Dissertation Writing Services

Dissertation Creation Information

Free Dissertations

Dissertation Help

Visitor Resources

Other Services

Free Dissertations - Psychology Dissertations

Critically evaluate whether social psychology should aim for a more integrated approach

This essay first considers the historical development of social psychology and seeks therein possible causes of its present fragmentation and evidence as to whether this fragmentation has been a help or hindrance to the development of the subject. Alongside this historical development, the essay traces social psychology’s internal debate as to the nature of the its research: is it a natural science, a moral philosophy or a political science? Much of this fragmentation can be explained by such attempts of social psychologists to define the nature and scope of operation of their discipline, and one can infer from an analysis of social psychology’s self-consciousness whether its disparate fractions and groupings are healthy or divisive for its future research and development. The essay then considers various perspectives of social psychology and analyses the extent to which these competing perspectives have contributed to a negative or positive disintegration of the discipline. Finally, the essay considers three possible models and approaches to the unification of social psychology. These models raise fundamental philosophical and epistemological questions about the work of social psychology as well as prompting debate as to whether certain perspectives ought to be rejected outright so as to ensure future coherence for the discipline.


*

‘… specialization (in social psychology) is both to be expected and functional;
the sheer volume of empirical work makes it increasingly difficult to keep up
with the latest developments in all parts of the field. This reality encourages
researchers to concentrate in their careers in a specialized area of social
psychology, but not without a cost. Such specialization produces
fragmentation in the field; evidence of this can be found in all three areas of
social psychology.’
(Spears, 1999: p.62)

Russell Spears’ above words are quoted here at such length because they explain succinctly the dilemma central in the debate about greater integration in social psychology. On the one hand, specialization is part of the natural growth of all social sciences and it is necessary for ensuring the continuance of quality research and deepening knowledge within a subject. On the other hand, specialization produces disintegration and this in turn raises questions about the legitimacy and coherence of social psychology (Stone, 1981). Too many competing voices and too little cross-disciplinary understanding and dialogue rob the discipline of unity and give the appearance to outside observers that it lacks direction, purpose or meaning. Originally, the disunity of social psychology could be explained and perhaps justified by the eclectic nature of its founding. Social psychology did not emerge from the work of a single pioneer or from a specific group of researchers, but instead from a variety of diverse practitioners researching independently of one another (Spears, 1999). Integration at this early stage in social psychology’s history was inconceivable and unnecessary whilst the discipline sought to establish itself as a member of the social sciences and to set down its theoretical and practical principles. Nonetheless, now that social psychology has existed as a recognisable science for more than half a century, it distresses many social psychologists and outside observers that the discipline is still highly fragmented and lacking a central coherence or identity. The emergence of social psychology from an infant state into a mature science requires a corresponding consolidation of theory so as to bind the various and diverse voices and theories of the discipline together – thus providing internal stability, theoretical unity and future momentum.

Much of the present fragmentation of social psychology can be attributed to the nature of its historical development, and to the historical debate as to the theoretical and epistemological nature of the discipline. Social psychology did not spring from the mind of one individual or a closely-knit group of researchers, but from a generally felt perception amongst disparate and loosely connected psychologists and social scientists of the early twentieth century that it might be possible to infer from nature and her processes psychological theories about the social behaviour and organization mankind (Hollander, 1971). These ideas had been refereed to as early as the eighteenth century by political and social scientists such as John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) and Auguste Comte (1798-1857) (Hollander, 1971); nonetheless, it was not until around 1925 that empirical advances in sociology and psychology allowed larger numbers of psychologists and sociologists to begin to produce theories as to the psychological causes of the human social behaviour. Nonetheless, even when such theories started to emerge they came from eclectically distributed sources such as professors and academics working independently of each other in various international university departments and with very little dialogue between each other. These departments working in almost complete isolation from one another began to specialize in or favour one particular segment or theory of the emerging science of social psychology; accordingly these departments became entrenched with certain theoretical and practical viewpoints and their international identification with these viewpoints made inter-dialogue and inter-conversation with other social psychologists difficult and rare.

Moreover, even though by the 1960’s and 1970’s social psychologists were publishing research that was internationally recognised throughout the social sciences, nonetheless these publications were still the work of independent specialists without any central organization or structure and often still working largely in ignorance of the contributions to the field made by other social psychologists. Thus Marvin Shaw (Shaw & Costanza, 1970: p145) spoke of ‘an inherent lack of self-consciousness within the emerging discipline of social psychology’. In other words: unlike, for instance, early psycho-analysts like Jung, Freud and Adler who knew intimately each other’s research and who had a definite and mutual consciousness of the novelty and importance of their work, the early social psychologists lacked this intimate knowledge of other scientists’ ideas and thus had little or no consciousness of the emergence of a ‘discipline’ or ‘science’ of social psychology. Scholars of the history of social psychology argue that this initial lack of consciousness lingered and become increasingly protracted and ossified until reaching its present condition where it remains largely un-unified and disparately organized (Hollander, 1971).

Historically, the fragmentation of social psychology has also been increased by an internal and external debate as to whether the subject is a natural science, political science or moral philosophy. John Stuart Mill and Comte firmly believed that human social cognition and human social behaviour were proper material for empirical scientific investigation and could therefore be regarded as a natural science like any other. Many modern social psychologists (See Brown, 1986: p122-126) maintain this position arguing that the purpose of the social psychology is the empirical investigation of social behaviour as well as psychological workings related to social cognition, social groups and social behaviour. Social psychology uses qualitative methods (naturalistic observation, discourse analysis, participant observation etc.,) as well as quantitative methods (controlled experiments, mathematical models, surveys etc.,) to investigate the above phenomenon. For many social psychologists the legitimacy and integrity of the discipline depends upon the classification of social psychology as a natural science. Others though (Brown 1986: 130-133) argue that social psychology should properly be understood as a political science since its principal field of observation is the life of the polis and the daily inter-actions between human beings. Such arguments have rent social psychology into two opposing and the apparently contradictory halves. To a lesser extent, some social psychologists (Brown, 1986: p156-158) have tried frame the discipline in terms of a moral philosophy that derives moral principles within society based upon observation of cognitive and psychological processes. Opponents inside and outside of the discipline have accused such interpretations of being amorphous and scientifically weak; nonetheless, such opinions show further the depth of divisions as to identity within social psychology.

What then can we infer from this apparent ‘crisis of identity’? Above all it is clear that even if various specialities of research can be tolerated and sustained as a healthy diversity, nonetheless on the question of identity and perception it is vital that social psychologists convene to agree upon a unified and coherent description of the nature of the discipline itself. It is serious enough that critics of the social sciences assail the validity of the existence of social psychology, but to have such doubts or uncertainties from within is clearly detrimental for the advance and prosperity of social psychology. A clear statement needs to be made by the social psychology community of scholars and academics as to whether the discipline will present itself as a pure natural science in the vein of chemistry or physics, or whether it wants to be understood as a branch of political science. Until this question is resolved social psychology will remain centrally weak.

Further fragmentation arises from the plethora of different perspectives that are rife in social psychology. For instance: Reinforcement Theory teaches that social behaviour is determined by a complex system of rewards and punishments that condition human responses; Social Learning Theory in complete contrast maintains that human behaviour is based upon systems on observing and mimicking the world; Cognitive Theory ascribes central place in the causation of human behaviour to thinking, mental phenomena and choices that determine personal actions and attitudes; accordingly cognitive functions are seen to be the foundation for all social systems also. Discursive Psychology denies the ‘cognitive level’ proposed by cognitive theory and instead proposes that only limited and specific mental phenomena such as brain signals and language functions can be meaningfully used to construct theories of social behaviour; Evolutionary Theory grounds human behaviour in biological and physiological processes that are derived from the genetic transmission of information across several human generations (Hewitt, 2002).

As this long sentence shows, social psychology contains numerous perspectives on the aetiology of human behaviour, but many of these are in near total contradiction to one another. If it were the case that social psychology knew several different perspectives that complemented each other by highlighting different aspects of the causation of behaviour in society then this diversity could be welcomed as a sign of a healthy profusion of research; nonetheless, the present host of contradictory perspectives work to undermine the credibility of social psychology and to confirm the criticisms of sceptics that the discipline lacks clear direction, leadership or credibility as a true science. Clearly social psychology cannot keep all of the perspectives that live under its banner or the discipline will wilt under a ceaseless barrage of inner-contradictions; some perspectives must be cut away and others integrated into one another so as to provide a simpler and more coherent structure for both social psychologists themselves and for observers from the outside world.

*

Social psychologists have begun to realize in recent years that integration of competing perspectives must be achieved by selecting either a cognitive psychological model, an evolutionary psychological model and or a cohesive psychological model.

The future of the cognitive perspective appears to lie with a minutely detailed and specific analysis of the neural mechanisms that lay beneath social patterns and behaviour. This near molecular state of analysis is described by Fiske (1998) and centres upon the mental processes and information processing faculties used by individuals whilst making decisions within society. Researches into these questions and into the question of the mechanisms that lie beneath a person’s perception of Self have proved highly fruitful in the past two decades (Fiske, 1998). Interesting future research topics include questions as to how far cognitive incapacities affect a person’s attitude and biases in social decision-making. These may ultimately lead to a ‘machine code’ for cognitive phenomena and therefore to a unifying voice throughout the subject of social psychology (Smith, 1996).

A second perspective behind which social psychology might unite is that of evolutionary theory. The work of scholars such as Buss (1995) and Kenrick (1997) has shown that social psychological behaviour can be explained in terms of evolutionary and genetic rules. According to these principles the behaviour of personal relationships, gender considerations in sexual processes, aggression and attitude can be comprehensively explained by evolutionary principles. The many questions about the causes of differences between gender behaviour in society are potentially solved by evolutionary theory: for instance: the promiscuity of men in comparison with women, the psychological preoccupation of women with offspring, the natural aggressiveness of men.

Finally, the cohesive perspective is being championed by many social psychologists (Wicklund, 1992). This perspective arises out of frustration amongst social psychologists that attempts to base social psychology in neural passages or genetic history ignore vital ‘top down’ forces flowing from the social scene itself. As such, an essential social psychological strata of research rooted in the ‘here and now’ is neglected. Social psychologists such as Wicklund (1992, 1992b) argue that social psychology has borrowed too much from other disciplines in its evolutionary and cognitive models and must establish itself upon principles of a purely social psychological nature. Such a perspective must come to integrate social consciousness and theoretical perspectives on self-categorization processes; taken in union, these two areas present a ‘grand theory’ of the inter-connections between socially cognitive and emotional processes for explaining societal behaviour. Social psychology must likewise avoid a too rigid application of biological determinism or evolutionary theory that is borrowed from other disciplines (Tajfel, 1997). Social identity moreover must come to be understood as central to a person’s self-consciousness in relation to their participation in a social group and moreover the moral and emotional concomitants of this social identity must be better understood. Thus in Spears words ‘The social identity/self-categorization tradition provides us with a relatively simple but powerful theoretical framework for integrating and explaining a variety of psychological phenomena across the three areas of research’ (Spears,1997: p. 201). In specific instances, self-definition theory can be used to explain phenomena such as group formation, esteem maintenance, intra-psychic processes, crowd behaviour social stereotypes and so on. In short, by this cohesive perspective social psychology cuts for itself from the cloth of social sciences a perspective that is truly its own and not borrowed from elsewhere.

*

In the last analysis, it is evident to all conscientious social psychologists that the discipline must dispense with many of its competing perspectives and adopt a more integrated approach if it is to continue to produce high quality research and theory. Any such move towards integration regrettably means a loss of the rich pluralism that has been characteristic of the discipline to date; nonetheless, this loss must be undertaken for the sake of unity and cohesiveness. Social psychology as a young and emerging social science could afford to keep its eclectic and disparate groups; as a mature science it must produce a coherent set of principles and theory as well as a certain sense of self-consciousness. This is not to say that all social psychologists must always agree with each other about epistemological or other questions; it is to say that a common purpose and goal is needed to prevent the total disintegration and splintering of the discipline. This integration might be consolidated through either a cognitive, evolutionary or cohesive perspective; the later has the particular advantage of grounding social psychology upon purely social psychological principles and therefore fencing off a definite and separate area of investigation from the other social sciences.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Academic Books, Journals & Articles

-- Brown, R.W. (1986). Social Psychology. Collier Macmillan, London.

-- Buss, G. (1995). Evolution and Social Psychology. Horton Press, Dublin.

-- Costanza, P.R. & Shaw, M.E. (1982). Theories of Social Psychology. Mc-Graw Hill, London.

-- Fiske, M, Gilbert D.T. & Lindzey, G. (1998). The Handbook of Social Psychology. Oxford
University Press, Oxford.

-- Hewitt, J.P. (2002). Self and Society: A Symbolic Interactionist Social Psychology. Allyn &
Bacon, Boston.

-- Hollander, E.P. (1981). Methods and Principles of Social Psychology. Oxford University Press,
London.

-- Kenrick, P. (1997). Evolution in Social Psychology. Jameson, London.

-- Smith, A.P. (1996). The Machine Code in Social Psychology. Farmer Press, Bangor.

-- Spears, R. (1997). The Social Psychology of Stereotyping and Group Life. Blackwell’s, Oxford.

-- Spears, R. (1999). Social Identity. Blackwell’s, Oxford.

-- Stone, G.P. (1981). Social Psychology Through Symbolic Interaction. Wiley, London.

-- Tajfel, H. (1997). Introducing Social Psychology. Penguin, London.

-- The Oxford English Dictionary. (1989). Oxford University Press, Oxford.

-- The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge, London.

-- Wicklund, R.A. (1992). Symbolic Self-Completion. Hillsdale, London.

-- Wicklund, R.A. (1992b). The Self-Knower: A Hero Under Control. Plenum Press, London.