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What constitutes evidence in the study of politics and how is evidence used in political analysis?

As Lisa Harrison (2001:3) suggests, there has been a gradual trend in the study of politics away from the name of ‘political studies’ towards the more empirical sounding ‘political science’; a situation that reflects not only an ever more maturing discourse but an evolving methodology and a desire to distance the discipline from the everyday, as Harrison states, “chaotic” world of real world politics. In the light of such developments, this paper asks what exactly are we to take as evidence in political science and how can we best use it in analysis.

Some of the problems of defining evidence and data in political science are outlined by Burnham et al (2004); they cite that, in a democracy, whilst everyone is entitled to hold an opinion, “(t)hat does not, of course, mean that every opinion is equally valid or influential.” (Burnham et al, 2004: 2). Whilst anecdotal statements may form part of political debate they are generally not considered part of the corpus of evidence used in political science; mainly, we could assert, because they are uncorroborated, unrepeatable and without universal application, as Burnham et al state:

“Thus a college student may say to another, ‘My friend isn’t registering to vote because he thinks it’s pointless.’ One could not use this view as a basis for generalizations about voter registration rates among all American college students.” (Burnham et al, 2004: 2)

Commensurate with the notions of Marsh and Stoker (2004) political science can be split into a number of different epistemological positions each of which can be characterised by either ‘qualitative’ or ‘quantitative’ methodologies. The first of these denotes the collection of interpretive data from focus or discussion groups, polling interviews or observations; the latter describes the collection of empirical, mainly statistical data that is then used as the basis for a universalised generalisation (Marsh and Stoker, 2004: 11). As Marsh and Stoker point out, the choice of method is very often dictated by the epistemological foundations and assumptions of the research or researcher:

“Qualitative work is more obviously associated with interpretive or anti-foundational theories…Marxism would draw on different types of data depending on the question posed. Feminism would perhaps tend to favour qualitative data collection, although there are feminist political scientists who use quantitative data.” (Marsh and Stoker, 2004: 11)

Despite there being disparities and differences in approach, then, and aside from the variation in epistemological foundation, the notion of evidence in political science remains remarkably the same. Whether one is dealing with focus group observation or statistical analysis, evidence arises out of the various processes that ensure its rigidity and its value as a basis for hypothesis testing. Under this notion evidence is not so much an object for study as an outcome of the process of study, where data is determined, cross checked and sifted in the initial developmental stages as well as the collection stage. Lalman, Oppenheimer and Swistak (1993) sum up this complex situation succinctly when they assert that “science is not an answer so much as it is a method of obtaining answers” (Lalman, Oppenheimer and Swistak, 1993: 98).

This idea, of the notion of evidence being the outcome of the process of a scientific methodology rather than a specific research object, seeks to avoid the rather unsatisfying answer that evidence differs from method to method. Both Marsh and Stoker and Burnham et al suggest that evidence, for both quantitative and qualitative studies exists within the network of interconnected methodological checks and balances that should form the basis of a scientific study. In observations of focus groups, for instance, the ‘evidence’ is not contained so much within the observations themselves but in the selection of representative participants that form the basis of subsequent generalisations and hypothesis testing. In statistics, the ‘evidence’ is not so much in the bare figures but in the rigorous process of their collection and the inferences drawn from them.

The use of political evidence depends a great deal upon the methodology one is utilising, however, as with the definition of evidence itself, there are as many parities as there are differences. As Fiona Devine (2004) asserts, qualitative evidence very often manifests itself in ethnographic studies of opinion formation and socio-cultural patterns of behaviour; we could suggest that it is used to discern the reasons or the psycho-social meaning behind issues of polity – why voting patterns change (Devine, 2004: 198), for instance, or how a current government is being received in certain demographic sections.

Peter John (2004) gives us the opposing view, asserting that quantitative data is used in political science to chart large voting shifts over time or geographic area, as he states:

“Quantitative works rests on the observation and measurement of repeated incidences of apolitical phenomenon, such as voting for a political party, an allocation of resources by a government agency or citizen attitudes towards taxation and public spending.” (John, 2004: 232)

We can see here subtle differences in the way that evidence is used: on the one hand to discern the nature of large scale objects of research (voting patterns, broad public opinion, simple attitudinal studies etc) and, on the other, attempting to find the specificity behind these; extrapolating modes of behaviour through small, representative focus groups and participant observation.

As Marsh and Stoker so vehemently assert, the true nature of political science lies not so much in the singularity of its methodology as in the diversity. The true picture of the political situation rests somewhere in between the methods of description and the methods of quantification, between the large scale universals and the smaller representative groups; in this way political science can link the macro with the personal and explain the one through the other.

References

Burnham, P, Gilland, K, Grant, W and Layton-Henry, Z (2004), Research ethods in Politics, London: Palgrave.
Devine, F (2002), ‘Qualitative Methods’, published in Marsh, D and Stoker, G (eds), Theory and Methods in Political Science, London: Palgrave, pp.197-215.
Harrison, L (2001), Political Research: An Introduction, London: Routledge.
John, P (2002), ‘Quantitative Methods’, Marsh, D and Stoker, G (eds), Theory and Methods in Political Science, London: Palgrave, pp.216-230.
Lalman, D, Oppenheimer, J and Swistak, P (1993), ‘Formal Rational Choice Theory: A Cumulative Science of Politics’, published in Finifter, A (ed), Political Science: The State of the Discipline, Washington: American Political Science Association.
Marsh, D and Stoker, G (2002), ‘Introduction’, published in Marsh, D and Stoker, G (eds), Theory and Methods in Political Science, London: Palgrave, pp.1-16.

Further Reading

Barbour, R and Kitzinger, J (eds) (1998), Developing Focus Group Research: Politics, Theory and Practice, London: Sage.
Goodin, R and Klingmann, H.D (1998), A New Handbook of Political Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pennings, P, Keman, H and Kleinnijenhuis, J (2005), Doing Research in Political Science, London: Sage.
Van Evera, S (1997), Guide for Methods for Students of Political Science, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Yates, S (2003), Doing Social Research, London: Sage.

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