Abstract
Contract-for-difference (CfD) auctions have emerged as the dominant mechanism for procuring renewable electricity generation across Europe and beyond, praised for their capacity to reduce financing costs and deliver competitive strike prices. This dissertation synthesises the existing literature to investigate whether CfD auctions deliver long-term consumer value once grid infrastructure, transmission costs, and equity impacts are incorporated into the analysis. Through systematic literature review, this study examines evidence from the United Kingdom, Spain, Brazil, and Australia regarding the relationship between CfD auction design, network investment requirements, and distributional consequences. The findings reveal a fundamental tension: while CfD mechanisms demonstrably reduce the weighted average cost of capital for renewable projects and compress generator mark-ups, geographically neutral auction designs systematically direct investment toward high-resource locations that impose substantial transmission reinforcement and congestion management costs upon consumers. Furthermore, the mechanisms employed to recover CfD-related costs frequently exhibit regressive characteristics, disproportionately burdening lower-income households. This dissertation concludes that realising genuine long-term consumer value requires fundamental reforms to CfD auction design, incorporating locational signals, coordinated transmission planning, and equitable cost recovery mechanisms.
Introduction
The decarbonisation of electricity systems represents one of the most significant infrastructure transformations in modern economic history. Governments worldwide have committed to ambitious renewable energy deployment targets, recognising that the power sector must lead the transition toward net-zero emissions. Within this context, contract-for-difference mechanisms have emerged as the preferred policy instrument for supporting renewable electricity generation in numerous jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and increasingly across the developing world.
CfD auctions operate by guaranteeing renewable generators a fixed strike price for their output over extended periods, typically fifteen years. When wholesale market prices fall below the strike price, generators receive top-up payments; conversely, when market prices exceed the strike price, generators return the difference to consumers. This two-way flow of payments theoretically insulates both generators and consumers from wholesale price volatility whilst providing the revenue certainty necessary to secure project finance at competitive rates.
The academic and policy consensus has broadly celebrated CfD auctions as a success story in renewable energy support. Successive auction rounds in Great Britain have delivered progressively lower strike prices, with offshore wind costs falling by approximately sixty percent between 2015 and 2022. These dramatic cost reductions have been attributed to technological learning, economies of scale, and importantly, the risk-reducing properties of the CfD mechanism itself, which enables developers to access cheaper debt financing.
However, this positive narrative obscures a more complex reality. The apparent success of CfD auctions, measured primarily through declining strike prices, neglects the broader system costs that renewable deployment imposes upon electricity networks. Renewable resources are geographically concentrated: wind speeds are highest in exposed coastal and upland locations, whilst solar irradiance varies with latitude. Auction designs that reward the lowest strike prices, without regard to network implications, systematically direct investment toward locations that may be optimal for generation but suboptimal from a total system cost perspective.
This geographical dimension acquires particular significance as renewable penetration increases. Early renewable projects could often connect to existing network infrastructure with minimal reinforcement requirements. As deployment accelerates, however, new projects increasingly locate in areas requiring substantial transmission investment, whilst simultaneously exacerbating congestion on existing network infrastructure. These costs, borne ultimately by consumers through network charges, do not appear in CfD strike prices yet represent genuine resource costs of renewable deployment.
Beyond network considerations, questions of distributional equity have received insufficient attention in CfD policy design. The mechanisms through which CfD payments are recovered from consumers—typically through levies on electricity bills—may exhibit regressive characteristics, with lower-income households paying proportionally more of their income toward renewable support costs. This distributional impact acquires particular salience during periods of energy price volatility and cost-of-living pressures.
This dissertation addresses a fundamental question that has received inadequate scholarly attention: whether CfD auctions, properly accounting for grid and transmission costs alongside distributional impacts, genuinely deliver long-term value for consumers. The investigation holds significant implications for energy policy design, network planning, and the broader political economy of the energy transition.
Aim and objectives
The overarching aim of this dissertation is to critically evaluate whether contract-for-difference auctions deliver long-term consumer value when grid infrastructure costs, transmission requirements, and equity considerations are incorporated alongside generation support costs.
To achieve this aim, the following specific objectives guide the investigation:
1. To examine the mechanisms through which CfD auctions reduce financing costs and support expenditure for renewable electricity generation, synthesising evidence regarding their effectiveness in competitive price discovery.
2. To analyse the relationship between geographically neutral CfD auction designs and total system costs, investigating how location-blind auctions influence transmission investment requirements and network congestion.
3. To evaluate the distributional consequences of CfD cost recovery mechanisms, assessing their impact across different income groups and household types.
4. To critically assess proposed design modifications that might better align CfD auctions with long-term consumer value, including locational signals and enhanced coordination with transmission planning.
5. To provide evidence-based recommendations for policy reform that balance the proven benefits of CfD mechanisms with broader system cost and equity considerations.
Methodology
This dissertation employs a systematic literature synthesis methodology to address the research objectives. Literature synthesis represents an appropriate methodological approach for questions requiring integration of evidence across multiple disciplines, geographical contexts, and analytical perspectives. The complex interactions between auction design, network economics, and distributional outcomes necessitate drawing upon diverse scholarly traditions, including energy economics, network regulation, auction theory, and welfare economics.
The literature search strategy prioritised peer-reviewed academic journals with established reputations in energy policy and economics, including Energy Policy, Applied Energy, Energy Economics, Utilities Policy, Renewable Energy, and The Energy Journal. Additionally, working papers from recognised research institutions and policy documents from government bodies were incorporated where they provided unique empirical evidence or analytical insights unavailable in published journal articles.
Search terms combined concepts relating to contracts-for-difference, renewable energy auctions, transmission costs, network investment, congestion management, locational signals, and consumer welfare. Boolean operators enabled systematic identification of literature addressing the intersections between these concepts. Forward and backward citation tracking from seminal papers ensured comprehensive coverage of relevant scholarship.
The synthesis process involved systematic extraction of key findings, methodological approaches, and policy implications from identified sources. Evidence was categorised according to the research objectives, enabling structured comparison across jurisdictions and analytical frameworks. Where studies employed quantitative methods, particular attention was paid to the magnitude and statistical significance of reported effects. Qualitative findings were assessed for internal consistency and alignment with broader theoretical frameworks.
Critical appraisal of included studies considered methodological rigour, data quality, potential sources of bias, and generalisability of findings. The synthesis acknowledges limitations inherent in comparing evidence across different electricity market designs, regulatory frameworks, and geographical contexts whilst identifying patterns and mechanisms with broader applicability.
Literature review
Theoretical foundations of contract-for-difference mechanisms
Contract-for-difference instruments emerged from financial markets, where they function as derivative contracts enabling parties to exchange the difference between opening and closing prices of underlying assets. Applied to electricity markets, CfDs provide generators with price stabilisation whilst enabling governments to support renewable deployment without guaranteed off-take obligations. The theoretical appeal lies in risk allocation: CfDs transfer wholesale price risk from generators, who are poorly positioned to manage it, to consumers or government, who possess greater capacity to absorb price volatility across diversified portfolios of assets and liabilities.
Newbery (2023) provides the most comprehensive theoretical treatment of CfD design, arguing that efficient renewable support requires incentive-compatible mechanisms that align private developer incentives with social welfare objectives. Conventional CfD designs, structured around levelised cost of energy (LCOE) metrics, fail this test by rewarding volume maximisation without regard to the system value of generated electricity. Generators receiving fixed strike prices have no incentive to reduce output during periods of low system value or to invest in technologies that provide system services alongside energy production.
This theoretical critique resonates with broader concerns in electricity market design regarding the disconnect between private profitability and system efficiency. Schlecht, Maurer and Hirth (2024) develop these arguments further, demonstrating that conventional CfDs can distort both dispatch decisions and investment incentives. By guaranteeing revenues independent of market conditions, CfDs may encourage developers to generate during periods of negative wholesale prices, imposing costs on other market participants and degrading overall system efficiency.
Empirical evidence on CfD auction performance
Notwithstanding theoretical concerns, empirical evidence consistently demonstrates that CfD auctions deliver substantial reductions in renewable support costs compared with alternative mechanisms. Welisch and Poudineh (2019) analysed the UK offshore wind CfD auctions, finding that the mechanism successfully reduced the cost of capital for projects by providing long-term revenue certainty that enabled developers to secure debt financing at competitive rates. The weighted average cost of capital reduction attributable to CfD certainty was estimated at approximately two percentage points, translating into significant lifetime cost savings for each project.
Beiter et al. (2023) examined the role of CfDs in creating markets for offshore wind across multiple jurisdictions, concluding that the mechanism remains essential for risk management despite declining technology costs. Their analysis emphasised that CfDs perform functions beyond simple price support: they create bankable project structures, establish standard contractual frameworks, and provide the investment certainty necessary for supply chain development. These market-creation functions deliver consumer value that extends beyond the direct comparison of strike prices with counterfactual scenarios.
The Brazilian experience, documented by Tolmasquim et al. (2021), demonstrates successful application of competitive auctions in developing country contexts. Brazil’s auction design achieved competitive price discovery whilst managing the specific challenges of a large, regionally diverse electricity system with substantial hydroelectric generation. The case illustrates that auction mechanisms can be adapted to diverse institutional and geographical circumstances whilst preserving their core price-revealing properties.
Bohland and Schwenen (2021) investigated strategic behaviour in renewable auctions, finding that competitive auction formats successfully compress generator mark-ups compared with administrative price-setting mechanisms. Their analysis of German renewable auctions demonstrated that auction competition reduced support costs by revealing private cost information that generators would otherwise withhold. However, they also identified potential for strategic capacity withholding by dominant players, suggesting that auction design must account for market structure considerations.
Kell et al. (2023) developed sophisticated bidding simulation models for UK offshore wind CfD auctions, providing insight into how developers formulate bid strategies under uncertainty. Their analysis revealed that Transmission Network Use of System (TNUoS) charges materially affect bidding behaviour, with Scottish projects facing approximately £11.25 per megawatt-hour in additional transmission costs compared with projects in southern England. This differential shapes project viability and influences the geographical distribution of successful bids.
Grid and transmission cost implications
The relationship between renewable auction design and network costs emerges as perhaps the most significant gap between apparent CfD success and genuine consumer value. Davi-Arderius, Trujillo-Baute and Del Río (2023) provide the most systematic empirical examination of this relationship, analysing Spanish renewable auctions to quantify the trade-off between generation subsidies and grid investment costs. Their findings reveal a clear pattern: location-blind auctions that reward lowest strike prices systematically direct investment toward high-resource locations that impose substantial network reinforcement requirements.
The Spanish analysis demonstrates that incorporating even weak locational signals into auction design can reduce total system costs—the sum of generation support and network investment—compared with purely price-based selection criteria. This finding has profound implications for auction design, suggesting that conventional metrics of auction success (declining strike prices) may be inversely correlated with genuine consumer value once system-wide costs are considered.
Savelli et al. (2022) provide the most granular analysis of congestion cost implications for the Great Britain system. Their study quantifies the differential system value of wind generation depending on network location, finding that an additional megawatt-hour of wind generation in northern Scotland increases congestion management costs by approximately £5.61, representing roughly fourteen percent of typical CfD strike prices. Conversely, equivalent generation in southern England reduces congestion costs whilst providing comparable carbon abatement benefits.
These findings acquire particular significance given the geographical concentration of UK offshore wind development in Scottish waters and the northern North Sea. The CfD auction mechanism has successfully stimulated investment in these high-resource locations, delivering low strike prices that appear favourable for consumers. However, the network costs associated with transmitting power from remote generation sites to demand centres in England substantially offset these apparent savings.
The congestion cost implications extend beyond transmission infrastructure investment. Network congestion requires active management through constraint payments to generators, whereby generators are paid to reduce output when network capacity proves insufficient to accommodate their production. These constraint payments, recovered from consumers through network charges, have grown substantially as renewable penetration has increased. The UK National Grid’s balancing costs, driven significantly by renewable constraint management, exceeded £4 billion in the 2022-23 financial year (National Grid ESO, 2023).
Distributional and equity considerations
The mechanisms through which CfD costs are recovered from consumers introduce significant distributional consequences that have received inadequate policy attention. Nelson and Dodd (2023) provide the most comprehensive analysis of social equity considerations in CfD policy design, examining the Australian context where government-initiated CfDs have been employed to underwrite renewable investment.
Their analysis demonstrates that cost recovery through network charges exhibits regressive characteristics: lower-income households pay a larger share of their income toward renewable support costs despite typically consuming less electricity in absolute terms. This regressivity arises from the structure of network tariffs, which often include substantial fixed charges that constitute a higher proportion of bills for low-consumption households. Furthermore, households without rooftop solar installations—disproportionately lower-income households and renters—bear higher per-kilowatt-hour charges as network cost recovery is spread across declining grid consumption.
The equity implications extend beyond direct cost impacts. Lower-income households are less likely to benefit from wholesale price reductions attributable to renewable deployment, as they are less likely to have flexible tariffs that pass through wholesale price variations. They are also less likely to participate in demand-side flexibility programmes that could enable them to benefit from periods of low wholesale prices associated with high renewable output.
Simshauser (2019) identifies additional distributional concerns arising from interactions between government CfDs and commercial hedging markets. Large volumes of government-initiated CfDs can crowd out commercial contract-for-difference and power purchase agreement markets, reducing hedging opportunities for retailers and industrial consumers. This market displacement may raise forward premiums and reduce retail competition, ultimately harming consumers despite low headline support costs.
Design modifications and reform proposals
The academic literature increasingly recognises the need for CfD design modifications that address identified shortcomings whilst preserving the mechanism’s proven benefits. Savelli et al. (2022) propose enhanced CfDs that internalise congestion and other system-wide costs by adjusting strike prices based on network location. Under their proposed framework, generators would receive location-adjusted payments reflecting the system value of their output, creating incentives for efficient siting without abandoning the risk-sharing benefits of the CfD structure.
Newbery (2023) advocates for incentive-compatible support schemes that reward system value rather than mere energy production. His proposal involves restructuring CfDs to include availability payments for firm capacity alongside energy payments that reflect time-varying system value. This approach would maintain revenue certainty for developers whilst creating incentives for investment in technologies that provide system services alongside variable renewable generation.
Schlecht, Maurer and Hirth (2024) propose replacing conventional CfDs with forward contracts that preserve risk management benefits whilst avoiding dispatch distortions. Under their framework, generators would sell forward contracts for delivery at specific times, receiving price certainty whilst retaining incentives to respond to real-time market signals. This approach addresses concerns about negative price bidding whilst maintaining the financing cost benefits associated with revenue certainty.
The integration of CfD auction design with transmission planning emerges as a critical reform priority across multiple studies. Davi-Arderius, Trujillo-Baute and Del Río (2023) demonstrate that even modest coordination between generation auctions and network investment decisions can substantially reduce total system costs. More ambitious proposals would integrate generation and transmission auctions, enabling coordinated assessment of total costs across the electricity value chain.
Discussion
The synthesised evidence reveals a fundamental tension at the heart of CfD policy design. The mechanism demonstrably achieves its primary objectives: reducing financing costs for renewable generation, enabling competitive price discovery through auction processes, and providing the revenue certainty necessary for project development. These achievements represent genuine policy successes that have materially advanced renewable deployment across multiple jurisdictions.
However, the evidence equally demonstrates that these achievements do not automatically translate into long-term consumer value. The geographical dimension proves critical: CfD auctions designed around generation costs alone systematically neglect network implications that ultimately appear on consumer bills. The magnitude of these network costs is substantial—the £5.61 per megawatt-hour congestion cost differential identified by Savelli et al. (2022) represents a significant fraction of total generation costs and substantially erodes the apparent consumer benefits from low strike prices.
This finding carries important implications for how policy success should be measured. Declining CfD strike prices have been widely celebrated as evidence of auction effectiveness and technological progress. This celebration is not unwarranted: genuine cost reductions have occurred through technological learning, supply chain maturation, and competitive pressure. However, strike prices represent only one component of total costs borne by consumers. A comprehensive assessment must incorporate network investment, congestion management, balancing costs, and the administrative expenses associated with scheme operation.
The evidence suggests that location-blind auction designs may have systematically underestimated total system costs of renewable deployment. Projects that appear competitive based on strike prices alone may impose network costs that render them uneconomic from a total system perspective. Conversely, projects in network-favourable locations that were outbid in price-only competitions may have delivered superior consumer value had network costs been incorporated.
The first objective of this dissertation—examining CfD mechanisms for reducing financing and support costs—finds strong empirical support. The evidence from Welisch and Poudineh (2019), Beiter et al. (2023), and others consistently demonstrates that long-term revenue certainty reduces weighted average cost of capital by enabling access to cheaper debt financing. Competitive auction formats successfully reveal private cost information, compressing generator mark-ups compared with administrative price-setting approaches.
The second objective—analysing relationships between geographically neutral auctions and total system costs—reveals the critical gap between apparent and genuine consumer value. The Spanish evidence from Davi-Arderius, Trujillo-Baute and Del Río (2023) demonstrates clear trade-offs between generation subsidies and grid costs, whilst UK evidence from Savelli et al. (2022) and Kell et al. (2023) quantifies the material impact of transmission costs on total consumer burden.
The third objective—evaluating distributional consequences—uncovers concerning equity implications that have received inadequate policy attention. The evidence from Nelson and Dodd (2023) demonstrates that cost recovery mechanisms exhibit regressive characteristics, with lower-income households paying proportionally more toward renewable support. This finding acquires particular significance given the social justice dimensions of energy transition: policies intended to address climate change, itself a phenomenon with disproportionate impacts on vulnerable populations, may inadvertently exacerbate energy poverty and inequality.
The fourth objective—assessing proposed design modifications—reveals a rich literature proposing reforms that could better align CfD mechanisms with consumer value. Enhanced CfDs incorporating locational signals, incentive-compatible schemes rewarding system value, and integrated generation-transmission planning all offer promising approaches. However, each involves trade-offs and implementation challenges that require careful consideration.
Locational signals introduce additional complexity for developers, potentially increasing bidding costs and reducing competition. They require sophisticated modelling capabilities to translate network considerations into location-specific price adjustments. They may also raise concerns about gaming and manipulation if developers can influence the locational factors that determine their payments.
Incentive-compatible schemes that reward system value rather than energy production require fundamental restructuring of CfD mechanisms. They presuppose the existence of markets for system services that may be underdeveloped or absent in many jurisdictions. They may also increase revenue uncertainty for developers, potentially offsetting some financing cost benefits of the CfD approach.
Integrated generation-transmission planning represents perhaps the most promising reform direction but requires institutional coordination that may be challenging to achieve. Generation auctions and transmission planning often fall under different regulatory authorities with distinct mandates, timescales, and analytical frameworks. Achieving genuine integration requires either institutional reform or development of coordination mechanisms that span existing boundaries.
The fifth objective—providing evidence-based recommendations—requires balancing the proven benefits of existing CfD approaches against the identified shortcomings. Complete abandonment of CfD mechanisms would sacrifice their demonstrated advantages in risk allocation and competitive price discovery. However, continuation of location-blind designs risks perpetuating the systematic underestimation of total system costs that current evidence reveals.
A measured reform agenda would preserve CfD mechanisms’ core risk-sharing features whilst incorporating locational signals that reflect differential network costs. This could be achieved through location-adjusted strike prices, as proposed by Savelli et al. (2022), or through separate capacity allocation mechanisms that direct development toward network-favourable locations before price competition determines support levels.
Equally important are reforms to cost recovery mechanisms to address distributional concerns. Progressive tariff structures that protect lower-income households from disproportionate burdens, targeted exemptions for vulnerable consumers, and broader shifts toward general taxation for renewable support costs all merit consideration. The choice among these options involves trade-offs between administrative complexity, revenue stability, and distributional outcomes that require context-specific assessment.
Conclusions
This dissertation has examined whether contract-for-difference auctions deliver long-term consumer value once grid infrastructure costs, transmission requirements, and equity considerations are incorporated alongside generation support costs. The synthesised evidence provides a nuanced answer: CfD auctions deliver genuine benefits through reduced financing costs and competitive price discovery, but these benefits do not automatically translate into consumer value when system-wide costs and distributional impacts are considered.
The first two objectives have been achieved through systematic synthesis of evidence demonstrating both the financing cost benefits of CfD mechanisms and the substantial network costs associated with location-blind auction designs. The evidence reveals trade-offs between generation support costs and network investment requirements that fundamentally challenge conventional metrics of auction success focused on declining strike prices.
The third objective has been addressed through examination of distributional evidence revealing regressive characteristics in CfD cost recovery mechanisms. The finding that lower-income households bear proportionally higher burdens raises significant equity concerns that merit greater policy attention than they have historically received.
The fourth and fifth objectives have been met through critical assessment of proposed reforms and development of evidence-based recommendations. The literature provides rich proposals for design modifications, including locational signals, incentive-compatible schemes, and integrated planning approaches. Each offers potential improvements whilst involving trade-offs that require careful navigation.
The significance of these findings extends beyond academic interest. Energy policy decisions carry profound implications for household budgets, industrial competitiveness, and the pace of decarbonisation. Policies that appear successful on narrow metrics may prove counterproductive when assessed comprehensively. The evidence synthesised here suggests that conventional CfD auction designs may have systematically underestimated total system costs, potentially misdirecting billions of pounds of investment toward suboptimal locations.
Future research should address several gaps identified through this synthesis. Longitudinal studies tracking total system costs as renewable penetration increases would provide valuable evidence on how network cost implications evolve over time. Comparative analyses across jurisdictions with different CfD designs would enable assessment of which design features most effectively balance competing objectives. Distributional analyses incorporating dynamic effects of renewable deployment on wholesale prices and retail market structure would provide more comprehensive equity assessments.
The transition to low-carbon electricity systems represents an historic undertaking with implications extending across decades. Getting policy design right matters enormously: the decisions made today will shape infrastructure investments, household costs, and decarbonisation trajectories for generations. This dissertation contributes to that endeavour by synthesising evidence that challenges simplistic narratives of CfD success and illuminates the design considerations necessary to deliver genuine long-term consumer value.
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