151] For whole paragraph cf. Al-Khoei (2016), pp. 11-13.

[152] Cf. Pantucci, Stephens (2016), pp. 47-52.

[153] Cf. Lucas (2016), p. 12.

[154] For whole paragraph cf. Al-Khoei (2016), pp. 11-14.

[155] Cf. Alam (2016), p. 15.

[156] Cf. Fulton, Holliday, Wyer (2013), p. 22.

[157] Cf. Djalili, Kellner (2014), p
401.

[158] For whole paragraph cf. Iran Watch (2011).

[159] For whole paragraph cf. Chatham House (2012), p. 9.

[160] For whole paragraph cf. Fulton, Holliday, Wyer
(2013), p. 19.

[161] For whole paragraph cf. Fulton, Holliday, Wyer
(2013), p. 16.

[162] Cf. Hokayem (2014), p. 56.

[163] Cf. Djalili, Kellner (2014), p. 401.

[164] For whole paragraph cf. Al-Khoei (2016), p. 6.

[165] Cf. Pantucci, Stephens (2016), pp. 48-53.

[166] For whole paragraph cf. Al-Khoei (2016), pp. 11-14.

[167] Cf. International Crisis Group (2013), p. 17.

[168] Cf. Lawson (2014), p. 1353.

[169] For whole paragraph cf. Joshi (2016), p. 28.

[170] Cf. Al-Khoei (2016), p. 11.

[171] Cf. Al-Khoei (2016), p. 12.

[172] For whole paragraph cf. Fulton, Holliday, Wyer
(2013), p. 22.

[173] Cf. Akbarzadeh (2016), pp. 128-143.

[174] Cf. Akbarzadeh, Conduit (2016a), p. 136.

[175] Cf. Jenkins (2014), p. 7f.

[176] Cf. Hokayem (2014), p. 64.

[177] For whole paragraph cf. Fulton, Holliday, Wyer
(2013), p. 22.

[178] Cf. Joshi (2016), p. 27.

[179] Cf. Al-Khoei, H. (2016), p. 12.

[180] Cf. Zuhur (2015), p. 144.

[181] Cf. Joshi (2016), p. 26f.

[182] For whole paragraph cf. Jenkins (2014), p. 7f.

[183] For whole paragraph cf. Jenkins (2014), p. 7f.

[184] Cf. Ansari, Tabrizi (2016), p. 4.

[185] Cf. Hokayem (2014), p. 56f.

[186] Cf. Ansari, Tabrizi (2016), p. 5.

[187] Cf. Smyth (2015d).

[188] Cf. Smyth (2015i), p. 2.

[189] Cf. Smyth (2015c).

[190] For whole paragraph cf. Lawson (2014), p. 1353.

[191] For whole paragraph cf. Fulton, Holliday, Wyer
(2013), p. 24.

[192] For whole paragraph cf. Fulton, Holliday, Wyer
(2013), p. 19.

[193] Cf. Smyth (2015e).

[194] Cf. Smyth (2015b).

[195] Cf. Smyth (2015g).

[196] Cf. Smyth (2015f).

[197] Cf. Smyth (2015h).

[198] Cf. Al-Khoei (2016), p. 11.

[199] Cf. Al-Khoei (2016), p. 12.

[200] Cf. Hokayem (2014), p. 56.

[201] Cf. Al-Khoei (2016), p. 12.

[202] Around 1 million Afghani refugees live in
Iran: cf. Djalili, Kellner (2016c), p.
106.

[203] Cf. Ansari, Tabrizi (2016), p. 5.

[204] Cf. Al-Khoei (2016), p. 12.

[205] For whole paragraph cf. Jenkins (2014), p. 6f.

[206] For whole paragraph cf. Al-Khoei (2016), p. 12.

[207] Cf. Smyth (2015a).

[208] Cf. Smyth (2015b).

[209] Cf. Al-Khoei (2016), p. 12.

[210] For whole paragraph cf. Fulton, Holliday, Wyer
(2013), p. 23f.

[211] Cf. Fulton, Holliday, Wyer (2013), pp. 19-26.

[212] For whole paragraphcf. Peterson, S. (2015).

[213] Cf. Butter (2015), p. 3.

[214] Cf. Gupta (2016), p. 36.

[215] Cf. Monshipouri., Dorraj (2013), p. 135.

[216] Cf. Butter (2015), p. 23.

[217] Cf. Butter (2015), p. 24.

[218] Cf. Pantucci, Stephens (2016), pp. 50-52.

[219] Cf. IMF (2016).

[220] Cf. Butter (2015), p. 25.

[221] Cf. Kellner (2017),
p. .

[222] Cf. Pantucci, Stephens (2016), pp. 47-52.

[223] Cf. Djalili, Kellner (2016b), p. 18.

[224] Cf. Butter (2015), p. 25.

[225] Cf. Alam (2016), p. 15.

[226] Cf. Akbarzadeh,
Conduit (2016a), p. 134.

[227] Cf. Butter (2015), p. 3.

[228] Cf. Alam (2016), p. 15.

[229] Cf. Butter (2015), p. 19.

[230] Cf. Butter (2015), p. 19.

[231] Cf. Butter (2015), pp. 19 and 23.

[232] Cf. Pantucci, Stephens (2016), pp. 47-53.

[233] Cf. Akbarzadeh,
Conduit (2016a), p. 136.

[234] Cf. Pantucci, Stephens
(2016), pp. 48-52.

[235] Cf. Akbarzadeh,
Conduit (2016a), p. 146.

[236] Cf. Hokayem (2014), p. 56.

[237] Cf. Syrian Economic Forum (2014).

[238] Cf. Djalili, Kellner (2016a), p. 2.

[239] Cf. Esfandiary, Tabatabi (2015), p. 13.

[240] Cf. Nasser-Edine (2016), p. 117.

[241] Cf. The Economist (2013).

[242] Cf. Chatham
House (2012), p. 9.

[243] Cf. Sadjadpour (2013).

[244] Cf. Butter (2015), p. 16.

[245] Cf. Lacourt, Lester, Parkes, Wilmshurst (2013), p. 2.

[246] Cf. Hokayem, (2012), p. 8.

[247] Cf. Hokayem (2014), p. 55.

[248] Cf. Djalili, Kellner (2014),
p. 401.

[249] Cf. Djalili, Kellner (2016b), p. 23.

[250] For whole paragraph cf. Jenkins (2014), pp. 1-3.

[251] Cf. International Crisis Group (2013), p. 1.

[252] Cf. Lain, Sutgayin (2016), p. 21.

[253] Cf. Ibish (2016), p. 18.

[254] Cf. Lain, Sutgayin (2016), p. 23.

[255] Cf. Lain, Sutgayin (2016), p. 20.

[256] Cf. Lucas (2016), p.
14.

[257] Cf. Ansari, Tabrizi
(2016), p. 4.

[258] Cf. Lucas (2016), p.
12.

[259] Cf. Djalili,
Kellner (2016b), p. 19.

[260] Cf. Lain, Sutgayin (2016), pp. 18-20.

[261] Cf. Alam (2016), p. 15.

[262] Cf. Lain, Sutgayin (2016), p. 19.

[263] Cf. Chaziza (2014), p. 249f.

[264] Cf. Paulraj (2016), p. 105.

[265] Cf. Geranmayeh, Kadri (2017), p. 89.

[266] Cf. Lain, Sutgayin (2016), pp. 18-20.

[267] Cf. Katz (2013), p. 38f.

[268] Cf. Djalili, Kellner (2016b), p. 23.

[269] Cf. Talmadge (2008), p. 82.

[270] Cf. Olanrewaju, Joshua (2015), p. 50.

[271] Cf. Garver (2013), p. 73.

[272] Cf. Garver (2013), p. 84.

[273] Cf. Goodarzi (2013b), p. 26.

[274] Cf. Chaziza (2014), p. 253.

[275] Cf. Friedman (2015), p. 4.

[276] Cf. International Crisis Group (2013), p. 36.

[277] For whole paragraph cf. WikiLeaks (2015).

[278] Cf. Adelphi
Series (2013b), p. 119.

[279] Cf. Hokayem (2014), p. 47.

[280] Cf. Chatham
House (2012), pp. 10-15.

[281] Cf. Berti, Guzansky (2014), p. 28.

[282] Cf. Kuznetsov (2016).

[283] Cf. Zuhur (2015), p. 145.

[284] Cf. Hove, Mutanda (2014), p. 560.

[285] Cf. Zuhur (2015), p. 144.

[286] Cf. Hassan, Tabrizi (2016), p. 33.

[287] Cf. Berti, Guzansky (2014), p. 28.

[288] Cf. Gause III (2014), p. 16.

[289] Cf. Adelphi Series (2013b), p. 122.

[290] Cf. Hassan (2013), p. 23.

[291] Cf. Hokayem (2014), p. 48.

[292] Cf. Steinberg (2014), p. 26.

[293] Cf. Stephens (2016), p. 39.

[294] Cf. Stephens (2016), p. 40.

[295] Cf. Chatham
House (2012), p. 11.

[296] Cf. Hokayem (2014), p. 46.

[297] Cf. Gaub (2016a), p. 19.

[298] Cf. SIPRI (2016), p. 20.

[299] Cf. Cronin (2013), p. 3.

[300] Cf. Chatham
House (2012), p. 10.

[301] Cf. SIPRI (2015), p. 14.

[302] Cf. Akbarzadeh,
Conduit (2016b), p. 179.

[303] For whole paragraph cf. Shapir (2016).

[304] For whole paragraph cf. Gaub (2016b), p. 3.

[305] Cf. Berti, Guzansky (2014), p. 28.

[306] Cf. Mitton (2016), p. 284.

[307] Cf. Chatham
House (2012), p. 9f.

[308] Cf. Zuhur (2015), p. 145.

[309] Cf. Stephens (2016), p. 39.

[310] Cf. Zuhur (2015), p. 148.

[311] Cf. Quamar (2014), p. 157.

[312] Cf. Djalili, Kellner (2016b), p. 19.

[313] Cf. Kuznetsov (2016).

[314] Cf. Steinberg (2014), p. 24.

[315] For whole paragraph cf. Zelin (2014), pp. 10-12.

[316] Cf. Obaid (2016).

[317] Cf. Obaid (2016).

[318] Cf. Stephens, (2016), p. 40f.

[319] Cf. Hassan (2013), p. 23.

[320] Cf. Kuznetsov (2016).

[321] Cf. Zuhur (2015), p. 156.

[322] Cf. Ennis, Momani (2013), p. 1132.

[323] Cf. Pasha (2016), p. 394.

[324] For whole paragraph cf. Berti, Guzansky (2014), p.
27-32.

[325] Cf. Kinninmont (2016b).

[326] Cf. Djalili, Kellner (2016b), p. 24.

[327] Cf. Zuhur (2015), p. 152.

[328] For whole paragraph cf. Berti, Guzansky (2014), p.
28f.

[329] Cf. Hokayem (2014), p. 50.

[330] Cf. Esfandiary, Tabatabi (2015), p. 12.

[331] Cf. Zuhur (2015), p. 152.

[332] Cf. Jenkins (2014), p. 9.

[333] Cf. Al-Khoei (2016), p. 13.

[334] Cf. Chatham
House (2012), p. 10f.

[335] Cf. Berti, Guzansky (2014), p. 29.

[336] For whole paragraph cf. Jenkins (2014), p. 9.

[337] Cf. Ennis, Momani (2013), p. 1133.

[338] Cf. Quamar (2014), p. 149.

[339] Cf. OPEC (2016).

[340] For whole paragraph cf. Jaffe, Elass (2016).

[341] Cf. von Soest (2013), p. 629.

[342] Cf. Pasha (2016), p. 393.

[343] Berti, Guzansky (2014), p. 28.

[344] Cf. Berti, Guzansky, (2014), p. 28.

[345] Cf. Steinberg (2014), p. 24.

[346] Cf. Adelphi Series (2013a), p.
159.

[347] Cf. Hokayem (2014), p. 44.

[348] Cf. Steinberg (2014), p. 24.

[349] Cf. Olanrewaju, Joshua (2015), p. 49.

[350] Cf. Saikal (2016b), pp. 165-180.

[351] Cf. Gallarotti, Al-Filali (2014), p. 242.

[352] Cf. Djalili, Kellner (2016b), p. 26.

[353] Cf. Hassan (2013), p. 22.

[354] Cf. Hassan (2013), p. 19.

[355] Cf. Stephens (2016), p. 42.

[356] Cf. Jaffe, Elass (2016).

[357] Cf. Quamar (2014), p. 153.

[358] Cf. Stephens (2016), p. 43.

[359] Cf. Friedman (2015), p. 3.

[360] Cf. Djalili, Kellner (2016b), p. 27.

[361] Cf. Chatham
House (2012), p. 9f.

[362] Cf. Quamar (2014), p. 153.

[363] Cf. International Crisis Group (2013), p. 11.

[364] Cf. Ismail (2016), pp. 83-102.

[365] Cf. Stephens (2016), p. 42.

[366] Cf. Zelin (2014), p. 11.

[367] Cf. International Crisis Group (2013), p. 13.

[368] Cf. Stephens (2016), p. 39.

[369] Cf. Hokayem, (2012), p. 13.

[370] Cf. Gause III (2014), p. 21.

[371] Cf. Stephens (2016), p. 42.

[372] Cf. Hokayem (2014), p. 44.

[373] Cf. Stephens (2016), p. 40.

[374] Cf. Gaub (2016b), p. 3f.

[375] Cf. Djalili, Kellner (2016b), p. 22.

[376] Cf. Shapir (2016).

[377] For whole
paragraph cf. Kuznetsov (2016).

[378] Cf. Bardaji (2016), p. 91.

[379] Cf. Bardaji (2016), p. 91f.

[380] Cf. Ibish (2016), p. 22.

[381] Cf. Obaid (2016).

[382] Cf. Bardaji (2016), p. 91f.

[383] Cf. Akbarzadeh,
Conduit (2016a), p. 137.

[384] Cf. Hokayem, (2012), p. 9.

[385] Cf. Saikal (2016a), p. 26.

[386] For whole paragraph cf. Hokayem (2014), p. 65.

[387] Cf. Goodarzi (2013b), p. 29.

[388] Cf. Gause III (2014), p. 14.

[389] Cf. Steinberg (2014), p. 24.

[390] Cf. Hokayem, (2012), p. 8.

[391] Cf. Steinberg (2014), p. 23f.

[392] Cf. Adelphi Series (2013b), p. 121.

[393] Cf. Djalili, Kellner (2016c), p.
307.

[394] Cf. Goodarzi (2013b), p. 30.

[395] Cf. Nasser-Edine (2016), pp. 103-120.

[396] Cf. Djalili, Kellner (2016b), p. 19.

[397] Cf. Ennis, Momani (2013), p.
1140.

[398] Cf.
Gause III (2014), p. 16.

[399] Cf. Hassan (2013), p. 20.

[400] Cf. Ennis, Momani (2013), p.
1140.

[401] Cf. Hokayem (2014), p. 62.

[402] Cf. Stephens (2016), p. 40.

[403] Cf. Steinberg (2014), p. 24.

[404] Cf. International Crisis Group (2013), p. 7.

[405] Cf. International Crisis Group (2013), p. 32.

[406] Cf. Akbarzadeh,
Conduit (2016b), p. 178.

[407] Cf. Ibish (2016), p. 7.

[408] Cf. Balanche (2015), pp. 1 and 3.

 [FH1]Bei kellner bei military support